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WEBS OF RESISTANCE:
THE CITIZEN ONLINE JOURNALISM OF THE NIGERIAN DIGITAL DIASPORA

by

FAROOQ ADAMU KPEROGI

Under the Direction of Dr. Michael L. Bruner

ABSTRACT

The enhanced discursive opportunity structures that the Internet enables has inspired a
momentous revolution in the Nigerian media landscape. This dissertation chronicles the
emergence and flowering of the citizen and alternative online journalism of the Nigerian
diasporic public sphere located primarily in the United States. Using case-study research, it
profiles the major diasporan online citizen media outlets and highlights instances where these
geographically distant citizen media sites shaped and influenced both the national politics and
policies of the homeland and the media practices of the domestic media formation.
The study makes the case that while it is customary in the scholarship on sovereignty,
state-civil society relations, and diaspora studies to emphasize domination and one-

dimensionality in cultural flows, the participation of members of the Nigerian digital diaspora in
the politics and discourses of their homeland, from their exilic locations in the West through the
instrumentality of online citizen media, illustrates that citizens, especially in the age of the
Internet, are not mere powerless subjects and receivers of informational flows from the
institutions of the state and corporate mass media but can be active consumers and producers of
informational resources and even purveyors of political power in ways that amply exemplify
trans-local reciprocality.
It also argues that the Nigerian diaspora media might very well be a prototype of an
evolving, Internet-enabled, trans-local, and mutual informational and cultural exchange between
the educated deterritorialized ethnoscapes of peripheral nations whose exile in the West endues
them with symbolic and cultural capital and the private institutions and governments of their
homelands. The study recommends a comparative study of the online citizen journalism of Third
World virtual diasporas in the West.

INDEX WORDS: Alternative journalism, Alternative media, Citizen media, Deliberative
democracy, Diasporic media, Guerilla journalism, Nigeria, Nigerian journalism, Online
journalism, Public sphere
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CHAPTER ONE
1

INTRODUCTION
A momentous revolution is sweeping across Nigeria’s media landscape. Since 2005, the

dominance of the traditional media in the country is being challenged, and occasionally
supplanted, by an emergent, if as yet amorphous, diasporic online citizen journalism formation,
reversing time-honored notions of the contours of informational flows between diasporas and
homelands and the role of ordinary individuals in the transmission of information across
geographic and temporal boundaries. Ordinary Nigerians who are now permanently located in
America by virtue of voluntary geographical displacement have taken advantage of the enhanced
discursive opportunity structures that the Internet enables to set up citizen media sites that not
only serve as valuable vaults of information for many ordinary Nigerians and traditional
journalists back home but that also expose corruption in government and ethical infractions in
homeland media practice. The purveyors of this inchoate but nonetheless politically potent
diasporan online media have neither institutional support for their operations nor are they
affiliated with the state.
Hamid Mowlana has perceptively isolated three historically foremost vectors of crossborder informational flows: national governments, transnational corporations, and individuals. 1
However, as Karim H. Karim has aptly noted, the preponderance of international communication
and globalization scholarship over the years has tended to be disproportionately concerned with
the first two at the expense, sometimes to the exclusion, of the third. 2 Yet it is the case that

1

Hamid Mowlana, Global Information and World Communication 2nd edition (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997),
37.
2

Karim H. Karim, “From Ethnic Media to Global Media: Transnational Communication Networks
Among Diasporic Communities,” Economic and Social Research Council, Oxford University,
1998; accessed September 1, 2009 from http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/karim.pdf

2
individuals who operate outside the institutional structures of governments and corporations have
played significant roles in trans-border data flows. This fact is becoming even more salient with
the extraordinary expansion and reach of the Internet, which is enabling the emergence of a vast
multitude of what Latin American scholar Michel S. Laguerre has called “virtual diasporic public
spheres,” 3 or what Jennifer Brinkerhoff has called “digital diasporas.” 4
The progressively diminishing importance of the nation-state in the age of globalization,
what Arjun Appadurai controversially characterized as the imminence of the “end of the era of
the nation-state,” 5 is also bringing into bold relief the importance of non-state and non-corporate
actors in the new information age. As Appadurai observes, in place of nation-states,
“transnations” of diasporic communities play increasingly defining roles in shaping the structure
and substance of the processes of globalization. He argues that as electronic media “increasingly
link producers and audiences across national boundaries, and as these audiences themselves start
new conversations between those who move and those who stay, we find a growing number of
diasporic public spheres.” 6
More recently, Nancy Fraser has extended this notion of the emersion of ever more
politically and socially consequential but spatially dispersed non-state actors in the
contemporary, globalized epoch to account for the growth of public spheres that are
“transnational” in form and essence. Specifically, she uses the term to denote the profusion of

3

Michel S. Laguerre, “Homeland Political Crisis, the Virtual Diasporic Public Sphere, and Diasporic Politics,”
Journal of Latin American Anthropology, 10, (2008): 206 – 225.

4

Jennifer M. Brinkerhoff, Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009).

5

Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: The Cultural Dimensions of Globalizations (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1996), 18.
6

Ibid: 22.
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non-traditional communicative arenas for the articulation and mobilization of political willformations that “overflow the bounds of nations and states.” 7 These transnational diasporic
public spheres, as Janet Conway and Jakeet Singh have noted, may be “comprehensive publics,
counter-publics, weak publics or strong publics.” 8 Such conceptions extend Appadurai’s notion
of diasporic public spheres in one important respect: they free it from a narrow preoccupation
with the dynamics of the flows of migratory elites from the periphery to the core of the global
power structure and link it instead with the politics and discourses of transnational political willformation and mobilization by non-state actors.
What is missing, however, even in Fraser’s more sophisticated analysis of transnational
diasporic public spheres—and in the analysis of most scholars who study transnational diasporic
public spheres—is a recognition of the progressively central roles that the online media,
especially the citizen online media, of diasporic public spheres now play in the articulation and
mobilization of political will-formation across the bounds of nations and states. 9 Even scholars
who have studied the role of the Internet in the enablement of transnational public spheres have
generally failed to focus attention on the role of the Web-based citizen media of diasporic public
spheres. 10

7

Nancy Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and Efficacy of Public Opinion in a PostWestphalian World,” Theory, Culture & Society, 24 no. 4 (2007), 7.

8

Janet Conway and Jakeet Singh, “Is the World Social Forum a Transnational Public Sphere?: Nancy Fraser,
Critical Theory and the Containment of Radical Possibility,” Theory, Culture & Society, 26 no.5 (2009), 65.

9

See, for instance, Steve Vertovec, “Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism,” Ethnic and Racial Studies,
22 (1999): 447–62; J.A. Guidry, M.D. Kennedy and M.N. Zaid, Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture,
Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000); Bruce Becker and
Jason Wehner, “Electronic Networks and Civil Society: Reflections on Structural Changes in the Public Sphere,” in
Culture, Technology, Communication: Towards an International Global Village ed. Charles Ess (Albany, NY:
SUNY Press, 2001); and Karim H. Karim, “Mapping Diasporic Mediascapes,” in The Media of Diaspora ed. Karim.
H. Karim (London: Routledge Press, 2003).

10

For examples, see Bart Cammaerts and Leo Van Audenhove’s study of the role of the Internet in the enabling of a
transnational public sphere in a European context: Bart Cammaerts and Leo Van Audenhove, “Online Political
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In a related but slightly different context, Ulf Hannerz problematizes this deficiency as a
manifestation of the inadequacy of disciplinary conversation between migration and media
studies even though, as he points out, migration and mediatization “are continuously
intertwined.” 11 I would say, however, that what the lack in transnational public sphere
scholarship evinces is the inadequacy of disciplinary dialogue between the as yet embryonic but
nonetheless vibrant field of transnational online journalism research and the more theoretically
grounded area of public sphere theory. This study fills that void by studying how the citizen
online media of a peripheral but transnational virtual diasporic public sphere have functioned as
veritable sites for transformative trans-border informational and political intercourse between a
deterritorialized ethnoscape and the media and state institutions of its homeland.
Over the past eight years, the Nigerian diasporic public sphere has transcended media and
migration scholars’ notions of the concerns and preoccupations of deterritorialized
ethnoscapes. 12 During this period, we have seen the robust growth and flowering of Web-only,
citizen-generated, and sometimes alternative, diasporic Nigerian online news outlets that have
risen above the traditional thematic preoccupations of diasporic media. Such U.S.-based,
Nigerian-owned online news outlets as SaharaReporters.com, Pointblanknews.com,
ElenduReports.com, TimesofNigeria.com, Huhuonline.com, and Nigeriavillagesquare.com have
become rich sources of information for local Nigerian newspapers. They have also called
Debate, Unbounded Citizenship, and the Problematic Nature of a Transnational Public Sphere,” Political
Communication 22 (2005):179-196, and Victoria Bernal’s study of the same phenomenon in an African context.
Victoria Bernal, “Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination: The Eritrean Diaspora Online,” Global Networks
6.2 (2006): 161–179.
11

12

Ulf Hannerz, Transnational Connections: Cultures, People, Places (London: Routledge, 1996), 101.

Most scholars who study the media of diasporic public spheres often do no more than study the media
consumption patterns of migratory elites in their bid to reterritorialize in their host countries. See, for instance,
Karim H. Karim, ed., The Media of Diaspora: Mapping the Globe (London: Routledge, 2003) and Russell King and
Nancy Wood, eds., Media and Migration: Constructions of Mobility and Difference (London: Routledge, 2001).
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attention to acts of corruption in Nigeria and challenged abuse of power in ways the local media
are not equipped to do. This study specifically focuses on the six diasporic online media just
mentioned—which straddle the traditions of citizen and alternative journalism—and evaluates
their impact on the politics and journalistic practices in Nigeria. This is done through archival,
documentary, and observational evidence.
Although it is customary for some scholars to conflate citizen media and alternative
media, I distinguish them in this study and apply this distinction to my objects of inquiry. 13 In
the new media literature, as we will see in more detail in Chapter Two, citizen journalism is
conceptualized as online “news content produced by ordinary citizens with no formal journalism
training.” 14 It needs to be noted, though, that this definition does not preclude people with formal
journalism training who partake in non-professionalized, user-generated news-gathering and
dissemination practices. Alternative journalism, on the other hand, is not merely nonprofessionalized and non-institutionalized journalism produced by ordinary citizens; it is also
purposively counter-hegemonic and “closely wedded to notions of social responsibility,
replacing an ideology of ‘objectivity’ with overt advocacy and oppositional practices.” 15 While
citizen journalism (at least the way the term is widely understood in new media scholarship) is
enabled solely by the emergence of the Internet, alternative journalism preceded the Internet.
And while all online alternative media, to the extent that they are products of the journalism by
ordinary citizens outside institutional and professional structures, are citizen media, not all
citizen media are alternative media. To be alternative media, citizen media have to be expressly
13

See, for instance, Clemencia Rodriguez’s Fissures in the Mediascape: An International Study of Citizens’ Media
(Cresskill, NJ: Hampton, 2001).
14

Kristen A. Johnson and Susan Wiedenback, “Enhancing Perceived Credibility of Citizen Journalism Web Sites,”
Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 86 no. 2 (2009), 333.

15

Chris Atton, “What is ‘Alternative’ Journalism?” Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism 4 (2003): 26.

6
oppositional and actuated by a progressive, emancipatory political agenda. 16 Since all the six
online media selected for this study are run by ordinary diasporan Nigerian citizens who are not
affiliated with any professional news organization, they qualify as citizen media. But not all of
them are alternative media because they are not all explicitly political and counter-hegemonic in
their reportorial temperaments, as chapters four, five and six show.
As subsequent sections of this study reveal, however, these categories are not neat,
unchanging, and invariably mutually exclusive. News sites that began as alternative media can
transmute to being ordinary citizen media, and profit-driven citizen media can occasionally
exhibit the characteristics of alternative media. What is not in doubt, though, is that the Nigerian
diasporan online news media, whether they are merely citizen or alternative media, have
dramatically altered the journalistic landscape in Nigeria and have caused major shifts in
homeland state policies in unexampled ways.

1.1

Significance of the Study

The primary reason this study is necessary is because the emergence of Nigeria-focused
diasporan online citizen media has not only broadened the breadth and diversity of informational
resources for Nigerians both at home and in the diaspora, it has also inaugurated a sometimes
noticeably hostile and at other times ambivalent relationship between traditional, mainstream
media practitioners in Nigeria and the plethora of exilic online citizen journalists who
increasingly seem to be building their legitimacy on the strength of their capacity to undermine
the credibility of traditional journalists in the homeland. Diaspora citizen journalists also have
16

Alternative media researchers traditionally evaluate the “alternativeness” of media by the extent to which the
media emphasize political versus cultural news, offer critiques of capitalism, and mobilize the citizenry for action in
their news reports. See Rodney Benson, “Commercialism and Critique: California Alternative Weeklies,” in
Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World ed. Nick Couldry and James Curran (Lanham,
MO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).
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easy access to news sources and privileged newsgathering practices that have sometimes put
traditional Nigerian journalists to shame. Similarly, the citizen online media of the Nigerian
diasporic public sphere has lately been at the vanguard of instigating politically consequential
discourses that have had and continue to have far-reaching implications for politics and
governance in the homeland. An indication of the ever-increasing importance of the sometimes
adversarial online citizen journalism of the Nigerian diasporic public sphere is the growing
tensile relationship between critical online citizen journalists in the diaspora and the Nigerian
government, a relationship that has led to the high-profile arrests of a number of diasporan online
journalists who had cause to travel to the homeland for routine business. 17
No scholarly work has captured this burgeoning phenomenon of diasporic citizen online
media simultaneously changing and challenging the practice of corporate, institutional
journalism and dramatically influencing the state policies of a far-flung homeland, or other
dimensions of the emerging hallmarks of the transnational citizen online journalism of the
Nigerian diaspora in the West. If Nancy Fraser is correct that a transnational public sphere is
defined by its capacity “to be a vehicle for mobilizing public opinion as a political force [and by
its capacity to] empower the citizenry vis-à-vis private powers and permit it to exercise
influence over the state,” then the non-corporate, non-professional online citizen and alternative
media of geographically displaced but politically and socially consequential Nigerian exiles in
the West undoubtedly qualify as a veritable transnational diasporic public sphere and are

17

See, for example, BBC News, “News Blogger Detained in Nigeria,” accessed September 11, 2009 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7686119.stm; Committee to Protect Journalists, “Second U.S.-based Nigerian
Blogger Held,” Oct. 31, 2008 [accessed September 11, 2009 from http://cpj.org/2008/10/second-us-based-nigerianblogger-held.php]. Also see Sahara Reporters, “Federal Court Declares the arrest and detention of US-based Blogger
Emmanuel Asiwe Illegal,” February 3, 2009 [ accessed September 11, 2009 from
http://www.saharareporters.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=663%3Afederal-court-declaresthe-arrest-and-detention-of-us-based-blogger-emmanuel-asiwe-illegal&catid=1%3Alatestnews&Itemid=18&showall=1.
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therefore worthy of a careful scholarly study. 18 These newfangled Nigerian diaspora media
might very well be the prototype of an evolving, Internet-enabled, trans-local, and mutual
informational and cultural exchange between the educated deterritorialized ethnoscapes of
peripheral nations whose exile in the West endues them with symbolic and cultural capital and
the private institutions and governments of their homelands.
It was Debra Spitulnik who first called attention to how what she calls “small media” in
Africa (by which she means alternative, citizen discursive spaces that ordinary individuals and
small groups can be in command of, such as the Internet, cassettes, and so on) can function as
“vital and pervasive undercurrents and reservoirs of political commentary, and potential
mobilization.”19 Courtesy of the dizzying ease of cross-border data flow, made even easier by the
phenomenal expansion of hitherto restricted Internet and mobile phone technology on the
African continent, 20 only a few years after her essay appeared, what she identified as a
probability is materializing in ways that likely exceed her prognostications.
The argument of this study, therefore, is that while it is customary in the scholarship on
sovereignty, state-civil society relations, and diaspora studies to emphasize domination and onedimensionality in cultural flows, 21 the participation of members of the Nigerian digital diaspora
in the politics and discourses of their homeland, from their exilic locations in the West through
18

Fraser, “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere:”7.

19

Debra Spitulnik, “Alternative Small Media and Communicative Spaces,” in Media and Democracy in Africa ed.
Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie and Folu F. Ogundimu, New Brunswick:Transaction Publishers, 2002, 179.
20

Bjørn Furuholt and Stein Kristiansen, “Internet Cafés in Asia and Africa: Venues for Education and Learning?”
The Journal of Community Informatics, 3 no. 2 (2007):1-12; Peter A. Kwakwu Kyem and Peter Kewku LeMaire,
“Transforming Recent Gains in the Digital Divide into Digital Opportunities: Africa and the Boom in Mobile Phone
Subscription,” The Electronic Journal on Information Systems in Developing Countries, 28 no. 5 (2006):1-16.
21

See, for example, Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 1988); Thomas B. Hansen and Finn Stepputat, Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in
the Postcolonial World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Achille Mbembe, “Necropolitics,”
Public Culture, 15 (2003): 11–40.

9
the instrumentality of online citizen media, illustrates that “citizens,” especially in the age of the
Internet, are not mere powerless subjects and receivers of informational flows from the
institutions of the state and corporate mass media but can be active consumers and producers of
informational resources and even purveyors of political power in ways that amply exemplify
trans-local reciprocality.
This study will be the first to systematically chronicle and explore the rising power,
through the instrumentality of online citizen media, of the digital public sphere of a previously
politically disempowered diaspora in the West. Traditionally, diasporans, because of what
Brinkerhof called their “hybrid identities,” had always been comparatively politically
inconsequential in the politics of their homeland. 22 In particular, their media use patterns had
consisted in (and in most other contexts still consist in) the consumption of news from the
homeland rather than participation in the generation and reporting of news from, about, and for
the homeland. Historically, where vibrant diaspora media existed, their creators and consumers
did little more than deploy them mostly to negotiate their identities as voluntary and involuntary
exiles, promote solidarity, and nurture collective national memories that were often sanctified by
nostalgia and the desire to suture the ruptures that so readily emerge in a state of uprootedness
that is concomitant with geographic displacement to new socio-cultural habitats, what Arif Dirlik
has called the “mournful discourses of marginalized diasporics.” 23 The media were never used as
instruments to change homeland state policies, or as reservoirs of information for citizens back
“home,” or as tools for political mobilization.
22

23

Brinkerhoff, Digital Diasporas: 2.

Arif Dirlik, “Intimate Others: [Private] Nations and Diasporas in an Age of Globalization,” Inter-Asia Cultural
Studies, 5 no. 3 (2004), 496. Also Andreea D. Ritivoi’s Yesterday's Self: Nostalgia and the Immigrant Identity
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002) offers an interesting and incisive exploration of the intersections
among nostalgia, identity, and the immigrant experience.

10
The online citizen media of the Nigerian diasporic public sphere have transcended these
time-honored structural hallmarks of diaspora media in ways that seem to have no parallel as yet.
This study, therefore, makes important contributions to the existing literature on critical diaspora
discourse. It illustrates, through the diasporic alternative and citizen journalism of the Nigerian
digital public sphere, that, in the process of deterritorialzation, societies of departure and arrival
are inextricably interlinked in the delineation of human motions, which is characterized not “by
linear and unidirectional motions…but by ‘circulations’ of peoples and commodities that are in
the process of creating new spaces….” 24
This study is also significant because it captures, on a transnational scale, the nascent
ambivalent relationship between citizen journalism and institutional journalistic practices. The
extant literature on the consequences of the proliferation of citizen media on traditional
journalistic practices is almost exclusively preoccupied with the experiences of the more
advanced parts of the world; it does not capture the singularities of peripheral, transitional
nations like Nigeria where the Internet is only just becoming demotic, where the tension between
traditional and online journalism is assuming unpredictably unique forms every moment, and
where alternative and/or citizen online journalism imposes on itself the simultaneous task of
fighting corrupt governments and an equally corrupt, co-opted traditional, mainstream media in
the homeland. 25
By tracing the evolution of the citizen journalism of the Nigerian digital diaspora,
exploring its variegated manifestations and forms, capturing the relational and professional
24

25

Dirlik, “Intimate Others: ”, 495.

For scholarly works on the tensions between citizen journalism and the traditional media in the West, see Neil
Thurnan, “Forums for Citizen Journalists? Adoption of User Generated Content Initiatives by Online News Media,”
New Media & Society, 10 no.1 (2008):139–157; Donald Matheson, “Weblogs and the Epistemology of the News:
Some Trends in Online Journalism,” New Media & Society 6 no.4 (2004): 443–68; Neil Thurman and Susan Jones,
“From Nexus to Newslog: Online Journalism from the Grassroots,” in Print Journalism: A Critical Introduction ed.
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tensions between online citizen journalists in the diaspora and traditional journalists in the
homeland, and showing how all this has altered journalistic practice and statecraft in Nigeria, this
study makes original contributions to the scholarship not only on the tension between online and
traditional journalism but also on the reconfigurations of the loci of political and symbolic power
that are taking place in the age of globalization and the Internet. It therefore joins and advances
disciplinary conversations in media and migration studies, online journalism, and public sphere
theory.
It also contributes to the body of work on the notion of “resistance” in critical media
theory and cultural studies. For instance, it explores such questions as: How much “resistance” (a
subject-matter with which cultural studies has been preoccupied) can Web-based alternative
media that are compelled to survive by attracting advertisements put up to the system they
purport to fight? Cultural studies scholars, in their bid to reverse the disabling cynicism of much
of the Frankfurt School, have been obsessed with investigating instances of “resistance” to the
power structure by citizens at the lower end of the social scale. As Thomas Frank satirically has
noted, in echoes of Meaghan Morris’ apt observation of the tendency of cultural studies scholars
to read rebellion in every banal form of pop culture consumption,
Their books teem with stories of aesthetic hierarchies rudely overturned; with subversive
shoppers dauntlessly using up the mall’s air conditioning; with heroic fans building their
workers’ paradise right there in the Star Trek corpus; with rebellious readers of women’s
fashion magazines symbolically smashing the state. 26
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He was ridiculing such cultural studies scholars as John Fiske who aver that the capacity for
“oppositional” readings of media texts is evidence of “resistance” to cultural hegemony. 27
However, as Douglas Kellner has argued, such “oppositional” readings occur at no cost to the
reader and certainly without any consequence to the capitalist hegemony it is supposed to be
“resisting.” It is merely a weak struggle for “meaning” and “pleasure.” 28 So where might
resistance lie in the emerging forms of Web-based alternative citizen media, or what Chris Atton
has called “radical online journalism”? 29
Similarly, this study complicates traditional notions of media imperialism and advances
the conversation about media flows in international communication scholarship. The concept of
media imperialism has dominated scholarship in international communication for decades. The
argument of scholars who propounded the theory of media imperialism is that the flow of
cultural goods across the world is disproportionately skewed in favor of countries in the West,
which are at the core of the world system, and to the disadvantage of countries in the Third
World, which are at the periphery of the global system. The early proponents of this theory,
interestingly, are American scholars whose geographic and cultural realities put them at the core
of the world system. 30 Writing in the 1970s, Herbert Schiller pointed out, for instance, that 65
percent of the world’s news and cultural products originated in the United States, a reality that
27
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condemned the rest of the world to being consumers of American media and cultural products. 31
Wilbur Schramm also pointed out that the uneven distribution of mass media in the world has
meant that the realities of the peoples of the Third World are either ignored or distorted by the
dominant Western media. 32
Over the last few decades, however, fresh theoretical insights into the nature of global
flows have challenged the accuracy of the media imperialism paradigm. One such insight is the
theory of contra-flows, which shifts scholarly attention to instances of the subversion of the
dominant conception of global flows. Appadurai, for instance, calls attention to the fact that
globalization has not necessarily translated into the homogenization of the world or, for that
matter, the Westernization of non-Western societies. What has happened, he says, is that in
cultural and informational flow, the global often fuses with the local to produce the “glocal.” 33
As Daya Thussu points out, “The global (which in essence means Western or more accurately
American) offering interacts with the national and the local in ways that produce often
hybridized, ‘glocal’ media products, hallmark of a postmodern cultural sensitivity.” 34 This
reconsideration of the nature of global flows has given rise to the concept of “contra-flows.”
In his essay, “Mapping Global Media Flow and Contra-Flow,” Thussu develops a
typology that divides the main media flows in the world into three categories: global,
transnational and geo-cultural. He draws a distinction between what he calls the “dominant
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flows,” which spring forth from the global North, and the “subaltern flows,” which he defines as
“contra-flows originating from the erstwhile peripheries of global media industries.” 35 This is
similar to Straubhaar’s asymmetrical interdependence thesis, within the context of a developing
bifurcation in global cultural interchange between the “global popular” in movie production and
“glocalization” in television production. 36
The notion of contra-flows has become popular and can even be said to have achieved a
position of dominance in international communication scholarship. As a result, the perception of
a unidirectional flow of informational and cultural goods from the Western “core” to the Third
World “periphery” has been contested by many scholars who insist that global flows are
inherently multi-directional. 37 Such scholars theorize globalization as a force that animates—or
at least has the potential to animate—ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic resistance to the
homogenizing and imperialistic tendencies of the Western media and the neoliberal gospel of
their owners. Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi, for instance, points out that popular notions of
Western cultural and media imperialism blur the intricate and mutually reinforcing nature of
interaction over centuries between diverse and progressively more hybridized cultures. 38
Similarly, Anthony Giddens, among others, points to the phenomenon of inverse
colonization instantiated by the proliferation of alternative loci of cultural influence in the
35
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periphery and, in fact, the increasing exportation of this influence to the core, such as the export
of Brazilian television programs to Portugal, its ex-colonial overlord, and the “Hispanicization”
of southern California. 39 More generally, it is argued, global media enterprises have been forced
to adapt to local cultures and to link up with local partners in order to sustain their expansion.
The identity of diasporic communities, it is argued, can also now be nourished not only through
treasured postcards and the evanescent recollections of grandparents but through daily media
feeds that sustain endangered ethnic minority identities. 40
The emergence, popularity, and ubiquity of the Internet have further complicated this
process. Although the wealthiest nations of the world still have an edge in access to the Internet,
the nature of the Internet has helped to dramatically complicate informational flows. Information
from “peripheral” countries is getting to “core” countries at a higher volume—and at a faster
rate—than was ever thought possible. This has enabled coalition building between people who
are vastly physically separated.
This study takes off from these interventions about the perpetually kaleidoscopic nature
of informational and cultural flows in the age of globalization, but departs from them and
advances their application to the changing face and phase of global news flow in ways that
account for what I call Western diaspora media cultural capital. Although the media flow that I
investigate is still geographically from the West, it is initiated by people who have been
territorially displaced from the periphery to the core by the forces of globalization and who have
not only internalized a Western journalistic ethos but have tremendous access to information that
is not available to their counterparts in the homeland.
39
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In this study I argue, therefore, that territorial displacement in the emerging global age
does not simply alienate; it also invests people with the social and cultural capital to exert
influence in the domestic public sphere from which they are uprooted in ways that complicate
and dramatize the antinomies between diasporic public spheres and the national politics of
nation-states. This reality has profound implications for the ways we theorize globalization,
media flows, and media imperialism.
It is obvious from the foregoing that citizen journalism on the Internet constitutes the
fulcrum around which this changing phase of transnational news flows revolves and that is what
this study is concerned with. In order to empirically map and situate the evolution, rise,
significance and impact of Nigerian diasporan online citizen journalism we need a set of
questions to undergird our investigation. The following six research questions have been
formulated to guide this study. A methodology and study design based on these questions follow.

1.2

Research Questions
1. How have the online citizen and alternative media of the Nigerian diaspora influenced
traditional journalistic practices in Nigeria?
2. How and why have online citizen and alternative media of the Nigerian diaspora
caused the Nigerian government to change state policies?
3. How and why did online citizen news media emerge in the Nigerian digital diaspora
with their current characteristics?
4. How have the online media of the Nigerian digital diaspora disrupted traditional
notions of news flows between the media of the homeland and the people in the
diaspora?
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5. What dominant influences—such as advertising, political affiliations, emancipatory
politics, etc—actuate the citizen journalism of the Nigerian diaspora?
6. How might the journalistic practices of the Nigerian diaspora complicate notions of
citizen and alternative journalism?

1.3

Methodology

In light of the above research questions, the method found to be best suited to study the impact
and consequences of the online citizen journalism of the Nigerian virtual diasporic public sphere
is the in-depth case-study research method, which has variously been defined as the “detailed
examination” of either a single example or multiple examples of a class of social phenomena, 41
“a research strategy which focuses on understanding the dynamics present within single
settings,” 42 the in-depth study of the “particularity and complexity of a single case” 43 where the
researcher “emphasizes episodes of nuance, the sequentiality of happenings in context, the
wholeness of the individual.” 44 Most importantly, it has been explicated as a research technique
that is “especially appropriate in new topic areas” 45or, as Izak Benbasat and his colleagues put it,
where research and theory are at their early formative stages” 46 such as this study, which
investigates a phenomenon that is not yet captured in the scholarly literature. However, as Robert
41
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Stake cautions, “not everything is a case.” A case, he says, is a bounded, integrated system,
which may be consciously goal-directed. “The parts do not have to be working well, the
purposes may be irrational, but it is a system.” 47
According to Robert Yin, one of the leading case-study research methodologists, the
appropriateness of the method is determined to a large degree by the nature of the researcher’s
research questions, the extent of depth required in laying bare the particular social phenomenon
the researcher investigates, and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical
events. The more researchers seek to make sense of a contemporary social phenomenon,
especially “how” and “why” a social phenomenon exists, and the more they have a need to do an
extensive “in-depth” description of a social phenomenon, the more that the case study will be
relevant. 48 Since this study investigates an ongoing social phenomenon (the impact and
consequences of the citizen journalism of the Nigerian digital diaspora) about which nothing has
been done in the past and which therefore requires a detailed description, the case study approach
is appropriate.
An additional advantage that redounds to the appropriateness of the method for this study
is that it lends itself to triangulation. Case studies, Eisenhardt points out, in general, coalesce
such data collection methods as archives, interviews, questionnaires, and observations. 49 As Yin
observes,
The case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, but when the relevant
behaviors cannot be manipulated. The case study relies on many of the same techniques
as a history, but it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the historian’s
repertoire: direct observation of the events being studied and interviews of the persons
involved in the events. Again, although case studies and histories can overlap, the case
47
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study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence—documents,
artifacts, interviews, and observations—beyond what might be available in a
conventional historical study [emphasis mine]. 50
What is obvious from the above passage is that six sources of evidence are central to case-study
research: documents (letters, agendas, progress reports), archival records (past news reports, and
so on), interviews (typically open-ended, but also focused, structured), direct observations
(which can either be formal or casual or both), and physical artifacts. Since this study explores a
complex, multifaceted, and evolving social phenomenon, it lends itself to the kind of mixedmethod approach to scholarly inquiry that Yin says the case study research method allows.
This latitude has allowed me to study the historical background of the citizen online
journalism of the Nigerian digital diaspora, to utilize information I gather from my participant
observation of the phenomenon I am studying, to explore and analyze archives of both the online
diaspora media and the print and online editions of Nigerian newspapers that this study
investigates, and to reconstruct and interpret what Yin calls the “interviews of the persons
involved” in the events that the case studies highlight. This last point is particularly important
because I did not directly interview the persons involved in the events of this study because of
the near impossibility of getting IRB approval for research subjects that are located outside the
United States. 51 Fortunately, the key figures involved in the phenomenon that this study
investigates have given interviews to newspapers and online outlets on various aspects of their
activities, which have sufficed to answer some of this study’s research questions. That is why
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Yin’s phrasing of case study interviews is noteworthy here. It does not have to be interviews with
the persons involved to be valid; it can also be interviews of the persons involved.
The case study as a method has over the years achieved a position of respectability in
social science research, although it had been dogged by many misconceptions. 52 Some of the
misconceptions about case study research from an early stage (some of which endure till today)
are that the method is best suited only for the exploratory (and not descriptive or explanatory)
phase of research; that it is too context-dependent; that it is subjective and gives too much
interpretive latitude to the researcher; that its findings are not generalizable; and that it often
encompasses a considerable element of narrative, which is not reducible to “neat scientific
formulae, general propositions, and theories.” 53 But as many case study methodologists have
pointed out, these misconceptions are a consequence of an inadequate appreciation of the
meaning and intent of case-study research. For instance, Bent Flyvbjerg points out, in defense of
case-study research, that predictive theories and universals cannot be found in any study of
human affairs and that formal generalization is often “considerably overrated as the main source
of scientific progress.” 54 Perhaps the most comprehensive defense against the charge of the lack
of predictive validity of case-study research is provided by Campbell in the following passage:
In a case study done by an expert social scientist who has thorough local acquaintance,
the theory he uses to explain the focal difference also generates predictions or
expectations on dozens of other aspects of culture, and he does not retain the theory
unless most of these are also confirmed…. Experiences of social scientists confirm this.
Even in a single qualitative case study, the conscientious social scientist often finds no
explanation that seems satisfactory. Such an outcome would be impossible if the
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caricature of the single case study…were correct—there would instead be a surfeit of
subjectively compelling explanations. 55
The experiences encapsulated in the above passage show that it is falsification, not verification,
that is the most important hallmark of the case study. Besides, since all human research is
amenable to subjectivism of some sort, it is impractical to suppose that it can be eliminated in
case-study research. However, to increase the generalizability of case-study research,
methodologists have suggested that circumspection be exercised in the choice of cases to isolate
and study. 56 There are broadly six kinds of samples and cases in case-study research. They are
random selection, information-oriented selection, extreme/deviant cases, maximum variation
cases, critical cases and paradigmatic cases. 57
The type of cases researchers choose in order to illuminate their subject of inquiry is
often determined by the purpose of the selection. Researchers concerned with avoiding
systematic bias in their sample size choose random selection, although in case study research
case selection is less about statistical sampling than it is about theoretical sampling. But
researchers who seek only to generalize for specially selected subgroups choose random
sampling. Where researchers want to maximize and generate the widest possible range of
information from small, single cases they do an information-oriented selection. Extreme cases
are useful in instances where the researcher wants to highlight a phenomenon through a dramatic
example. Popular and oft-cited examples of this, according to Flyvbjerg, are such case studies as
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Foucault’s “Panopticon” and Freud’s “Wolf Man.” 58 A critical case is one that has a strategic
importance in relation to the general problem a researcher studies. It is the kind of case that
permits the researcher the latitude to make such logical deductions as “If this is (not) valid for
this case, then it applies to all (no) cases.” 59 Although there are no universally accepted
methodological principles to isolate critical cases, it is a “good idea to look for either ‘most
likely’ or ‘least likely’ cases, that is, cases likely to either clearly confirm or irrefutably falsify
propositions and hypothesis.” 60
The last strategy for the selection of cases is choice of the paradigmatic case.
Paradigmatic cases draw attention to “exemplars,” to prototypes, to instances that bring a
particular social phenomenon into bold relief. As Eisenhardt has noted, there is considerable
overlap among the case selections discussed above, especially among critical, extreme, and
paradigmatic cases. Because cases are chosen “for theoretical, not statistical, reasons,” more
often than not, a case can be all of the three at the same time. 61 Foucault’s “Panopticon,” for
instance, is simultaneously a critical, extreme, and paradigmatic case. In the next section, I show
which kinds of cases I have chosen for this study and my justification for choosing them.

1.4

The Design of the Study

As Peter Darke and his colleagues have noted, “designing and scoping a case study research
project in order to ensure that the research question (or research questions) can be appropriate
and adequately answered can be difficult, and data collection for case study research can be time58
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consuming and tedious, and often results in the accumulation of large amounts of data.” 62 These
difficulties can be overcome or minimized, however, if the researcher has a well-defined unit or
units of analysis, has isolated types and number of cases to study and analyze, and has developed
a general data analysis strategy that “will indicate what to analyze and why, and will help ensure
that data collection activities are appropriate and support the ways in which the evidence is to be
analyzed.” 63 Based on the foregoing, I conducted the following study design.
The primary units of analysis for this study are the archives of six prominent Nigerian
online diasporan citizen media, well-known professionally run traditional newspapers in Nigeria,
interviews given by Nigerian diasporan citizen journalists in Nigerian newspapers and in online
outlets, and opinion articles and commentaries about the phenomenon this study is investigating
in both the print editions of selected Nigerian newspapers and in the archives of popular Nigerian
online discussion forums. This was complemented with my observation of the citizen and
alternative journalism of the Nigerian diaspora and my in-depth experiential familiarity with the
background of the study. I am a former newspaper editor and write two weekly columns for
different Nigerian newspapers. I am also an active participant in the discourses of the Nigerian
cyber-sphere. Thus, extensive newspaper documentation, archival, documentary and
observational evidence constitute the core of the data with which I answered the study’s research
questions. As Yin has noted, the best case studies are those that deploy multiple sources of
evidence. “The use of multiple sources of evidence in case studies allows an investigator to
address a broader range of historical and behavioral issues. However, the most important
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advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence is the development of converging
lines of inquiry, a process of triangulation and corroboration…” [emphasis original]. 64
The diasporan online citizen media analyzed in this study are Nigeriavillagesquare.com,
ElenduReports.com, SaharaReporters.com, TimesofNigeria.com, Pointblanknews.com, and
Huhuonline.com. These U.S.-based Web-online citizen media are by far the most popular and
the most effective diasporan media that not only serve as alternative sources of information for
Nigerians at home and in the diaspora, and therefore function as counterweights to the traditional
print media in Nigeria, but that have served and continue to serve as vigorous arenas for political
mobilization against repressive homeland state policies. The earliest of them—
Nigeriavillagesquare.com—emerged in 2003, and the last of them—Huhuonline.com and
Pointblanknews.com—came to the scene in 2007. All of them have fully functional archives of
their past stories and of their discussion boards that served as some of the primary texts for this
study.
Since this project is interested in exploring the impact and consequences of the online
journalism of these diasporan online media on the traditional, mainstream, institutional media in
Nigeria, newspapers and weekly newsmagazine are randomly analyzed as well. They are Daily
Trust, Vanguard, Nigerian Tribune, Punch, Leadership, Guardian and The News. Although
Nigeria has a “large number of newspapers and magazines,” these seven are chosen because of
their strategic importance, prestige, influence, and vast national reach. 65 The Guardian is
Nigeria’s most influential newspaper, the Punch its most widely read paper, the Nigerian
Tribune its oldest surviving paper and southwest Nigeria’s most influential newspaper, the Daily
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Trust is northern Nigeria’s most influential paper and one of the nation’s most prestigious, and
the Vanguard has a reputation as the nation’s paper of record. The Leadership is an influential,
up-and-coming newspaper headquartered in the nation’s capital, and the The News is far and
above the country’s most popular and most influential weekly newsmagazine; it has the
distinction of inaugurating an insurgent genre of media practice called “guerilla journalism,”
which was designed to fight military totalitarianism in Nigeria in the 1990s. 66 Its evening
publication, called PM News, was also analyzed.
The selection of newspapers also achieves some geographical balance: four of the
publications—Guardian, Punch, Vanguard and the The News—are published in Lagos, Nigeria’s
media capital and commercial nerve center, and two of them—Daily Trust and Leadership—are
published in Abuja which, though the nation’s capital, is geographically in northern Nigeria. The
Nigerian Tribune is published in Ibadan, the political headquarters of southwest Nigeria. But,
most importantly, all the publications are circulated and read nationally.
This study will not look at the broadcast media because in Nigeria the broadcast media
are, for the most part, state-run, are deeply distrusted by the Nigerian public, and are additionally
not influential sources of mass communication. Although newspapers are in danger of
disappearing, at least in their present form, in the West, 67 they are “still the most iconic outlet for
news and other types of written communication” in Nigeria. 68 It is precisely because they are the
most reliable vaults of historical records, the most readily accessible chronicles of contemporary
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national events and memories, and the most dominant form of mass communication for the
educated elite in the country that they have been chosen for the evaluation of the impact of the
citizen and alternative online journalism of the Nigerian digital diasporic public sphere in the
homeland. They are also the media best suited for examining the reactions of Nigerian public
officials to the acts of political will-formation and mobilization by the Nigerian digital diaspora
through their citizen journalism.
The observational data for this study was gathered from my own extensive immersion in
Nigerian online discussion groups, my relations with some U.S.-based citizen journalists, 69 and
my intimate familiarity with the traditional Nigerian press with which I have been associated for
many years. This background situated and inflected my interpretation of the documentary and
archival evidence that I gathered from examining the citizen online media and homeland
newspapers selected for this study. As Yin points out, the case-study investigator “must have a
firm grasp of the issues being studied, even if in an exploratory mode. Such a grasp reduces the
relevant events and information to be sought to manageable proportions.” 70
For data analysis, the analytic choice of this study is a multiple-case approach that
identified and isolated cases that answer the study’s research questions. In order to draw
attention to data that have strategic importance, that offer dramatic examples, and that are
prototypic, the case selections encompass those that meet the criteria to be simultaneously
adjudged critical, extreme, and paradigmatic; they were not guided by the requirements of
representativeness of samples since, according to Eisenhardt, qualitative case study research is
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not about statistical sampling but rather theoretical sampling, or what he calls “theoretically
useful cases… that replicate or extend theory by filling conceptual categories.” 71
In light of this, the case selections I deployed for data analysis are those that highlight
major instances where Nigerian diaspora online media broke sensitive stories that not only made
it to the pages of Nigerian newspapers but that also caused federal and state governments to react
officially or that caused them to change state policies. The case selection began from 2005, when
Nigerian diasporan online news media started to be taken seriously, and end in the early part of
2011. I also explored the history of the diasporan citizen media sites, paying close attention to
the personalities associated with them, the highs and lows in their evolution, stories that defined
their character, controversies that trailed them, and the financial and political pressures they
contended with in the course of their existence. These profiles in themselves constitute case
studies.
In order to build the internal validity of the cases that were selected for the study, I did a
cross-case pattern search, using divergent techniques, to show the “why” behind relationships. 72
For instance, using my background knowledge as a guide, I examined why some diasporan
online citizen media reported certain stories and others did not, and why some have more access
to privileged sources of information from the homeland than others. In order to do this, I
searched for the types of advertisement that appeared on the sites of the selected online citizen
media, the political affiliations of their sponsors (if any), and the possible motivations for their
highlighting of particular stories at the expense of others. I also highlighted cases that illustrate
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the cooperation, tension, and ambivalence that characterize the relationship between online
citizen journalists in the diaspora and traditional journalists in the homeland.
Finally, I situated the evidence I gathered from this data analysis within the broader
theoretical framework of this study and compared it with existing literature on diaspora media,
international news flows, resistance theory in critical cultural studies, and transnational public
sphere theory. This design conforms to the useful analytic manipulations recommended by
Matthew Miles and A.M. Huberman, which include putting information into diverse categories,
making a matrix of categories and placing evidence within such categories, tabulating the
frequency of different events, and putting information in a chronological order or using some
other temporal scheme. 73

1.5

Outline of Chapters

Chapter One is a broad overview of the subject-matter of this study, the significance and
justification for the study, the research questions that guide the investigation, and the
methodology that is deployed to provide answers to the research questions.
Chapter Two reviews and coalesces the extant literature on diaspora media, citizen online
journalism, alternative media, public sphere theory, and the various conceptions of informational
flows. It also identifies the gaps in the existing literature and points out what contributions this
study is making to the disciplinary conversation. It, in addition, highlights the broad theoretical
framework that undergirds this study.
In Chapter Three, I trace the historical trajectory of resistant and emancipatory journalism
in Nigeria and find linkages between this and the study’s object of inquiry. It particularly focuses
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on a phenomenon that has been called “guerilla journalism” in Nigeria, which flourished in the
1990s in the face of a particularly brutal military dictatorship that reigned between 1993 and
1998. With the restoration of democratic rule in 1999, the insurgent journalism of the “guerilla”
media era in Nigeria all but fizzled out and the erstwhile radical, uncompromising, and
adversarial media now appear co-opted and compromised. This chapter locates the emergence of
the citizen online diasporic media within this dead or dying media tradition, especially because
some of the diasporan media initially had working agreements with the remnants of the guerilla
media in Nigeria to share and cross-promote stories.
Chapter Four is one of the compositional phases and evidentiary bases of the study. It
traces the history of online journalism in Nigeria and locates the evolution of online journalism
in Nigeria in the context of broader discussions about online journalism globally. It then provides
detailed histories of the six diasporan citizen media sites selected for this study, pointing out their
most important stories, reportorial temperaments, limitations, and differential motivations.
This set the stage for the examination of more specific case studies in Chapter Five. The
cases are organized and thematized to illuminate cases where online citizen media stories have
led to homeland governmental policy changes and cases where the diasporan online media
exposed high-level corruption in the local media. This selection conforms to the outlines of
critical, extreme, and paradigmatic case studies discussed earlier. The implications of these cases
are explored and related to the broader theoretical and empirical concerns of the study.
Chapter Six is the last chapter. It juxtaposes the research questions in Chapter One
against the data presented in chapters Four and Five. It also highlights the implications of the
findings of this study and draws conclusions based on these findings. The findings, where
applicable, are compared to existing theoretical formulations to discover patterns, themes, key

30
issues, nuanced divergences, and new insights. Since this dissertation is ultimately about the
nature and consequences of emergent forms of informational flows between the diasporas and
homelands of peripheral, transitional nation-states in the age of globalization and the Internet, in
this chapter I draw connections between existing theories of media flows, transnational public
spheres, resistance, and so on and the findings of the research. I also show the limitations of the
study and recommend areas for future research.
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CHAPTER TWO
2

CITIZEN AND ALTERNATIVE JOURNALISM: WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE?
Citizen journalism and alternative journalism are core constructs in this study. Although

some scholars conflate the two, they are markedly different, and an awareness of the differences
between them is central to the preoccupations of this investigation. In this chapter, I define
alternative and citizen journalism, map their conceptual contours, and point out their
intersections in the age of the Internet. In reviewing the corpus of research that has been done in
conceptualizing citizen and alternative journalism, I reveal the gaps in the extant literature. How
might we conceive alternative journalism? How is it different from and similar to citizen
journalism? And how are these categories useful for this project?
Relative to traditional, mainstream “professional” journalism, alternative journalism has
historically attracted little scholarly attention from both critical and administrative researchers. 74
The last ten years, however, have witnessed a profusion of scholarly interest in alternative
journalism. 75 This is certainly partly a consequence both of the popularity and ubiquity of the
Internet and the expansion of the discursive space that it enables, evidenced in the unexampled
blossoming of several Web-based citizen and alternative media. But although many critical
media scholars have robustly and carefully captured the emergence, constraints, motives,
practices, prospects, singularities, and dominant thematic preoccupations of alternative media,
there is no universally agreed upon conception of what alternative journalism is. 76
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As Chris Atton has noted, 77 until relatively recently, the only definitive scholarly study of
alternative journalism was John Downing’s influential 1984 book on the subject. 78 For Downing,
the distinctiveness of alternative journalism lies in its self-conscious subversion of the elaborate
hierarchies typical of professional news organizations and in its explicitly non-conformist and
counter-hegemonic political agenda. The kind of media formation this engenders is often well
suited to the progressive, anti-capitalist agenda of social movements, which are usually
marginalized in the mainstream media. Downing draws clear contrasts between alternative media
and the mainstream media, and maintains that the operations of the mainstream media are
animated by crass profit motive, are organized according to predetermined, exclusive
professional and routinized standards, and are hallmarked by entrenched hierarchies. In other
words, as Atton observes, Downing’s conception of alternative media privileges “media that are
written and run by non-professionals, by groups that are primarily activists for progressive social
change.” 79
As more critical media scholars became interested in the systematic study of alternative
media, however, conceptions of what constitutes alternative journalism has become much more
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complicated than Downing’s simplistic, if historically contingent, binaries. Since the publication
of Downing’s book, at least five other notable scholarly books—among them another book by
Downing which revises his earlier approach—have been published, all of which have sought to
more carefully capture the complexity of alternative journalism. 80 Similarly, at least five journal
issues have devoted exclusive attention to the subject of alternative journalism. 81
As Patricia Gibbs and James Hamilton have pointed out, part of the difficulty in
providing an all-encompassing definition of alternative journalism is that the term is often
merely a convenient label that encapsulates—or seeks to encapsulate—a variety of nonhegemonic media practices that are vastly diverse in aims, goals, and specificities, and that
replace or supplant “more specific designations such as the ‘labor press,’ ‘feminist press,’ or
‘underground media.’” 82 Vincent Campbell agrees. He says terms like “alternative press” tend to
be used as “broad-brush collective terms for a disparate body of practices,” although common
themes can often be isolated from these practices. 83 Scholars who want to remain faithful to the
differential motivations that actuate the practices of alternative media formations often
distinguish between “oppositional” alternative media and “advocacy” alternative media to take

80

See Atton, Alternative Media; Downing, Radical Media; DeeDee Halleck, Hand Held Visions: The Impossible
Possibilities of Community Media (Bronx, New York: Fordham Press, 2002); Clemencia Rodriguez, Fissures in the
Mediascape: An International Study of Citizens’ Media (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2001); and Rodger
Streitmatter, Voices of Revolution: The Dissident Press in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).
81

See Atton, ed., “What is Alternative Journalism?”; Matthew Cecil, ed., “Alternative Media,” Journal of
Communication Inquiry 24 no. 4 (2000): 355-356; Patricia Gibbs and James Hamilton, eds., “Special Issue of Media
History: Alternative Media,” Media History 7 no. 2 (2001): 117-118; Dorothy Kidd and Bernadette BarkerPlummer, ed., “Social Justice Movements and the Internet,” Peace Review 13 no. 3 (2001): 331–337; Graeme
Turner, ed., “Citizens’ Media,” Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and Policy, 103 (2002):
82

83

Gibbs and Hamilton, eds., “Special Issue of Media History: Alternative Media:” 117.

Vincent Campbell, Information Age Journalism: Journalism in an International Context (London: Arnold, 2004),
178.

34
account of the dominant concerns that inform several different alternative media practices. 84
While advocacy alternative media often function as the mouthpieces of organized social
movements, oppositional alternative media are usually not wedded to any definite political cause
or social movement.
However, even though the term “alternative media” would appear to dissolve the
exceptionalities that characterize a wide variety of counter-hegemonic, insurgent media
practices, Gibbs and Hamilton insist that “it is extremely useful to see them together because
such a move emphasizes their collective resistance to increasingly monolithic commercialized
media systems and products.” 85 In fact, John Downing, in his later work on alternative media,
agrees with Vincent Campbell that in spite of what might seem like the vastly divergent goals of
various categories of alternative media, they are actually united by the dual functions they all
perform: as “counter-information institutions” and as “agents of developmental power.” 86 It is
because of this dual function that some scholars have broadly characterized this genre of
journalism as “insurgent journalism” 87 or “counter-hegemonic journalism.” 88 In other words,
alternative journalism’s meaning can only be realized in opposition to the established,
mainstream media.
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Such a discursive delineation provides the conceptual justification for the customary
practice in media studies to conceive of “alternative” media in binary opposition to the
“mainstream” media, with “‘mainstream’ seen as maximizing audiences by appealing to safe,
conventional formulas and ‘alternative’ foregoing the comfortable, depoliticizing formulas to
advocate programs of social change.” 89 It is in the same vein that Tanni Haas conceives of
alternative media as “media devoted to providing representations of issues and events which
oppose those offered in the mainstream media and to advocating social and political reform.” 90
This means, in essence, that alternative media defines itself—or is defined—only in
contradistinction to the mainstream media. Where the mainstream media is impersonal and
professionally managed, alternative media is “self-managed.” 91 Where the mainstream media is
formally structured, alternative media is “non-hierarchical.” 92 Where the practices of the
mainstream media are motivated by profit motive, those of the alternative media are motivated
by “collectivist-democratic” ideals. 93 By being radically different from the mainstream media in
structure and content, alternative media seek to comfort a broad range of subaltern populations
that are either pushed to the margins of the mainstream media or that are completely excluded
from it. 94
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Most importantly, according to scholars of alternative media, while the mainstream
media impose on themselves the responsibility to create and nurture an “informed” citizenry,
alternative media practitioners have as their goal the desire to inspire a “mobilized” citizenry. 95
As Kenya Tomaselli and Eric Louw put it, alternative media practitioners perceive their role
more as “facilitators of social communication” than as “sources of information.” 96 This explains
why scholars of alternative media variously characterize the unequivocally political content of
alternative journalism as “mobilizing information,” 97 “information for action,” 98 “action on
action,” 99 or simply “useful information.” 100
Other scholars locate the difference between alternative media and mainstream media in
terms of their differential conventions of news sourcing. While the routinized professional
practices of the mainstream media often predispose them to take recourse to “the systematic
accessing of powerful, resource-rich institutions and their definition of events—and to the
marginalization of resource-poor social groups and interests,” 101 alternative media actively seek
a “different cast of accessed ‘officials’ and other voices.” 102 It adopts a newsgathering practice
that has been dubbed “native reporting,” which Atton defines as an alternative newsgathering
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practice “where social actors, instead of being subjects of the news, become their own
correspondents, reporting on their own experiences, struggles and ideas.” 103 This nonconformist
alternative media reportorial practice finds its most sophisticated expression in what Nick
Couldry calls “active witnessing,” 104 which John D. Peters describes elsewhere as a situation in
which “one is a privileged possessor and producer of knowledge in an extraordinary, often
forensic, setting in which speech and truth are policed in multiple ways.” 105
In other words, for the mainstream media, the primary definers of news are people who
occupy the upper end of the social scale, while for the alternative media the voices of the
voiceless tend to take precedence. Predictably, this makes most “professional” news hardly more
than the concerns, interpretations, and the cultural biases of the privileged few in the society.
The concerns of the lower rung of the social order only get highlighted under special
circumstances. As Robert McChesney observes,
Professional journalism tends to demand ‘news hooks’—some sort of news event—to
justify publication. This means that long-term public issues, like racism or suburban
sprawl, tend to fall by the wayside, and there is little emphasis on providing the historical
and ideological context necessary to bring public issues to life to readers. 106
An additional consequence of this demotion of the concerns of subalterns to the fringes and the
elevation of the concerns of the upper classes to the forefront is that the society is often burdened
with a media formation in which “consumerism, the market, class inequality, and individualism
tend to be taken as natural and often benevolent, whereas political activity, civic values, and anti-
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market activities tend to be marginalized or denounced.” 107 It is this media practice that
liberatory alternative media seeks to reverse and, in its place, inaugurate a media system
where working people, sexual minorities, trade unions, protest groups—people of low
status in terms of their relationship to elite groups of owners, managers and senior
professionals—could make their own news, whether by appearing in it as significant
actors or by creating news relevant to their situation. 108
This is possible because many people involved with alternative journalism, Tony Harcup
reminds us, “see their journalism as ‘political activity’…, a perspective that appears to be far
from the norm among journalists in the wider industry.” 109 However, the Nigerian experience of
alternative citizen journalism, with which this study is primarily concerned, is in some ways
markedly different from most of the dimensions of “native reporting” that scholars of alternative
journalism have identified. Most of the alternative online news sites use conventional news
sources for their stories. Although they speak with sources that would not have any voice—or
that would at best have only marginal voices— in the mainstream Nigerian media, they mostly
tap from the discontent and internal wrangling of the Nigerian power elite to get exclusive stories
that would never make it to the pages of the mainstream media.
This is especially possible because the Nigerian alternative online news practitioners are
geographically displaced from the homeland. This gives their sources assurances of
confidentiality. Exclusive pictures of the president’s son bathing in a pile of cash and
brandishing brand new guns, video clips of a governor in the strictly Muslim, Shariaimplementing state of Borno dancing with a female musician and splashing loads of cash on her
(dancing and music are prohibited in Sharia states), PDF files of court documents showing that
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important Nigerian government officials were once convicted of crimes (which should disqualify
them from holding public office), or pictures of the choice property of corrupt Nigerian elites in
Nigerian cities and in Western capitals, do not fall under the purview of “native reporting,” but
they are radically alternative nonetheless, and have so shaken the roots of the Nigerian
presidency that the late president of Nigeria, Umaru Yar’adua, was compelled in 2008 to force
every person working in his office to swear an oath of secrecy. 110 Nigeria’s oldest surviving
weekly newsmagazine, the Newswatch, remarked that “This is the first of such oath-taking at the
seat of power” in Nigeria. 111 The only feature that this mode of newsgathering shares with native
reporting is its unabashed repudiation of the requirement of balance and objectivity, what Sunday
Dare, a practitioner of “guerilla journalism” (a precursor to Nigerian alternative online
journalism that is discussed in more detail in Chapter Three) calls “an editorial philosophy of
partisan objectivity on the side of the truth.” 112
Another popular way to conceive of alternative media, especially among Marxist and
neo-Marxist media theorists, is to understand them in terms of their location “outside of the
forces of market economics and the state.” 113 Independence from the constraints of the market
and the pressures of the state, Atton contends, imbues alternative media with the capacity to
confront “radical questions of citizenship in the public sphere” in ways the mainstream media
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cannot. 114 Like other scholars of alternative media, he argues that it is this characteristic that
makes alternative media such irresistible magnets for new social movements. It has been
observed, for example, that alternative media emerge and flourish “during periods of heightened
social tension.” 115 In Nigeria, the social tension that justified the emergence of online alternative
media in the diaspora is the deepening of corruption and elite irresponsibility in the wake of the
restoration of civilian rule, as chapters Three, Four and Five show. This is precisely why there
has historically been a strong nexus between alternative media and social movements, although
in the Nigerian case an organized social movement has not accompanied the emergence of
alternative media platforms.
A number of empirical studies have also demonstrated that only alternative media
formations frame social protests sympathetically and cast activists in a positive light. 116 Another
study specifically found that activists in social movements consume more news from alternative
media than do non-activists. Yet another study showed that although activists extensively use
news from alternative media, they do not ignore the mainstream media. 117 The implication of all
of this is that because of their constant exposure to alternative viewpoints through alternative
media, activists are likely to develop what Stuart Hall called “resistant readings” 118 of the
hegemonic codes inscribed in the messages of the mainstream media. That is why Atton has
argued that a key feature of alternative media, especially online alternative media, is their
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“egalitarian mode of address, where intellectuals share media platforms with activists and where
it is hoped that elitism is eroded. Here we find the new media used both by grassroots activists
and by dissenting academics and other intellectuals participating in a counter public sphere.” 119
This is, however, an inadequate definition of radical online journalism. By limiting it to
the exchange of platforms between intellectuals and activists, it has already been rendered a
victim of the elitism it hopes to escape. This limitation is clearly a consequence of the tendency
among alternative media scholars to associate radical online news practices only with established
social movements and to conflate alternative media with social movement media. Although these
two kinds of media share many similarities, they are different in significant respects. While
social movement media are distinguished by their association with organized social movements,
not all alternative media are embedded in organized social action. When we learn to conceive of
online media activism outside the limited confines of organized social movements, and to
recognize that it can incorporate several varieties of small-group and individual dissent, we will
do more justice to notions of radical online journalism. The entire online alternative citizen
media that this study investigates, as pointed out earlier, operate outside the orbit of organized
social movements.
This is why Roger Silverstone’s instructive point that “alternative media have created
new spaces for alternative voices that provide the focus both for specific community interests as
well as for the contrary and the subversive” [emphasis mine] is more apt to this study. 120 Three
elements can be isolated from Silverstone’s conception of alternative media. First, alternative
media are often targeted at specific communities. This is a crucial distinction with the mass

119

Atton, Alternative Internet: 25.

120

Roger Silverstone, Why Study the Media (London: Sage, 1999), 103.

42
media that, for the most part, target a mass, heterogeneous, and anonymous audience, except that
the Nigerian alternative and citizen media also target both the subaltern population and the power
structure, which makes their reach more widespread than the traditional conceptions of
alternative media and their role as both “facilitators of social communication” and “sources of
information.” Second, alternative media are ideologically invested in espousing points of view
that are contrary to the traditions and conventions of the established order. Third, in order to
counter the hegemony of the power structure, alternative media deploy subversive tactics and
strategies. This ranges from their self-conscious repudiation of the institutional and
organizational structures of the mainstream media to their rejection of traditional methods of
news sourcing. Silverstone adds that whenever alternative media formations decide to adopt the
practices of the mainstream mass media, they often do so with the explicit aim to “pursue a
critical or alternative media agenda, from the margins, as it were, or from the underbelly of
social life.” 121 This dovetails with the character and operations of the Nigerian online news
outlets that will be studied and analyzed for this project. They do not employ the techniques of
“native reporting,” but rather adopt, adapt and subvert mainstream media newsgathering
techniques. 122
Based on these varying conceptions of alternative media, Atton concludes that the most
rewarding way to understand alternative media is to recognize their location outside timehonored, routinized professional news practices:
Alternative media may be understood as a radical challenge to the professionalized and
institutionalized practices of the mainstream media. Alternative media privilege a
121
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journalism that is closely wedded to notions of social responsibility, replacing an
ideology of ‘objectivity’ with overt advocacy and oppositional practices. Its practices
emphasize first-person, eyewitness accounts by participants; a reworking of the populist
approaches to tabloid newspapers to recover a ‘radical popular’ style of reporting; and
collective and anti-hierarchical forms of organization which eschew demarcation and
specialization—and which importantly suggest an inclusive, radical form of civic
journalism. 123
Alternative journalism is radical, he adds, when it is “opposed to hierarchical, elite-centered
notions of journalism as a business.” 124 This is, of course, problematic because many radical
online news outlets are run as businesses of some sort since they allow advertisements to be
placed on their web sites from which they make money. Similarly, not all alternative journalism
is explicitly anti-business. A few Nigerian alternative diasporan online media outlets illustrate
this.

2.1

Problematizing the Binary Opposition of Alternative and Mainstream Media

It is obvious from the foregoing that the germinal conceptions of alternative journalism, which
are still influential today, locate it in binary opposition to what has been understood as the
mainstream media. Perhaps this is not altogether surprising. After all, the very notion of
“alternativeness” presupposes not just an opposition to something but, in fact, mutual exclusivity
with the thing.
Lately, however, a few scholars of alternative media have begun to question the
ontological utility of this dualist conception of alternative media. In his later works, Downing
himself concedes that the dualism of his earlier typology imposed definitional and discursive
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burdens on the notion of alternative journalism. 125 He has identified two fundamental flaws with
his earlier approach. He terms the first flaw “anti-binarism.” 126 By “anti-binarism” he means his
rejection of the then dominant Western and Soviet media models and his insistence that both
models were ideologically complicit with maintaining and naturalizing exploitative relations of
production. Because he thought both media systems were monolithic and unrepresentative, he
argued that neither of them offered any hope. He labels the second flaw “binarism,” by which he
means the rigid distinction he imposed between alternative journalism and traditional,
professional journalism. He points out, however, that the “binarism” was prompted by the need
to “hammer home merits of alternative ways of communicating politically, however picayune
they might appear in the first instance.” 127 Downing has acknowledged that these flaws
prevented him from appreciating the subtleties and continuums that exist between alternative
media and mainstream media, and he ended up with an account that “seriously simplified
both.” 128
Many other scholars are recognizing the futility of an “either or” approach to
understanding alternative media. Atton, for instance, following Downing’s self-criticism, has
argued that it is more useful to talk of the ‘‘hybridity’’ of reportorial practices within ‘‘the
contemporary media landscape,’’ and has pointed to ‘‘the complex, hybrid nature of alternative
media in relation to its mainstream counterparts.’’ 129 Harcup has also called attention to what he
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terms the “crossover grouping,” that is, current mainstream media practitioners who were
previously alternative journalists and vice versa. 130
Similarly, the mainstream media have increasingly incorporated into their professional
repertoire media practices that were once thought to be exclusive to alternative media
formations. Such mainstream media practices as public or civic journalism, 131 which are
becoming more and more fashionable, especially with the popularity of online media, are
borrowed from alternative media practices. There are also many respects in which alternative
media practices borrow from the mainstream media.
Given the instability of the boundaries of “alternative” and “mainstream” media
practices, it has been suggested that critical scholars should embrace Gramsci’s notion of
hegemony to gain a more theoretically sophisticated understanding of media practices.
According to Atton,
[M]edia practices may be viewed as movable; they may articulate to bourgeois
(mainstream) values in one instance, but become joined with radical views in another. A
hegemonic approach suggests a complexity of relations between radical and mainstream
that previous binary models have not been able to identify. 132
Nick Couldry, 133 for his part, argues that the insistence on a rigid distinction between
“alternative” media and “mainstream” media has the effect of perpetually consigning
progressive, activist media to the margins and thereby robbing them not only of what Pierre
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Bourdieu calls “symbolic power,” 134 but also contributing to their exclusion from what Italian
political sociologist Alberto Melucci calls “the power of naming.” 135 Bourdieu notes that,
Durkheim has the merit of designating the social function…of symbolism in an explicit
way: it is an authentic political function which cannot be reduced to the structuralists’
function of communication. Symbols are the instruments of knowledge and
communication… they make it possible for there to be a consensus on the meaning of the
social world, a consensus which contributes fundamentally to the reproduction of social
order [emphasis from original]. 136
By accepting the label “alternative,” and conceding that the bourgeois media are the
“mainstream,” progressive and independent media practitioners legitimize the consensus that
reproduces narratives of their alterity and therefore unwittingly participate in their own
marginalization. Couldry avers that precisely because, in comparative terms, alternative media
organizations lack symbolic resources and the power of naming, their activities tend to be largely
invisible, 137 circumscribed, and reduced to being no more than what James Scott calls “weapons
of the weak.” 138 The challenge, then, is for the media of the oppressed to not only challenge the
status quo but to also seek the symbolic capital that will empower them to contest meanings and
the politics of naming. This is perhaps why many alternative media practitioners now prefer to
call their media “independent” media, with the implication that the corporate, legacy media are
“dependent” on external forces—advertisers, big business, the state, etc—to exist, and are
therefore, by implication, compromised and unreliable.

134

Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

135

Melucci, Challenging Codes, 182. He contends that “The real domination is today the exclusion from the power
of naming.”
136

Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, 166.

137

Couldry, “Mediation and Alternative Media, or Relocating the Centre of Media and Communication Studies.”

138

James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1985).

47
The utility of this distinction, however, is limited to pre-Internet, social movement
alternative media, which were usually supported, by and large, by voluntary contributions from
political activists who subscribed to the points of views of the various alternative media
platforms. In the age of the Internet this has been complicated. While activist-supported,
advertiser-averse, social movement media still exist, in the new platforms enabled by the
Internet, various kinds of alternative media whose practices are increasingly difficult to
differentiate from the corporate, commercialized media have emerged. So has the Internet
qualitatively altered the form and content of alternative media? Or are the changes brought about
by the Internet on the character and practices of alternative media merely cosmetic? The next
section provides insights on these questions.

2.2

Alternative Media in the Age of the Internet

While scholars have acknowledged how the Internet has radically altered the content and
character of alternative media, not all have come to terms with the ways in which the Internet has
done epistemological violence to erstwhile conceptions of alternative journalism. In fact, some
scholars are reluctant to admit that the Internet has inaugurated wholly new modes of practices.
According to Atton, prominent new media scholar Dorothy Kidd, for instance, finds striking
parallels between “contemporary, internet-based alternative media formations such as Indymedia
and its precursors in previous decades of social movement media” 139 and insists that the Internet
is not unique in any radical way. However, insistence that the Internet is no more than the
migration of erstwhile forms of alternative media formations in virtual forms does disservice to
efforts to come to grips with the ways in which the Internet complicates our understanding of
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contemporary alternative media forms. It ignores the substantially wider reach, structural
singularities, and the evolving form and content of Internet-supported alternative media. In so
doing, it ignores its capacity for unique patterns of publicity.
There are currently literally millions of blogs on the Internet with over 70,000 new blogs
added every single day. 140 While most of the blogs are owned by private citizens (which makes
them potentially “alternative” or at least “citizen” media since they are not “mainstream”), not all
of them are motivated by progressive, emancipatory political agendas. Furthermore, many of
them have “capitulated to capital” 141 by allowing Internet ads to be placed on their sites. As Kim
and Hamilton observe, in reference to a huge, commercially successful Internet-based
“alternative” media site in South Korea,
The charge of hypocrisy can be leveled against a media organization ostensibly
committed to progressive social change (which often includes as part of this the reform,
or even the abolition, of exploitative capitalist relations) but still sells its audience as a
commodity to advertisers. Similarly, critics of commercialization argue that courting
advertising revenue leads to depoliticization.142
This dilemma confronts many self-confessedly progressive Web-based alternative media. So, if,
as Atton argues, one of the abiding hallmarks of progressive alternative media is their freedom
from market forces, do ad-supported but nonetheless oppositional Web-based media qualify as
alternative media? 143 Or is Rodney Benson right in arguing that the commercialization of
progressive, counter-hegemonic alternative media is not a sufficient basis to conclude that they
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have been compromised? 144 What of Internet-based “alternative” media that are not associated
with, or the product of, any organized social movement?
And what about the phenomenon of mainstream media organizations maintaining and
supporting vibrant, uncensored online citizen media that, in fact, provide more untrammeled
avenues to ventilate strong opinions against the hegemonic order than many forms of alternative
media? For instance, a recent “State of the News Media” report by the Project for Excellence in
Journalism found that, paradoxically, the mainstream media provide greater mechanisms for
feedback and critiques than do most citizen media. 145 What is more, it is becoming increasingly
obvious that the relationship between alternative media and the mainstream media in the age of
the Internet is one of symbiosis rather than mutual exclusivity. Most online alternative media
liberally use material from the mainstream media, just as the mainstream media now increasingly
utilize information from the online citizen media (of which alternative media are a part, as will
become clear in the discussion on citizen journalism) for its profit-driven broadcasts. 146
All this calls for more self-reflexive theoretical exploration of the phenomenon of
alternative media in the age of the Internet, or what has more broadly been labeled citizen
journalism. Of course, there are significant differences between alternative journalism and
citizen journalism. It suffices, however, to just state for now that while most alternative
journalism is citizen journalism (that is, not produced by institutional and corporate media
elites), not all citizen journalism is alternative journalism (that is, consciously political and
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counter-hegemonic). So what is citizen journalism, and how is it different from other models of
journalism? The next section explains citizen journalism and situates it within the context of
other models of journalism. This move is important because it helps us to categorize the
emergent diasporan online media that the objects of inquiry of this study, especially in relation to
the traditional homeland legacy media they both subvert and complement.

2.3

Citizen Journalism and Resistance to Traditional Journalism

In online journalism scholarship, it is customary for scholars to deploy a variety of terms to
describe the same online media formations and practices. For instance, the terms “participatory
journalism,” “civic or public journalism” and “citizen journalism” are often used
interchangeably. However, these terms not only have distinct meanings, they also have different
histories. Since they will be used liberally in this study to refer to different genres of journalism
it is useful to distinguish them clearly.
Joyce Nip identifies five broad categories of journalism: (1) traditional journalism, (2)
public or civic journalism, (3) interactive journalism, (4) participatory journalism, and (5) citizen
journalism. 147 Although these terms have widely different significations for different scholars
and do, in fact, overlap at different conceptual levels, there appears to be sufficient agreement
among journalism scholars on their distinguishing features to deserve delineating them as distinct
journalistic models.
Traditional journalism, according to Nip, is the kind of journalism where “professional
journalists are the gatekeepers who filter through the happenings of the world, select the

147

Joyce Nip, “Exploring the Second Phase of Public Journalism,” Journalism Studies, 7 no. 2 (2006): 212-236.

51
significant events, and report them for their audience” 148 This model has limited participatory
content, except for letters to the editor and such other kinds of audience feedback, which are
sometimes no more than indecipherable crackles of background noise because they are merely
reactive and neither significantly inform the content of news nor the process of newsgathering. In
this model, professional journalists determine what constitutes news using frames of reference
internalized from their professional training and associations. In most cases, news is little more
than the actions of the primary definers of news: politicians and accredited sources in
government and other institutions that have access to the media almost as a matter of right. In
this sense, as Janet Woollacott points out, the media serve “to reinforce a consensual viewpoint
by using public idioms and by claiming to voice public opinion.” 149 This has been the dominant
model of journalism practiced by the mainstream media for many years.
Public journalism, also called civic journalism, emerged as a response to the perceived
inadequacies of traditional journalism. 150 According to Jay Rosen, the concept of ‘‘public
journalism’’ first appeared in the United States in 1993 as a reaction to the deepening chasm
between journalism and the citizens it professes to serve on the one hand and between the
quotidian concerns of ordinary people and public life in general on the other. 151 Lewis Friedland
cites the Wichita Eagle as the first notable newspaper to experiment with this model of
journalism. 152 Public journalism, in essence, invests itself with the task of actively seeking the
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input of local communities both in the choice of what constitutes news and how the news is
presented. As Nip points out,
Town hall meetings, citizen panels, and polls are common techniques used to tap the
concerns of the community, which would then form the reporting agenda for the
journalists. During the news-gathering process, professional journalists often report back
to the citizens what they have found for generating discussion in search of solutions to
the problems…. There have been cases where the citizens even partnered with the
professionals in gathering the news. 153
Although this model represents a greater connection with the people than traditional journalism
does, it still retains the professional journalist as the gatekeeper. Therefore, civic journalism,
while pretending to be an improvement on mainstream news practices, is mere cosmetic
reformism that leaves intact the fundamental essence of professional, mainstream media
practices. For one, it is market driven and constrained by the institutional and organizational
structures of the dominant mainstream news practices from which it purports to depart. 154 As
Louise Woodstock observes, “traditional and public journalisms adopt similar narrative
strategies to effect essentially the same ends: placing the power of telling society’s stories in the
hands of journalists.” 155
How is interactive journalism different from public journalism? The interactive
journalism model is not radically different, although it seeks to improve upon some of the
shortcomings of public journalism by taking advantage of the improved technical capabilities of
media organizations in the last couple of years since the Internet became a demotic medium. But

153

Nip, “Exploring the Second Phase of Public Journalism”: 216.

154

Steve Davis, “Public Journalism: The Case Against,” Journalism Studies 1 no. 4 (2000): 686-9; Theodore L.
Glasser, “The Politics of Public Journalism,” Journalism Studies 1 no. 4 (2000): 683-6.
155

Louise Woodstock, “Public Journalism’s Talking Cure: An Analysis of the Movement’s ‘Problem’ and
‘Solution’ Narratives,” Journalism: Theory Practice and Criticism 3 no. 1 (2002), 37.

53
precisely what interactive journalism actually entails is still imprecise. 156 Following Wolfang
Iser, however, we can construe it as consisting in a “network of response-inviting structures,
which impel the reader to grasp the text” 157 and in which the reader “is less massified and more
open.” 158 Jaana Hujanen and Sari Peitikainen define interactive journalism as “the increasing
opportunity to communicate across ‘old’ boundaries of time and place, and between journalists
and citizens.” 159 According to Brian Massey and Mark Levy, there are two important dimensions
to interactivity: content interactivity and interpersonal interactivity. 160 Content interactivity is
made possible not only by the technical capabilities that give users the latitude to liberate
themselves from the one-dimensionality set by the professional journalists, but also by the
variety of choice of content available to users. Interpersonal interactivity occurs when users can
interact with professional journalists through exchange of emails, chat sessions, or when the
“comment” pages of news organizations can serve as a site for the push and pull of contending
viewpoints in response to a news story on a news Web site. As Nip rightly notes, interactive
journalism is little more than computer-mediated public journalism. 161
Participatory journalism goes a step further than interactive journalism by actually
engaging consumers of news in the newsgathering process. In this model, users do not merely
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interact with the news and professional journalists that produce the news; they also participate in
some fashion in a many-to-many collaborative form of journalism. Like interactive journalism, it
is also enabled by the technology of the Internet, as it allows a new generation of Internet users
to become content creators. In this wise, Shayne Bowman and Chris Willis define participatory
journalism as
The act of a citizen, or group of citizens, playing an active role in the process
of collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and information.
The intent of this participation is to provide independent, reliable, accurate,
wide-ranging and relevant information that a democracy requires. 162
They add that participatory journalism uses what they call a “publish, then filter” model instead
of the traditional “filter, then publish” model. 163 In other words, citizen input to media content
often first goes past traditional media gatekeepers. However, the content could later be locked
out by media gatekeepers when it is found to be unworthy of the standards of the media
organization. Some of the features of the model, according to these authors, include discussion
groups, user-generated content, weblogs (blogs), collaborative publishing, peer-to-peer systems,
and Web syndication. As is by now obvious, although participatory journalism allows the
participation of news users in the news-making process, the process is still controlled by
professional journalists within mainstream institutional journalistic structures. The OhmyNews
site in South Korea, which is often wrongly called a citizen media site, is credited with
pioneering this brand of journalism. On this site, readers generate the bulk of the news stories,
but these stories are edited by a full-time staff of a few dozen editors. Yeon-Jung Yu, writing in
the Japan Media Review, says, “Most are written by housewives, schoolkids [sic], professors and
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other ‘citizen journalists.’” 164 San Jose Mercury News columnist Dan Gillmor predicts that the
many-to-many collaborative model of Korea’s OhmyNews would define the direction of news
business: “OhmyNews is transforming the 20th century's journalism-as-lecture model -- where
organizations tell the audience what the news is and the audience either buys it or doesn't – into
something vastly more bottom-up, interactive and democratic.” 165
Among prominent news organizations that have adopted the participatory model of
journalism are the BBC’s ‘‘Have Your Say’’
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/default.stm), which invites news users to express their
views about the news and then publishes them in a particular section of the news product, and the
relatively less successful MSNBC’s Citizen Journalists Report
(http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6639760/), where an editor suggests assignments for whoever is
interested in reporting on specified aspects of developing news stories, and so on.
Citizen journalism is different from the preceding four models (traditional, civic,
interactive and participatory) precisely because it eliminates the authority of the professional
journalist. As Nip puts it,
It can be one or a number of individuals, a citizen group, or a nonprofit organization
without a paid staff running a news blog, news website, community radio station, or
newspaper. To qualify as journalism, the content needs to include some original
interviewing, reporting, or analysis of events or issues to which people other than the
authors have access. 166
In other words, citizen journalism is the model of journalism that allows a wider range of
participants, including what Jay Rosen has described as “the people formerly known as the
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audience,” 167 to perform what J.D. Lasica calls “random acts of journalism.” 168 Terry Flew
identified three elements that are critical to the rise of citizen journalism and citizen media: opensource publishing, capacity for collaborative control of content, and the availability of
democratic, Web-enabled forms of content distribution. 169 Following Shayne Bowman and Chris
Willis’s model, I will characterize citizen journalism as the “publish, don’t filter” model of
journalism. The Indymedia site, a transnational multimedia news outlet that became prominent
for opposing the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in 1999, is often cited as one of
the pioneers of the citizen journalism model. It pioneered dialogic democracy in its news content
as every news report sent by the public is left intact. More generally, news-based weblogs can
also be categorized as practicing citizen journalism since the defining feature of citizen
journalism is that it is wholly user-generated and is free from the encumbrances of professional
news judgment and gate-keeping.
The five models of audience connection proposed above vary on the extent and form of
people participation, with citizen journalism involving the people to the greatest extent, and
traditional journalism the least. Interactive journalism gives the users initiative after the news is
published, whereas participatory journalism gets the users to gather the news. Public journalism
encompasses a wide range of experimentation in engaging citizens as advisers and partners in
news gathering and writing, while also allowing interaction after news publication.
It is clear that none of these models are immanent, self-sufficient containers of meaning.
They are not self-conscious journalistic models isolated in time and space. And they constantly
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overlap. It does appear, though, that citizen journalism is the only model that can be thought of
as distinct, even new-fangled; the rest are mere adaptations of or improvements on traditional
journalism. The five diasporan online news outlets chosen for this study fit the definition of
citizen media (those that are explicitly counter-hegemonic would in addition qualify as
alternative media), and the Nigerian newspapers that will be used to evaluate the impact and
consequences of the diasporan citizen media practice traditional journalism with occasional
elements of interactive journalism, since all of them have Web sites that permit reader comments
on their stories. A few of the traditional Nigerian newspapers allow readers to initiate and submit
eye-witness, user-generated, “publish-then-filter” content in a separate portion of their Web sites.
That would qualify as participatory journalism.
But, most importantly, it is the migration of news and information to the Internet that has
led to the robust flowering and proliferation of citizen journalism. Over the last few years,
millions of Weblogs, or blogs, with thematic preoccupations that encapsulate a broad spectrum
of human endeavors, have emerged and have continued to redefine the practice of journalism in
many fascinating ways. This development has inspired optimism in some quarters that what
Herbert Schiller famously called the “corporate take-over of public expression” by the traditional
media is about to be subverted, perhaps even extirpated, by the unexampled discursive
democracy that Web-based citizen media enable. 170
People who are enamored of this thought-process often construe user-generated citizen
media as inherently counter-hegemonic, as the emerging, as yet unformed but nonetheless
potent, antithesis to the traditional media. Writing in the Buffalo News, for instance, Anthony
Violanti gleefully celebrated the fact that “the mainstream media met their match” in blogs,
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which “not only compete in a new media landscape but also answer to the competitors.” 171
Implicit in this enthusiastic valorization of citizen media is the idea that they exist apart from
and, in fact, in opposition to, the mainstream media. As Stephen Reese and his colleagues have
pointed out, it has become customary to point to instances where news and public affairs blogs
exposed inaccurate reporting by mainstream media as evidence that “the online army of bloggers
will supplant the work and value of traditional journalists.” 172
Recent research has, however, shown that rather than challenging the dominance of
mainstream news media by linking to and commenting on an ideologically diverse range of
alternative news providers, weblog writers help strengthen mainstream media dominance by
further circulating, if not amplifying, their discourse. Indeed, the ‘‘derivative’’ 173 if not
‘‘parasitic’’ 174 relationship between weblogs and mainstream news media makes it more
accurate to characterize the blogosphere as an ‘‘online echo chamber of mass-mediated political
views’’ 175 than as an ‘‘alternative sphere of news and views.’’ 176 If this is the case for the citizen
media in advanced democracies, what is different about the citizen media of the Nigerian
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diasporic public sphere that gives them the power to sometimes determine the editorial agendas
of the institutional media in the homeland? Why would the online media of a far-flung diaspora
challenge the authority and credibility of an established homeland media formation, mobilize the
citizenry both at home and abroad for collective action and, in the process, change state policies?
These questions highlight the tricky convergence between citizen journalism and
alternative citizen journalism. Citizen journalism, we have seen, is journalism that is practiced by
ordinary people, that is wholly user-generated, and in which professional news judgment and
gate-keeping, especially of the kind popularized by the corporate media, are eliminated. It is this
broad category of Internet-enabled media, which includes the millions of news weblogs on the
Internet, that have been described as largely derivative, parasitic and little more than online ecochambers of the hegemonic media. But this is a broad-brush characterization that ignores the fact
that there are also alternative and citizen media whose characteristics mark them out as
independent media formations. Let us recapitulate some of the features of online alternative
media: they are often operated by activists for progressive causes, they function as resistance to
monolithic commercialized media systems, they are located outside the forces of the market
economy and the state, they adopt counter-hegemonic reportorial practices (such as native
reporting and active witnessing) in newsgathering, they serve as counter-information systems
and agents of development power, they act as facilitators of social communication rather than as
sources of information, and they are more concerned with nurturing a “mobilized” citizenry than
an “informed” citizenry.
But can a media formation be deficient in some of the features of alternative media and
still legitimately be oppositional (to the mainstream media and the state) and activist? Many of
the Nigerian diaspora online media, for instance, do not deploy the kind of counter-hegemonic
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news gathering practice that alternative media scholars have identified; instead, they use
conventional newsgathering practices to subversive ends. Furthermore, some of them are not just
facilitators of social communication but sources of information for ordinary Nigerian citizens,
the national elite and even the corporate media. Similarly, almost all of the influential Nigerian
diasporan online media are not affiliated with any organized social movement and yet are
sufficiently activist and oppositional to cause tremendous discomfiture to the state and to the
national corporate media. And, although the content of some of the Web sites can be derivative
of and parasitic upon the mainstream homeland media, they offer interpretations opposed to
those offered in the mainstream media. These considerations partly inspire this study.
Significantly, both alternative journalism and citizen journalism take place in a public
sphere. Since the term public sphere, which is a core construct in this project, has varied and
sometimes hotly contested significations, it is appropriate to precede my historicization of the
evolution of the Nigerian public sphere with a brief excursion into the conceptions of public
sphere, and how the term will be used here. The next section therefore discusses the meaning,
history, application, critiques, and limitations of the concept of public sphere that undergirds this
research.

2.4

Understanding the Public Sphere

Jürgen Habermas, arguably the most notable of the second-generation members of the influential
Frankfurt School of critical theory, 177 popularized the concept of the public sphere in the
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English-speaking world when his book, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, first
published in 1962, was translated into English in 1989. 178 He conceives of it as an open,
inclusive, dialogic arena of rational-critical discourse untrammeled by either the state or the
private sector and that acts as a check on state power. It is important to note, however, that
although Habermas’ theory of the public sphere may be the most influential today, it is by no
means the only one; there is a multiplicity of competing conceptions of what constitutes the
public sphere.
An influential conception of the public sphere that is coeval with but radically different
from Habermas’, for instance, is Reinhart Koselleck’s, whose concept of the public sphere is
located in his historicization of the role that secret societies such as the Freemasons played in
challenging totalitarian authority in Europe. 179 By countervailing the totalitarianism prevalent in
Europe in the eighteenth century, he argued, the secret societies created moral alternatives that
expanded the range of discourse in much the same way that the bourgeois public sphere that
Habermas famously historicized served as a counterweight to feudal absolutism. For John
Dewey, an influential American theorist, the public is called into being by the concatenation of
“indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences of conjoint and interacting behavior” of
individuals and groups in the society. 180 For Walter Lipmann, the public sphere resides in a core
of people with specialist knowledge and skills who serves as a buffer between the government
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and the masses of the people. 181 In Mikhail Bakhtin’s conception, 182 the public inheres in
moments of wildly funny and grotesque inversion of the social hierarchies in the society, what
M. Lane Bruner calls “progressive public transgression.” 183 Since publics are constituted in those
moments in history when the ruling classes allow for the temporary upending of social
hierarchies through the carnivalesque, he dispenses with the necessity for communicative and
procedural rationality, or for the bracketing of subjectivities. What is common to all these
conceptions is that the public is constituted outside the home and the state, except Dewey’s
conception. 184
The notion of the public sphere that forms the theoretical bedrock of this work is the one
propounded by Jürgen Habermas because, as Nancy Fraser puts it, “no attempt to understand the
limits of actually existing late-capitalist democracy can succeed without in some way or another
making use of [Habermas’ early conception of the public sphere].” 185 Additionally, since this
project is concerned with investigating how the media of public expression can and have served
as centers for discursive resistance to totalitarian state powers, Habermas’ conception of the
public sphere seems particularly appropriate. According to Habermas,
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By ‘public sphere’ we mean first of all a domain of our social life in which
such a thing as public opinion can be formed. Access to the public sphere is
open to all citizens. A portion of the public sphere is constituted in every
conversation in which private persons come together to form a public. When
the public is large, this kind of communication requires certain means of
dissemination and influence; today newspapers and periodicals, radio and
television are the media of the public sphere. We speak of a political public
sphere when the public discussions concern objects connected with the
practice of the state. 186
Habermas' theory derives inspirational strength from a historical juncture during the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries in Western Europe—particularly in England, France and Germany—
when coffee houses, salons, societies, the town hall, the village church, the tavern, the public
square, convenient barns, union halls, parks, factory lunchrooms, and even street corners became
the arenas of debate, political discussion, and action. Habermas extends this to a normative
model of popular involvement in the public sphere for contemporary times. He explains that in
these venues, everyone had an equal right to speak as if they were equals. In England, for
example, the coffee house conferred discursive sanctuary not only on the nobility, but also on
“the wider strata of the middle class, including craftsmen and shopkeepers.” 187 The dialogue, he
posited, transpired in a profoundly democratic forum where the status differentials and positional
hierarchies of participants were bracketed and issues were discussed without external coercion.
According to Habermas, the public sphere was governed by a moral-practical discourse,
and the apparatus for the mediation of this discourse was rational and critical argumentation.
Habermas’ analysis of communication in the archetypal bourgeois public sphere reveals that
every participant who engaged in the moral-practical discourse of the time made recourse to a
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number of normative conditions, which he later called the “ideal speech situation” in his
extension of this theory. 188 The requirements to qualify for the Habermasian ideal speech
situation are as follows: the discourse should be independent from state and corporate
interferences; the exchange of points of views during a discourse should be amenable to criticism
and review, and dogmatism should be eschewed; participants in the discourse should
demonstrate reflexivity and a willingness to question both their individual assumptions and those
of the social milieu in which they live; participants should show a capacity for tolerance,
sympathy, and even a vicarious identification with points of views that are at variance with theirs
and also avoid the use of emotive and insulting language; participants must make an effort to be
sincere in their search for the truth; and there must be discursive inclusivity and equality. 189
It is significant that Habermas himself has recognized that these are counterfactual ideals
that have never been fully realized, even in the classical bourgeois public sphere. That is why in
Habermasian, discursive public sphere theory it is traditional to differentiate between the idealnormative concept of the public sphere and the empirical-descriptive concept. 190 The idealnormative model has never materialized anywhere; it is merely derived from the prototype of the
possibilities presented by seventeenth- and eighteenth-century European public spheres. This
approach takes the public sphere as non-normative, having no special “origin” but presenting
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itself to us just in its empirically observable form. The empirical-descriptive concept of the
public sphere sees society in terms of the functioning of public institutions that act in the public
domain, “such as the mass media, cultural establishments, educational institutions etc. – and of
the representations that the institutions convey, such as the acts of politicians and celebrities,
news and reports, advertisements, etc. – i.e. public ‘images’.” 191 Most researchers deploy the
empirical-descriptive concept of the public sphere to ask questions about how and why notions
of reasonable deliberations work in some societies and not in others, what influences public
debates, how public opinions form and influence state policies, etc.
Interestingly, in an important extension of his theory of the public sphere, Habermas
argues that if democracy is to be implemented in today’s diverse and complex world, society has
to learn to adjust to the reality of the impracticability of a spatially bound agglomeration of
mutually consenting members in the public sphere. Instead, he proposes that citizens who are not
necessarily physically co-present can develop forms of communication that dispense with the
necessity for corporeal presence. 192 This extension takes into account, or even prognosticates, the
centrality of mass media systems—and the Internet—in public deliberations. In this project, I
explore the mass media system and Internet-based journalistic activism of the Nigerian public
sphere. However, in spite of the popularity of Habermas’ theory and the immense utility it has
had and continues to have for the analysis of deliberative practice and state-civil society
relations, it has attracted criticism from a variety of quarters.
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2.5

Criticism of Habermas’ Public Sphere

Critics from different theoretical and ideological orientations have interrogated the limitations of
Habermas’ lofty, idyllic construction of the public sphere that most theorists of democracy and
popular participation invoke to evaluate the performance of both the traditional media of mass
communication and the new media in terms of meeting the conditions to qualify as public
spheres. Habermas’ conception of the public sphere has been criticized as Eurocentric, as biased
in favor of the bourgeoisie and against the working class, as patriarchal, and as logo-centric. 193
Poststructuralists such as, for instance, Lyotard even question the functional relevance of
Habermas’ model of consensus through rational-critical discourse. 194 He specifically queried the
emancipatory and social utility of excessive rationalism in the conduct of discourse for the wider
strata of society. The concept is also criticized for instituting a linear, evolutionary and
progressive history of the world that ignores the differential socio-historical experiences of nonWestern or, to be sure, non-European societies. It is accused of falsely conferring on the
idiosyncrasies of Enlightenment Europe a universality it never possessed, and of consigning the
differential temporalities of other societies to the discursive fringes. 195
Feminist theorists such as Nancy Fraser also point out the exclusion of women in
Habermas’ public sphere. 196 As Neil McLaughlin observes, a typical participant in the public
sphere was usually male, educated and propertied, with the means and leisure to take part in
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public discourse. 197 Economically disaffiliated segments of the society that had a need, indeed an
obligation, to work hard to survive the vicissitudes and cruelties of the incipient capitalist socioeconomic order did not have the luxury to expend energies and time to participate in the public
sphere discussions of the time. And certainly women at that time were either too ensnared by the
drudgery of domestic engagements or the suffocating stranglehold of male tyranny and
oppression to participate in the discursive indulgence of the public sphere. Several feminist
theorists such as Anne Fernald, 198 including a whole host of other critics in an edited volume
titled Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse, 199 also point out that the
putative discursive openness of Habermas’ public sphere is premised on practices of deliberative
omission not only of women but also of children and other marginal and subordinate groups in
the society. And Jodi Dean cites critics who allege that Habermas’ account of the bourgeois
public sphere is historically suspect, or “never existed.” 200 She also characterizes it as the
“utopian imaginings of democracy” that have been co-opted by “communicative capitalism.” 201
Aside from poststructuralist, postcolonial and feminist critics, other critics such as Oskar
Negt and Alexander Kluge, 202 Nancy Fraser, and Michael Warner 203 also instructively call
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attention to Habermas’ privileging of a hegemonic public sphere, which they argue was
structured to be congenial only to the preferences and prejudices of people who occupy the upper
end of the social scale. In place of one overarching, dominant public sphere, they postulate the
concept of multiple public spheres that are not only oppositional to the hegemonic public sphere
but that also incorporate the aspirations of marginal groups in society such as the working class,
women, and racial and sexual minorities.
The symbolic utility of their argument in terms of contemporary scholarship in nonWestern parts of the world and, in fact, in computer-mediated communication is that the
landscape of the public sphere has shifted from a historico-transcendental veneration of Europe
during the Enlightenment to a multiplicity of trans-historical loci of discourses. This crucial
change in the notion of the public sphere assumes its full consequence when it is seen in relation
to the Internet which, in many ways, defies simplistic spatial and temporal categorizations, and
encompasses a robust array of spheres of discourses in ways that are probably unparalleled in
human history.
It also allows us to conceive of the public sphere for this study in ways that differ
significantly from notions of the public sphere in non-Western societies. In Nigeria, for instance,
the state is organically linked with the quotidian existence of the citizens of the country. For
instance, a government-funded newspaper in northern Nigeria called the New Nigerian, while
largely supportive of the colonial government and subsequently northern Nigerian regional
governments, also served as the arena for anti-colonial protests and for searing critiques of
postcolonial northern Nigerian governments. So, Habermas’ insistence that the absence of state
interference in public discourse is crucial to the notion of a public sphere is limiting. It does not
adequately capture the lived realities of people in a “gate-keeper state.” As Chapter Three shows,
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the Nigerian public sphere has multiple origins and a diverse character and it is often called into
being in relation to or within the constraints of the state—from the colonial state to the postindependence state.
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CHAPTER THREE
3

THE NIGERIAN PRESS: FROM COLONIAL EVANGELISM TO GUERILLA

JOURNALISM
The Nigerian press has historically functioned as a veritable arena for the robust
articulation, ventilation, and circulation of transformative and politically consequential national
discourse, and for the instigation of momentous social changes. That is why studies of political
developments in Nigeria from the colonial to post-colonial period have always highlighted the
role of the Nigerian press and of Nigerian journalists in energizing and galvanizing popular
support for major, defining issues of the times. The Nigerian press was, for instance, the primary
instrument for sustained nationalist agitation against British colonialism, a fact that inspired
James Coleman to write that “there can be little doubt that nationalist newspapers and pamphlets
have been among the main influences in the awakening of racial and political consciousness [in
Nigeria].” 204Nigeria’s first president, Nnamdi Azkiwe, who was himself an anti-colonial activist
journalist, similarly characterized the Nigerian press as “identical with the intellectual and
material developments of this country,” pointing out that the “galaxy of immortal journalists
produced by Nigeria” played tremendous roles “in this corner of the world in the great crusade
for human freedom.” 205
But, before and after the dislodgement of formal colonialism, to what extent has the
Nigerian press served as a site for public sphere debates, especially in light of the rather
anticlimactic emergence of a corrupt, morally bankrupt, and intolerant post-colonial Nigerian
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state that Terisa Turner aptly characterizes as a “gate-keeper state”? 206 This chapter attempts to
answer this question by periodizing the evolution of the press in Nigeria—from the colonial-era
press in the mid 1800s to the anti-imperialist nationalist press that lasted from the late 1800s to
the late 1950s, and to the implacably adversarial anti-military press of the late 1990s, which is
often dubbed “the guerilla press.” These diverse epochs represent varying degrees of the
emergence, flowering, expansion, and constriction of the Nigerian public sphere and can help to
explain, connect, contextualize, and even presage the materialization of the diasporic citizen and
alternative online journalism that this project investigates. 207
However, it is important to note that mapping the history of the Nigerian press is a messy
affair because of the strong regional differences in the country, which are rooted in the decision
of British colonialists to govern the country as two separate regions for many years before
commixing them. Southern and northern Nigeria had been ruled as two separate territories until
1914 when they were arbitrarily amalgamated for colonial administrative convenience. The brief
history of Nigeria below will help contextualize the differences in the form and character of the
southern and northern press and the proliferation of state government presses in the 1980s.
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3.1

A Brief Political Background of Nigeria

Nigeria is a West African country made up of thirty-six states—plus Abuja, the Federal Capital
Territory—and over 400 ethnic groups, of which Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo are the major ones.
With a population of over 150 million, it is the most populous country on the African continent,
the eight most populous country in the world, and the world’s most populous country in which
the majority of the population is black. Lagos is the economic center of the country—and its
media hub—and was its capital city until 1991 when a new capital, Abuja, located in almost the
dead center of the country, was created.
Nigeria’s modern history is traceable to 1886 when the area was occupied by the Royal
Niger Company (Chartered & Limited), a mercantile company chartered by the British
government. Prior to that, the territory was a concatenation of different ethnic-based empires and
kingdoms. In 1900, the British government took over direct administration over what became
known as Nigeria and divided it into the southern and northern protectorates, a decision whose
consequence lingers to this day. In 1914, the northern and southern protectorates were
amalgamated to form Nigeria. 208 After sustained nationalist agitations, mostly on the pages of
southern newspapers, on October 1, 1960 the country became independent from Britain. It,
however, retained many holdovers of British colonial rule. For instance, because of the difficulty
of adopting any of the over 400 languages in the country as the lingua franca, English was
adopted as the official language. 209 It is the language of government, the media, the judiciary,
and of education.
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But there is an almost one-hundred-year gap between the British presence in Nigeria and
the introduction of formal institutions of learning. By the accounts of many educational
historians, it was only after the end of the First World War that the British Colonial Office began
to take a systematic interest in education not only in Nigeria but also in all of the African
colonies under the British sphere of influence. 210 There is ample literature on the justifications
proffered for this policy by British colonialists—and counter-arguments by an evolving
nationalist elite group that was initially educated by the British for purposes of serving as a
buffer zone between the colonizers and the colonized. 211 In light of the fact that the British
Colonial Office was not interested in the education of the “natives,” Christian missionaries filled
the void. So, early education in most of the former British colonies in Africa was not secular.
Protestant Christian missionaries were so involved in British colonial education policy that it was
customary to refer to them as Britain’s “unofficial partner” in the colonial project. 212 This fact
had deep implications for education, nationalist struggles, and newspaper journalism in Nigeria.
Because of the Christian missionary character of early education in Nigeria, it was stoutly
resisted by the Muslim north. This reality accounts for the wide disparity in educational
attainment between the north and the south, for the unequal media presence in the two regions,
and for the difference in the tone and tenor of nationalist agitations between the elites of the
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regions. In fact, by the late 1950s when Western-educated nationalists in the south were agitating
for independence from British colonial rule, their counterparts in the north protested that they
had not yet had enough indigenous Western-educated manpower to take advantage of the
benefits of self-governance. So they replaced the 1956 date proposed by southern Nigerian
nationalists for Nigeria’s independence from Britain with the imprecise phrase “as soon as
practicable.” 213 Generally, the colonial authorities were more comfortable with elites from the
north than they were with the elites from the south. There were at least two reasons for this. The
Muslim north was easier to govern because it had had a pre-existing centralized system of
governance that stressed respect for constituted authority. The British colonialists exploited this
structure to administer the vast region with little or no resistance. The second reason was that the
colonial authorities made good their pledge to never Christianize the region and so the feudal
elite willingly cooperated in the colonial project and were not in a hurry to achieve
independence. As would be expected, when the British departed in 1960, they handed over
power to northern Muslims—to the chagrin of southerners who felt their superior access to
Western education should make them worthier to inherit the departing colonizers than
northerners. The resentment of the southern elites at northern political dominance in spite of its
educational disadvantage was vigorously ventilated in their newspapers.
Thus, from its very founding, Nigeria has been plagued by regional rivalries, which is
also reflected in the character of the country’s media system. After only six years of northerndominated post-independence democratic rule, the country was engulfed in bitter internecine
regional rivalries that snowballed into a southern, Igbo-led Christian military coup against the
northern Muslim central government. After a Northern counter-coup which wrested back power
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from the south, the Igbo ethnic group fought to secede from Nigeria and declared its own country
called Biafra. This secessionist bid precipitated a bitter and sanguinary civil war between 1967
and 1970. Some accounts put the death toll at over 30,000. 214
The division of Nigeria from three regions at independence to thirty-six America-style
states in the mid 1990s was informed by the desire of successive military governments to douse
the importance of regional identification and to suppress the eruption of what Adiele Afigbo calls
“Nigeria’s sleeping volcano,” which he defines as “the primordial federal features of Nigerian
society (geographic and ethnic plurality).” 215 At independence, there were only three regions: the
Northern Region, the Eastern Region and the Western Region. The west and the east were part of
the Southern Protectorate. In 1966, the Mid-West Region was carved out of the Western Region.
In the wake of the Civil War, the regional structure was dissolved by the northern-led military
government. In its place, twelve states were created, which later increased to nineteen and finally
thirty-six. State creation, however, came with its peculiar problems, which were exacerbated
with the proliferation of state newspapers each championing the points of views of their people
and government, as we will see shortly.
Another important fact of Nigeria’s political history is that it has been ruled by a
succession of brutal, corrupt military dictatorships since 1966 with only spasmodic periods of
democratic rule. Sustained democratic governance was restored in May 1999 with the election of
President Olusegun Obasanjo who was a military ruler between 1975 and 1979 and who was
imprisoned by the previous military government for his caustic criticism of the lawlessness and
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venality of the government of the day. 216 After leaving office in 2007, Mr. Obasanjo, a southern
born-again Christian, handed over power to northern Muslim successor, Umaru Musa Yar’adua,
who died in office in 2010. His deputy, Goodluck Jonathan, completed his term and is seeking a
fresh term of four years.

3.2

The Nigerian Press and the Colonial Public Sphere of Debate

Peter Golding captured a fundamental fact of the history and development of the mass media
systems in the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin American in general when he
observed that the media are not the products of the natural, spontaneous social evolutions of
these societies but little more than cultural and professional transplants from the media systems
of the “metropolitan centers” of the West. 217 But his famous assertion that “the Nigerian press
was born out of anti-colonial protest, baptized in the flood of nationalist propaganda, and
nurtured in party politics,” while providing a good starting point to analyze and understand the
history and dynamics of the Nigerian press, does not give the accurate historical context of the
birth and maturation of the Nigerian media system. 218
It is more correct to assert, as Frank Ugboajah did, that the introduction of the press in
Nigeria was a consequence of the efforts of Christian missionaries who were tangentially
associated with the British colonial project at the time. As he put it, “The newspaper press thus
arrived to our shores…accompanied by its concepts and prejudices which were completely
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exogenous.” 219 In this statement, Ugboajah reclaimed a germinal element in the birth of the
Nigerian media system that was absent in Golding’s account: the unequivocally missionary and
colonial character of its heritage.
Although British claims to a West African sphere of influence received international
recognition in 1885, the territory known as Nigeria today did not formally come under the
control of the British government until January 1, 1901. 220 This means that what we call the
Nigerian press today, as Adigun Agbaje aptly notes, actually “predated formal colonial
annexation of any part of the area now known as Nigeria.” 221 In other words, the press in Nigeria
is more than a quarter of a century older than the Nigerian state.
Nigeria’s first newspaper, established in 1859, or thirty years before the formal
colonization of Nigeria by the British Empire, was founded by the Reverend Henry Townsend of
the English Church Missionary Society. 222 The paper, named Iwe Irohin fun awon Egba ati
Yoruba, which is Yoruba for “newspaper for the Egba and Yoruba people,” was published in the
Yoruba language. (The Egba are a subgroup of the Yoruba, Nigeria’s second largest ethnic group
found in the western region of the country).
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In a letter to the Church Missionary Society, the Reverend Townsend wrote: “I have set
on foot a Yoruba newspaper…. My objective is to get the people to read… to beget the habit of
getting information by reading.” 223 Media historians have posited that this missionary paper was
the first indigenous language newspaper in the whole of Africa. 224 It is also the continent’s oldest
surviving newspaper, although it has had hiccups and undergone several changes in ownership
and management. 225 The significance of this paper is broad. It inaugurated the first modern
means to construct a Nigerian national identity, and thus a public sphere, analogous in many
ways to Benedict Anderson’s account of how “print capitalism” in Europe helped create
“imagined communities” that transformed hitherto diverse communities into nations. 226 It was
also arguably the first modern means of mass communication to supplant talking drums and
other forms of pre-colonial, informal, and interpersonal rural communication in Nigeria, 227
although Akinfeleye asserts that “evidence exists of irregular ‘newspaper’ publishing ventures
before 1859 [in Nigeria].” 228 What Akinfeleye is perhaps referencing is the tradition of religious
periodical publishing in the Hausa language of northern Nigeria since about the fourteenth
century.
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3.3

Contested Provenance: The Rise of the Press in Northern Nigeria

Northern Nigerian media historians often contest the accuracy of the claim that Iwe Irohin is
Nigeria’s first newspaper. They claim that a newspaper had been published in their part of the
country through an improvised Arabic orthography called Ajami many centuries before the
Reverend Henry Town set foot in Nigeria 229 As Abdullah Uba Adamu notes,
Of the three largest ethnic groups in Nigeria, the Muslim Hausa have, arguably, the most
extensive and well-established literary tradition. This was made possible by [the
people’s] contact with Islam as far back as 1320…which exposed the area to literary
polemics and activities of the Muslim world at large. Thus, while most Nigerian
communities glorified their literary antecedents through extensive collections of oral
traditions and folklores, the Muslim Hausa, in addition to extensive collections of similar
oral traditions, had the instrument to write down their literature through the medium of
the Arabic language earlier than all the [other] groups. 230
Although religious pamphlets and texts had been produced in northern Nigeria for ages, northern
Nigerian media historians contend that the first publication that comes close to being called a
newspaper was the Kano Chronicle, published monthly in Hausa and Arabic around 1503, a fact
that leads Gausu Ahmad to argue that “the Kano Chronicle could be rightly regarded as the first
newspaper in the territory that was later to be known as Nigeria, contrary to popular [claims]
among Nigerian media historians.” 231
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But this claim is problematic on many levels. Even though media scholars have not yet
reached a definitive consensus on what kinds of publications qualify to be called newspapers,
Otto Groth’s time-honored criteria for determining a newspaper are generally used. According to
the German scholar, the criteria for adjudging whether a print publication qualifies to be called a
newspaper are: (1) the paper must be published periodically, “at intervals not less than once a
week”; (2) everyone who has the means to buy the paper should have access to it; (3) it must
have some appeal for large, diverse segments of the society by varying its content; and (4) it
must be “timely with some continuity of organization.” 232 The Kano Chronicle did not meet
most of these conditions. Although it was a monthly publication, which means it had some
frequency of appearance, “its circulation was restricted within the circles of the ruling class of
[the] Kano city-state.” 233 Besides, its editorial content was not about news or everyday
happenings in the society. Historians say its thematic preoccupations were myths of origin,
genealogies of rulers, methods of succession of kings, Islamic rites, accounts of battles, and news
about immigration to the city state of Kano. 234 These subject-matters were clearly not intended
for a popular audience, a critical element in the conception of a newspaper. The paper’s palacecentered editorial content and its exclusivity to the ruling circles contrast sharply with the
demotic appeal of the Reverend Henry Townsend’s Iwe Irohin. It is therefore contentious to
assert that Kano Chronicle was the first newspaper in Nigeria.
In northern Nigeria, the first attempt at publishing a truly modern, mass-market
newspaper, if we accept Goth’s categories for classifying print publications as newspapers, was
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the short-lived Jaridar Nigeriya Ta Arewa, which literally translates as “the newspaper of
northern Nigeria.” It was published in 1932 simultaneously in Hausa, Arabic, and English. 235
Unlike the Kano Chronicle, its editorial content reflected the quotidian concerns of the average
northern Nigerian. As Ahmad notes, “Its main contents were social news such as retirements,
government policies, security matters, trade, agriculture and other development news.” 236 In an
interesting way, this echoes Habermas’ account of the content of eighteenth-century European
newspapers in coffee houses.
In January 1939, six years after Jaridar Nigeria Ta Arewa ceased publishing, the colonial
government in northern Nigeria decided to establish an exclusively Hausa-language newspaper
called Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo (which translates as “the Truth is worth more than money”)
ostensibly to counter unsettling Nazi propaganda at the time, which suggested that northern
Nigeria was going to be ceded to the neighboring central African nation of Cameroun, then under
the German sphere of influence. 237 Dr. Rupert M. East, a high-ranking colonial officer in
northern Nigeria and brain behind the establishment of the paper, informed a certain Abubakar
Imam who would be the paper’s first editor that the colonial administration would like to
“establish a Hausa language newspaper in order to counter the German propaganda on Hitler’s
activities and plans for Africa.” 238 He identified the propaganda as the insidious rumor being
systematically spread in northern Nigeria by the German secret service that Britain and Hitler
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had reached “an understanding” that northern Nigeria would now fall under German colonial
occupation. This propaganda was said to have created panic in northern Nigeria and the “need
was therefore strongly felt for a more effective local language newspaper to counter such adverse
propaganda, hence the establishment of Gakiya.” 239
Although the well-known, Westernized Hausa writer Abubakar Imam was chosen as the
paper’s editor, the colonial administration insisted that a colonial officer by the name of L.C.
Giles be the deputy editor, “apparently to ensure conformity of the paper with the set colonial
objectives.” 240 In addition, every correspondent for the paper also had to be adjudged trustworthy
by the traditional rulers, who usually worked in cahoots with the British colonial administration
in northern Nigeria through what is known as “Indirect Rule.” 241
According to northern Nigerian media historians, there were other reasons for the setting
up of Gaskiya by the colonial government that were not explicitly stated. I. A. Yahya identified
at least three other reasons for the establishment of the paper. The first was as a propaganda
instrument to encourage northern Nigerian males to enlist in the British colonial army to fight in
World War II. The second was to counter the fierce opposition to colonialism by the emergent
nationalist press in southern Nigeria. And the third was to integrate the predominantly Muslim
north into Western ways of life in ways that did not threaten the colonial project. 242As Mora
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notes, the editorial content of the early edition of the paper consisted largely of colonial
government propaganda, propaganda against Hitler’s Germany and Mussolini’s Italy, and
mobilization of the locals for war. 243 If we were to employ Habermas’ categories, Gaskiya would
not qualify as helping to establish a public sphere because it was owned and operated by the
state—and a repressive, gate-keeper colonial state at that. However, even though the paper was
distrusted by the masses and by critical elements of the emergent northern Nigerian educated
elite, some of them “fully availed themselves of the opportunity the paper offered in their fight
against some of the colonial policies.” 244 After the departure of the British in 1960, the paper was
handed over to the northern Nigerian government and is still a state-run newspaper to this day.
This makes it the oldest surviving newspaper that has been published continuously under the
same ownership in Nigeria. 245 Let us now return to the Iwe Irohin and show how its
establishment and editorial choices conduced to the emergence of a different type of public
sphere in southern Nigeria.

3.4

Iwe Irohin and the First Southern Nigerian Public Sphere

Unlike in northern Nigeria, the first modern means of mass communication in southern Nigeria
was not directly affiliated with the colonial government, although, as will be shown in
subsequent sections of this chapter, missionary activities in the colonized parts of the world were
often inextricably linked with the colonial project. What is important, though, is that because of
the invisibility of the role of the colonial state in the setting up of Iwe irohin, the paper initially
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enjoyed tremendous credibility among southern Nigerians. Nigerian media historians note that,
in its reader catchment area, Iwe Irohin was regarded as second only to the Bible in
inerrancy. 246Akinfeleye, quoting media historian Esuakema Uton, points out that “Nigerians
looked at the news items in Iwe Irohin in just the same manner that they would comprehend their
preacher’s first sermon on the first Sunday of the New Year.” 247 It must be the novelty of the
printed word in a predominantly oral culture that contributed to this excessive faith in the
newspaper.
American median historian Frank Luther Mott recorded parallels in the early period of
American newspapers. The origins of the American press, he said, are shrouded in claims to
divinity. According to Mott, Benjamin Harris, the first person to publish a newspaper in the
United States, gave three principal reasons for the establishment of America’s first newspaper:
(1) to record “memorable occurents [sic] of Divine Providence”; (2) to aid understanding of
public affairs at home and abroad; and (3) and to work “towards the curing, or at least the
charming of that spirit of lying, which prevails among us.” 248 Writing in the North American
Review in 1866, James Parton also stated: “The skilled and faithful journalist recording with
exactness and power the thing that has come to pass, is Providence addressing men.” 249 In fact,
Mott relayed an instructive anecdote of a Baptist clergy: “a newspaper having been brought into
the room, he held out his hand to receive it, saying, ‘Be kind enough to let me have it for a few
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minutes, till I see how the Supreme Being is governing the world.” 250 It was this milieu that
inaugurated what Mott calls the dogma of journalistic inerrancy in nineteenth-century America.
Perhaps because of the enormous goodwill that the Iwe Irohin enjoyed, Nigeria’s early
media historians appear to discountenance any suggestion that there was a connection between
the nascent British colonial project in Nigeria and the setting up of the indigenous language
newspaper by missionaries. They narrativize the introduction of the press in Nigeria in the same
benign and humanitarian terms as the missionary gentlemen who set it up. For instance, eminent
press historian Fred Omu asserted that missionaries
[E]mbarked upon programmes of Western education and general enlightenment in Sierra
Leone and subsequently in what became the colonies of Nigeria, Gold Coast and Gambia.
Their most enduring weapon was the school but journalism played an important role. The
newspaper had been established as an essential instrument of mission work outside
Britain as a result of the effective use which the British humanitarian movement made of
it in mobilizing support for their programmes. 251
Similarly, notable Nigerian press historian Dayo Duyile gave the following account of the
processes leading to the establishment of Nigeria’s first newspaper:
On 17 December 1842, he [Reverend Townsend] arrived at Badagry and worked with
many Sierra Leonian freed slaves and natives of Badagry…. Rev. Townsend left for
Abeokuta where he lived the rest of his missionary life, and there in 1854 he established a
small printing press. Five years after, he set up an African Christian newspaper, the Iwe
Irohin…. His motive, among others, was to excite the intelligence of the people in his
area of operation and to get them to read. 252
It is obvious that the laudatory accounts of the motivations behind the emergence and activities
of the newspaper are no more than minor variations of the perspectives of the originator of the
paper. The newspaper has been presented as the product of the humanitarian endeavor of a
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missionary gentleman who wanted to “excite the intelligence” of the natives and “beget the habit
of getting information by reading.” However, more critical analyses of the paper found that its
editorial focus was broader than that. According to Jibrin Ibrahim, it covered
Commercial news about local produce prices of pall oil, etc; announcements from local
chiefs and from the Government of Lagos Colony; news of the movement of government
and commercial representatives…agricultural and craft exhibitions, and progress made by
mission schools….The Iwe Irohin even carried advertisements from local firms and
government agencies…. It was a faithful reporter and commentator of the political
development of the times. 253
This catalogue of the editorial content of the paper demonstrates the inaccuracy of what
Mohammed Musa and Jibril Mohammed call the “ecumenical theory of the origin of the
[Nigerian] press” 254 that historicizes the establishment of Iwe Irohin in terms of its preoccupation
with Christian evangelization and humanitarianism while ignoring the “the extraordinary
connection between Christian missions and the goals of colonialism.” 255 Musa and Mohammed
are not alone in calling into question the de-linking of missionary activities with colonialism.
Many scholars have demonstrated that Christian evangelical activists in colonized parts of the
world were often working in tandem with the colonial administrators of their home countries. As
Bob White notes, Protestant Christian missionaries were so involved with the British colonial
enterprise that it was customary to refer to them as Britain’s “unofficial partner” in the colonial
project. 256
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Certainly, news about product prices, the reporting on the progress of the colonial
enterprise and other metropolitan business enterprises, advertising the goods of local firms or the
service of colonial governments are outside the purview of pure Christian evangelical activities;
they are, according Ibrahim, “the direct requirements of capitalism moving and transforming
from its phase of primitive accumulation into competitive capitalism.” 257 Encouraged by the
success with his Yoruba-language newspaper experiment, the Reverend Townsend, who “had
some connections with newspaper work in Exeter where his brother was a newspaper publisher,”
introduced an English edition, called the Early Dawn, one year later. 258
His experiment in newspapering was fairly successful because the southwestern Nigerian
city of Abeokuta, where the paper was located, had a sizable number of natives who were literate
in both English and the Yoruba language. 259 Prior to the arrival of Townsend in the city, there
had been a steady stream of immigration of freed slaves from England and the West Indies by
way of the West African nation of Sierra Leone. Freetown, Sierra Leone’s capital city, was
founded through a resettlement program of London’s “black poor” who had joined the British
Army upon promise of freedom from slavery. 260 Most of these literate ex-slaves traced their
ancestry to western Nigeria and chose the cities of Abeokuta and Lagos as their new homes. It is
these returnees who worked to invent, systematize, and popularize Roman orthography for the
Yoruba language and spread literacy both in Yoruba and English.
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However, two major events caused a hiatus in the operations of Iwe Irohin after eight
years of continuous publishing (1859-97). 261 First, its relative discursive inclusivity had become
a source of worry for the colonial government. Nigerians increasingly deployed the medium to
oppose colonial policies. After only three years in the newsstands, the colonial officer in charge
of Nigeria, Governor H.S. Freeman, filed a complaint against Iwe Irohin with the Colonial Office
in London although no formal action was taken against the paper and its owner. But on many
occasions Reverend Townsend had been reprimanded by his own Christian Missionary Society
“at the prompting of the Colonial Office.” 262
In 1867, the offices of the paper were burned by irate Abeokuta natives ostensibly
because the paper took sides in local political disputes. 263 When the paper returned to the
newsstands many years later, it was not under the same management. The birth and death and
birth of this missionary indigenous paper are significant in the formation of the Nigerian public
sphere and in the evolution of its media system. As Omu correctly notes,
The missionary newspapers may not have exerted a very wide influence on West African
society but there can be no doubt that they introduced the first generation of educated
Africans to what had become an intrinsic part of enlightened society in Europe and other
lands. Their example gave inspiration to African people who inherited the idea of the
newspaper and came to employ it as the chief weapon by which they were to exercise
their power of participation in the government of their land. 264
This poignant observation captures the spirit behind the emergence of the nationalist press in
Nigeria. As we have seen, the public sphere in the period under review was very limited and still

261

Abiodun Salawu, “Paradox of a Milieu: Communication in African Indigenous Languages in the Age of
Globalization,” in Indigenous Language Media in Africa ed. Abiodun Salawu (Lagos, Nigeria: Center for Black and
African Arts and Civilization, 2006).
262

Omu, Press and Politics in Nigeria, 8.

263

Akinfeleye, “Religious Publications.”

264

Omu, Press and Politics in Nigeria, 8.

89
hampered by a severe “deliberation deficit,” 265 as evidenced in the burning down of the
newspaper as a consequence of disagreements with its editorial policies. During the period of the
flowering of the nationalist press, however, we see a more engaged and discursive public sphere
that took on the colonial administration in sustained rhetorical battles without recourse to
violence.

3.5

The Emergence of the Nationalist Press

As pointed out earlier, indigenous newspapering in Nigeria and, in fact, in the whole of
Anglophone West Africa, was animated largely by nationalist sentiments. As William Hatchten
observed, “To study either nationalism or the press in British West Africa is to study the
other.” 266 The first attempt to publish an independent English-language newspaper that was not
owned by Christian missionaries or the colonial government started in 1863 with the founding of
the Anglo African by a mixed-raced Jamaican émigré named Robert Campbell who humorously
described himself as “one-quarter Negro, one-quarter English and half Scotch.” 267 Significantly,
the emergence of the Anglo African is a direct consequence of the growing dissatisfaction with
the hypocrisy and double standards in the editorial direction of Townsend’s Iwe Irohin and Early
Dawn. Campbell was said to be the first to publicly proclaim that “Townsend’s reputation for
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forthrightness and sagacity was a myth.” 268 And his opinions gained wide popularity when it
later emerged that there was indeed a disjunction between the principles of Christian humanism
missionaries preached and their endorsement of racist colonial policies. This, coupled, with the
expansion of literacy in Lagos and other western Nigerian cities and the growth of the printing
industry, encouraged the emergence of the Anglo African. Although the paper lasted only two
years, it laid the groundwork for the growth and flourishing of the nationalist press fifteen years
later.
On November 10, 1880, a prosperous Nigerian, who was half Sierra Leonean, by the
name of Richard Beale Blaize who had worked as an apprentice in Anglo African, founded the
bi-monthly Lagos Times. Blaize made it clear that his venture into newspapering was not
actuated by “the hope of large pecuniary returns.” 269 In its inaugural editorial, the Lagos Times
declared:
We are not clamoring for immediate independence…but it should always be borne in
mind that the present order of things will not last forever. A time will come when the
West Coast will be left to regulate their [sic] own internal and external affairs. 270
This declaration set the tone for the nationalist, anti-imperialist fervor of Nigerian newspapers. 271
It inspired the emergence of the more radical Lagos Observer, recognized as “one of the symbols
of the intellectual aggression which characterized political developments in the two decades of
the nineteenth century.” 272Many more indigenous nationalist newspapers, such as the Lagos
Weekly Record, the Lagos Daily News, the Nigerian Chronicle, the West African Pilot and so on
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sprang up in the 1900s and committed themselves to “raising consciousness to a high level in
editorials and special columns devoted to anti-colonial issues.” 273
The colonial administration was predictably discomfited but, given its public pretenses to
democracy, rule of law, and of “civilizing the natives,” it initially chose to take the line of least
resistance. It responded to the challenges these oppositional papers posed in four ways. Initially,
it paid for a column to publicize government notices and to counter nationalist propaganda in
selected radical newspapers. When that did not work, it sponsored Nigerian citizens to set up
pro-government newspapers to counter the propaganda of the nationalist, anti-imperialist press.
For instance, in 1914, the year Nigeria was formally named, a newspaper called the Nigerian
Pioneer was formed by a certain Kitoyi Ajasa. The paper consistently supported the colonial
government and challenged the nationalist press. But following concerted attacks on the paper by
the nationalists, it soon lost credibility. The nationalist Weekly Record, for instance, dismissed
the Nigerian Pioneer as “a thorough-going lickspittle journal—sworn to the blind defense of
governmental policy whether right or wrong, good or bad—the greatest enemy and traitor of its
race.” 274
In light of the loss of credibility of the Nigerian Pioneer, the colonial administration
devised a different strategy: in 1925, it encouraged private English businessmen from Britain to
team up with a group of Nigerian businessmen under the aegis of the Lagos Chamber of
Commerce to start a new, professionally run, and well-edited daily newspaper called the Daily
Times. However, as Omu points out, “from the point of view of political development, the paper
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was not of much importance.” 275 The colonial government complemented its encouragement of
the Daily Times with its total control of the broadcast industry. As Uche points out, the “colonial
government controlled the broadcasting medium (radio)… to refute the charges that the
nationalists and their press were leveling against it.” 276
Finally, they turned to overt repression. In response to the unremitting nationalist attacks
on the colonial government, the government not only withdrew advertising patronage from the
nationalist press, it also passed a whole host of draconian press laws. The government, for
instance, criminalized the publication of any news that pilloried or embarrassed the government
or its officials. 277 It also appointed a press censor whose job was to “seize printing presses,
confiscate newspapers and impose a bond of 250 pounds on ‘undesirable’ publishers.” 278 When
this did not work, it serially arrested, charged, and convicted journalists with sedition, and
tortured others. But this repressive clampdown on the nationalist press did little to daunt the
resolve of its practitioners; it only compelled them to go underground to continue their
nationalist agitations. 279
This history is worth recounting because, as subsequent sections will show, it not only set
the template for subsequent government-press relations in Nigeria, it defined the contours of the
tenor and nature of public sphere debates in the country. Most important, as Philippa Hall points
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out, it “could be argued that this [nationalist] press constituted an emerging public sphere, in so
far as it mediated the interests of Nigerian[s]… within the colonial state and was organized to
express public opinion… albeit among a small section of the population.” 280
It needs to be pointed, though, that not all the nationalist agitation in the press was
actuated by a patriotic zeal to dislodge colonialism. A lot of it was self-interested, and some of it
was inspired and circumscribed by commercial interests. Hall has shown, for instance, that
“editors and owners of the Nigerian private press had a primary interest in expanding indigenous
trade, and editorials resisted or supported colonial policy as means to this end.” 281 She also calls
attention to the fact that the dependence of the Nigerian nationalist press on European advertising
revenues for their sustenance meant that “criticism of British policy was often muted by the need
for commercial presses to retain European advertising revenues.” 282
In the same vein, Mohammed Musa and Jibril Mohammed point out that the nascent
colonial-era Nigerian elite were attracted to journalism only because of the injustices they
personally suffered at the hands of British colonial administrators. “As for anti-racism, scores of
skilled Africans resigned their appointments in the colonial service in favor of journalism, now
seen as a thriving alternative occupation. But most importantly, journalism became the latest
avenue, after the schools and churches, for decisive ‘counter-hegemonic’ campaigns within the
colonial order.” 283 However, native Nigerian journalists still suffered a colonially engineered
cultural capital deficit. In the words of Obafemi Awolowo, a foremost Nigerian nationalist and
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Premier of Nigeria’s Western Region in the 1960s, who also took to journalism to ventilate
nationalist angst against colonial oppression, Nigerian journalists “were regarded as the flotsam
and jetsam of the growing community of Nigerian intelligentsia.” 284
Whatever the case, the important thing was that, in many significant respects, the
nationalist press, for all its structural defects, led to the development of a virile, if limited, public
sphere of debate in which Nigerians, as colonial subjects disallowed from participating in the
electoral process, could repugn the legitimacy of colonial policy by counterpointing the
European rhetoric of “freedom, democracy and Christianity” with “the hypocrisy of an
authoritarian colonial state based upon race superiority.” 285 The next section shows, however,
that the post-independence press, which replaced the nationalist press, did not necessarily expand
the public sphere in any qualitative way.

3.6

The Post-Independence Press: From Nationalism to Regionalism

After independence from British colonial rule in 1960, Nigeria’s press tradition changed
radically. The mostly adversarial reportorial temperament of the nationalist press disappeared. 286
The emergent post-independence national media, no longer faced with a common colonial
enemy, took a different form: they now reflected the divisive, regionalist, and ethnic-based
character of the emergent ruling elite. Particular newspapers were identified with particular
political parties, which were invariably formed along the ethnic and religious fault-lines that
were exploited, exacerbated, and in some cases created, by the departing colonizers. This
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tradition started in the late 1950s, when the British colonizers allowed some form of selfgovernance to the three regions they created—the Northern Region, the Western Region, and the
Eastern Region— prior to the granting of full independence, and peaked in the 1970s.
An important hallmark of the regionalist press era was that newspaper ownership shifted
from private hands to regional governments. 287 This was not surprising: many of the nationalist
crusaders who used the press to fight colonialism became the political leaders of the new nation.
For instance, Mr. Nnamdi Azikwe, publisher of the implacably anti-imperialist West African
Pilot, became the Eastern Region’s premier and later Nigeria’s first ceremonial president. Mr.
Obafemi Awolowo, publisher of the hitherto fiercely nationalistic Nigerian Tribune, became the
Western Region’s first premier. Unfortunately, these activist-journalists-turned-politicians used
their presses to cultivate the social basis of their legitimacy through appeals to the prevalent
primordial divisions in the society: ethnic differences, regional rivalries and Muslim-Christian
religious divides.
The government of the Eastern Region opened the floodgates to the emergence of
regionalist newspapers when, shortly after independence, it established the Eastern Outlook
(which it later renamed Nigerian Outlook to give it the semblance of a pan-Nigerian outlook). In
1961, the central government, which was dominated by northerners, established the Morning
Post to counter the propaganda of the Outlook. Two years later, in 1964, the government of the
Western Region established the Daily Sketch which, along with the Nigerian Tribune, defended
the sentiments of the people of the Western Region, who are predominantly Yoruba. (The
Nigerian Tribune was and is still owned by the Awolowo family). Although the Morning Post
propagated northern Hausa Muslim viewpoints in national debates, the Northern Regional
Government still went ahead to set up the New Nigerian in 1966 to, according to British
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journalist Charles Sharp, who helped set up the paper, “reflect the dignity and aspirations of the
north.” 288
It is significant that although the press during this period (between 1960 and 1966)
jettisoned all pretenses to nationalism and engaged in long-drawn partisan fights, the central
government did not enact any laws to curtail the freedom of the press. No newspaper was shut
down for expressing strong opinions against the government and no journalists were jailed. This
fact inspired Frederick Schwartz to assert that the press “was probably the most potent institution
supporting democratic freedom in Nigeria.” 289 But this freedom lasted for only about six years.
In 1966, the military overthrew the abrasive and feuding politicians of what Nigerians
like to call the First Republic and suspended the constitution, but the regional newspapers
continued to exist nonetheless. The Midwestern Region, which was carved out from the Western
Region in 1963, also set up its own regional newspaper, the Observer, in 1968. The regionalist
newspapers continued to be deeply and unabashedly partisan, but still retained what Minabere
Ibelema calls the “advocatorial press tradition” of the nationalist years. 290 In an apt observation
of the character and performance of the Nigerian press during this era, Rosalynde Ainslie noted
that the regionalist press, for the most part, produced polemical journalism that was highly
personalized, unsparingly abusive of political opponents and deficient in rational public sphere
debates. 291 That was scarcely surprising because, as Uche points out, any newspaper that didn’t
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take explicitly regional and ethnic perspectives on the issues of the day risked being “labeled a
saboteur and an unpatriotic element.” 292
The second phase of the regionalist era began when Nigeria’s four regions were further
sub-divided to twelve states. This gave rise to what Ibelema calls “the state-oriented press”
where “each state sought to establish its own news media.” 293 The South-Eastern State
established the Chronicle, the Western State continued to own the Daily Sketch, Kwara State
came up with the Nigerian Herald, the Benue-Plateau State set up the Nigerian Standard, the
East Central State established the Renaissance, and Rivers State set up the Nigerian Tide. In
1976, the Federal Military Government took over the New Nigerian, which was owned by the
Northern Region that had been further subdivided into many states. The military also bought a
sixty percent share in the Daily Times, the most influential, nationally circulated, and only
privately owned newspaper at the time. Ibelema points out that “the acquisitions were made the
same year that the federal government-owned daily Morning Post and Sunday Post ceased
publication after years of falling circulation and revenue losses.” 294 The federal government
bought the papers precisely to undercut the influence of the regional newspapers, which were
very critical of the center. In truth, though, the federal government was little more than the
aggregation of the interests of the predominantly Muslim north, which had always been
disadvantaged in media ownership owing to the low literacy rates in the region. Had the north
had nearly as much vibrant media presence as the other regions, the northern-controlled federal
government might not have needed to have its own newspapers.

292

Uche, Mass Media, People and Politics in Nigeria, 99.

293

Ibelema, “Nigeria Press and June 12,” 173.

294

Ibid.

98
The regionalist phase of the Nigerian press was characterized by two contradictory
editorial impulses. It was simultaneously adulatory and critical of people in authority. Philip
Elliot and Peter Golding, for instance, made this observation of the Nigerian press between the
late 1960s and the early 1970s:
[…] in the Nigerian media, the largest number of stories was devoted to the action of
political leaders, endlessly recording their minor speeches and airport statements,
meetings and ceremonial activities. Thus, as in the West, political action is defined and
portrayed by activities of incumbent elites….Conflict and drama are provided by the
familiar concentration on events and personalities. 295
However, apt as the observations were, they did not capture the sometimes adversarial nature of
even the state-owned press. As Uche observes, one of the main reasons for the relative vitality
and staying power of the state press was “their policy to even bite the fingers that fed them; at
times their anti-government stance on certain issues even embarrasse[d] the governments.” 296
Frank Ugboajah singles out the New Nigerian in this regard. He notes that “of Nigerian
newspapers, one of the most critical is New Nigerian. Its anti-government opinion on some
volatile issues of development in the Nigerian society is noticeable.” 297
The military governments reacted to the occasional independence of the state-owned
press by borrowing the tactics that the colonial administrations used to suppress the nationalist
press. Shortly after the military took over power, it promulgated the Defamatory and Offensive
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Publication Decree, which conferred unlimited powers on government to arrest any journalist
whose news reports or analysis were deemed to constitute a threat to national security. 298 The
next military regime that succeeded the first one (which lasted only six months) came up with an
even more draconian law. It enacted the Newspapers (prohibition of Circulation) decree, known
more popularly as Decree 17. This decree “authorized the government to ban and prohibit the
circulation of newspapers” when such newspapers carried editorial content that compromised
national security or embarrassed the government. 299 Newspapers were also required to sign every
edition of their publication and to submit them to the government for vetting after publication. 300
In a particularly dramatic case in 1973, Minere Amakiri, a journalist for the Rivers Stateowned newspaper was arrested, stripped naked, whipped, jailed, and had his beard and head
shaven with a pocket knife for writing a true story that teachers in the state had not been paid
their salary for months. The military governor was particularly irked and embarrassed because
the story appeared on his birthday. 301 In light of these crude repressions of the media and the
self-censorship that ensued, coupled with the severely limited reach of the existing state
newspapers, a need arose for the emergence of newspapers that were not state-run.
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3.7

The Birth of the Independent Press

The emergence of the independent press coincided with, if not inspired by, the restoration of
democratic rule in 1979. 302 This era is characterized by the growth and flowering of what one
might broadly describe as a commercial press that sought to rise superior to the prevalent
divisions in the polity, however unsuccessfully, for profit—reminiscent, in some ways, of the
context of the emergence of the penny press and the decline of the partisan press in nineteenthcentury America. 303 With the military government’s arbitrary take-over of the Daily Times, the
erstwhile nationally circulating daily newspaper, and its usurpation of the New Nigerian,
northern Nigeria’s only daily newspaper and one of the nation’s most influential newspapers,
there emerged a vacuum.
This vacuum was filled by wealthy Nigerians who, in partnership with professional
journalists, established advertiser-funded, profit-driven newspapers. The National Concord,
established by the late multi-billionaire Moshood Abiola in 1980, blazed the trail in independent,
commercial newspaper publishing. Its success spawned another independent newspaper, the
Guardian, which was formed in 1983 by millionaire Alex Ibru in partnership with Dr. Stanley
Macebuh, a seasoned and well-regarded journalist. These papers effectively displaced the staterun newspapers, especially the nationally circulating Daily Times and New Nigerian.
The fact of their being commercial did not, however, preclude the emergent privately
owned press from being implicated in the partisan politics of the Second Republic, as the civilian
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rule between 1979 and 1983 is called in Nigerian political parlance. 304 The National Concord,
for instance, came to be known to have sympathies with the ruling party of the time, the National
Party of Nigeria. Similar to the situation during the First Republic (that is, the period of civilian
rule between 1960 and 1966) the press was profoundly partisan. This fact led the London-based
international human rights organization called Article 19 to observe that the “period of multiparty civilian rule (1979-1983) was not a highpoint in Nigerian press history because all but a
few newspapers aligned themselves with fiercely competing and often corrupt political
parties.” 305 However, it is also the case that during this brief period of the restoration of
constitutional rule, the press was relatively free and the public sphere was significantly healthier
than during the military era. Governments responded to criticisms either by setting up their own
newspapers or by influencing news coverage and punditry in the independent media. Public
debates in the media were robust, if raucous, and journalists were never arrested for their often
hard-hitting philippics against political opponents.
That ended in late 1983 when the military struck again, ending five years of
constitutional rule. 306 However, rather paradoxically, the return of the military, with all its
notorious high-handedness against the press, saw the growth and flowering of a new phase of
vibrant, independent, commercial newspaper publishing. For instance, a corps of rebellious
journalists who were uncomfortable with the editorial direction of the National Concord decided
to resign from the paper and found Nigeria’s first weekly news magazine called Newswatch in
1984. According to Ray Ekpu, one of the magazine’s pioneer editors, Newswatch was conceived
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by a “gang of disgruntled journalists who were far from satisfied with the exiting state of things
in the Nigerian press and who hoped through their new, independent magazine, they could
contribute to the practice and growth of journalism in Nigeria.” 307 This trailblazing initiative
came to define the contours of the independent press era. Professional journalists henceforth did
not depend on wealthy businessmen to set up newspapers and magazines for them; they set them
up themselves and sought social and editorial distance from the prevailing partisanships in the
polity. Notable national newspapers formed by professional journalists were Vanguard (1984),
This Day (1995), Daily/Weekly Trust (1998), Tell (a breakaway from Newswatch in 1991) and
TheNews (another breakaway from Concord in 1993).
Significantly, this era is characterized by three fundamental features. First, it witnessed
the dramatic diminution of the presence and influence of government-owned newspapers and the
rise and popularity of the privately owned commercial press which, though not immune from the
political, regional, and ethnic rivalries in the country, were not necessarily defined by them.
Second, this era saw the phenomenal incursion into journalism of what Dapo Olorunyomi, a
former editor with one of the emergent radical news magazines, called “a well-educated and
politically committed crop of reporters.” He notes that, “Not only were these young men and
women prowling their beats with the confidence of brilliant college graduates, they had also
undergone an activist baptism of fire from the anti-apartheid and student movements.” 308 This
fact is congruent with Richard Flacks's findings on how the entry of young graduates who were
animated by the radicalism in U.S. campuses in the 1960s significantly transformed the
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professions. 309 Third, the period witnessed an extreme radicalization in the editorial
temperaments of significant portions of the independent press in ways that are reminiscent of the
era of the nationalist press, though this also brought with it an unprecedented government
repression of the press.
For instance, in 1984, shortly after the military overthrew the democratically elected
government, it arrested and imprisoned two journalists with the Guardian newspaper, Tunde
Thompson and Nduka Irabor, for allegedly publishing incorrect information about staff
deployment in the external affair ministry of the government. In a particularly bizarre case, in
1986, the military government murdered the America-trained, aggressively muckraking editorin-chief of Newswatch, Dele Giwa, by a letter bomb. 310 A year later, the magazine he edited was
proscribed for six months and its editors jailed for “publishing reports of a government
commission before it was made public.” 311 In 1990, twenty-five journalists were arrested in one
single day for reporting on an unsuccessful coup attempt. The National Concord was closed
down in 1992 for publishing a story that embarrassed Nigeria’s then self-styled military
president, Ibrahim Babangida. Several other independent papers were also proscribed when they
launched virulent attacks on the military for voiding a presidential election it conducted in 1993,
which Moshood Abiola, publisher of National Concord, won in a landslide.
But it was not just the press that was subjected to brutal suppression. Readers of the
radical media were punished as well. For instance, in 1993, a group of Nigerians was arrested for
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reading photocopies of an edition of the TheNews. The military government’s agents had thought
they had seized and burned every copy of the paper. In 1995, the military government’s security
forces arrested and detained a news vendor for transporting several thousand copies of TheNews,
Tell, and Tempo—three of the most adversarial news weeklies in Nigeria at the time. When the
news vendor was formally charged in court, the presiding judge asked the prosecutor if the news
magazines the news vendor was caught transporting to other parts of the country had been
formally banned by government. His response was that the magazines were “simply not
patriotic.” 312 In another incident, a newspaper vendor was arrested for selling the radical Tempo
weekly tabloid, which the government said contained “seditious materials” that had the capacity
to cause “disaffection among members of the public and make them rebel against the authority of
the Federal Government.” 313 At other times, “security forces harassed, arrested and beat anyone
found in a medium’s premises, or anyone related to wanted journalists.” 314
The military government also invoked the anti-press laws that had been in the law books
since colonial times and came up with newer, crueler ones. For instance, in 1993, the
government enacted the Treasonable Offenses Decree, which imposed the death penalty on
anyone who was found guilty of writing or speaking of Nigeria in ways that compromised its
territorial integrity and internal cohesion. This was obviously a trap for the independent press
since, in any case, a government prosecutor could go after a news vendor for merely transporting
news magazines that the government deemed “unpatriotic.” As if that was not harsh enough, the
same year, the government also enacted what it called the Newspaper Decree 43, which required
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all publications in the country to register with the military government’s ministry of information
for the sum of $1000. This move appeared to be borrowed from the colonial era, when the
colonial government made it mandatory for the nationalist newspapers to register with the
government before they could legitimately publish their newspapers. But these measures
obviously did not work because the independent press continued to flourish, so in the late 1990s
the government imposed a hefty valued-added tax on newsprint. This dramatically drove up the
cost of newspapers and magazines and made them exclusive to the people at the upper end of the
social scale.
These repressive measures, however, made the press even more vibrant and more
adversarial and gave rise to the blossoming of what has been called guerilla journalism in
Nigeria, which “involved a hit-and-run in which journalists operating from hideouts continued to
publish oppositional and critical journals in defiance of the state.” 315 As Ibelema aptly notes, this
extraordinary robustness of the Nigerian press in the face of atrociously brutal military
dictatorships “demonstrates that under certain circumstances a vibrant press can co-exist with
harsh censorship, albeit at high human cost. Similarly, whereas the military government's
despotism and the country's economic difficulties would have predicted substantial reduction in
the number of media outlets, there was actually a major expansion in both print and broadcast
outlets.” 316
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3.8

The Rise of Guerilla Journalism

The government-engineered rise in the cost of newspaper and magazine production, the mass
proscriptions of radical newspapers and magazines and the arrest of their reporters and editors
provided the locomotive force for the emergence of a vibrant underground press in the late 1990s
and contributed significantly to the dislodgement of military totalitarianism in 1999, considered
by some to be the “most significant democratic struggle in Nigeria since colonialism ended.” 317
Interestingly, the inspiration for this kind of journalism derives in large part from the adversarial
anti-colonial journalism of the nationalist era. Nosa Igiehor, Tell's executive editor, told a
Nigerian researcher that he found motivation for the kind of insurgent journalism he practiced
from “Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo, and other nationalists of the colonial era.” 318
What particularly redounded to the success and wild popularity of the underground press
was the fact that they practically served as the sole arena for the ventilation of popular
sentiments, especially in light of the fact that the broadcast industry was controlled by the
government and there was no popularly elected parliament. As Ogbondah puts it, in the absence
of a popularly elected parliament, the press became “the people’s parliament” and the “most
effective channel to express their wishes and grievances.” 319
The major publications associated with this phase of Nigerian journalism are Tell,
TheNews, Tempo, and Razor—all news weeklies. There were many other episodic, underground
newspapers that perpetually changed their names, mastheads, and locations in response to
repression from the military. There was an underground radio station called Radio Kudirat,
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named for the wife of Moshood Abiola who was shot in cold blood by agents of the military for
leading the fight for the restoration of her husband’s voided electoral mandate. Given the
increasing precariousness of radical publishing and the ever more vicious desperation of the
military junta, these news magazines decided to invent unconventional means to put out their
news. Nosa Igiebor, editor-in-chief of Tell, told Ayo Olukotun, how they did it.
We sat down and assessed the situation. Their [the military government’s] business was
to ensure that we didn’t publish. Ours was to ensure that we came out without fail. This
meant reorganizing our approach to producing. Rather than stay on one spot and become
sitting ducks for state security [operatives], we had to be several steps ahead of them, by
spreading out and operating in several centers or cells. If we use [one] house this week,
we change the next week and use another house. We of course had to preserve the
anonymity of the owners and venues of our cells. 320
These perpetually migratory, unorthodox news practices that Igiebor outlined became the modus
operandi of all the insurgent news magazines. The core of their strategy, according to Ayo
Akinkuotu, another Tell editor, was the “duplication of offices…. At critical times in Abacha’s
five-year tenure, the magazine was forced to operate over seven ‘bush offices.’ Some were
procured in extreme emergencies while others were evacuated without notice.” 321 They
abandoned the comfort of their newsrooms and held editorial meetings during soccer games, in
sports facilities, theaters, hotel lobbies, taxicabs, or other places that could guarantee a
reasonable concealment of their identities. To avoid arrest by the military government’s security
agents, the guerrilla journalists “sometimes distributed their publication using a hired ambulance
or water truck.” 322 Babafemi Ojudu, an editor with TheNews and Tempo, recalled that he
basically lived a nomadic life; his handbag was his office, he avoided his home, and even from
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time to time donned camouflage to escape the notice of security agents. 323 But the guerilla
journalists also sometimes depended on the protection of government security agents who
secretly sympathized with their crusade and from whom they got sensitive government secrets.
As Tokunbo Ojo put it,
Sometimes the methods used by the underground media bordered on the unethical, but
they seemed justified in the interests of public service and liberation of the country from
the shackles of military dictatorship. Much of the information published underground was
obtained by clandestine methods, including secret tape-recording of government meetings
and gaining access to classified or confidential documents through disguised identities or
through the cooperation of insiders. The stories also made use of documents leaked by
whistleblowers and pro-democracy activists, as well as interviews with victims of
government abuses. 324
This insurgent, narrativistic, personalized, and explicitly partisan journalism of the military-era
underground press in Nigeria ended in 1999 when the military government was compelled to
organize elections and hand over power to civilians again. The 1999 military-organized elections
saw many pro-democracy activists and friends of the guerrilla journalists in elective and
appointive positions. The enemy was defeated and replaced by friends. This effectively led to not
only the death of guerrilla journalism but the cooptation of its practitioners in the new
democratic epoch. So from 1999 to the mid 2000s, the Nigerian media landscape was overcome
by an unprecedented quietude and complacency. The critical gaze that the media had fixed on
people in positions of authority was lowered. The disappearance of the critical press and the
cooptation of many of its strongest advocates led to the untrammeled blossoming of high-profile
corruption in high places.
Nevertheless, as we will see in chapters four and five, the tradition of guerrilla journalism
reincarnated in the online alternative journalism of the Nigerian digital diaspora. In a way, the
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guerilla press in Nigeria is the precursor to the kind of diasporan online journalism this project
investigates. It is important for now to state that, along with sustained civil society agitation,
guerrilla journalism contributed to the defeat of military totalitarianism and the restoration of
democratic rule in 1999. But the triumphalism and self-congratulation that this feat inspired also
led to a premature abandonment of their struggle. Olukotun notes that the guerilla journalists’
“relative closeness to the political establishment has diluted their focus and mission,” arguing,
however, that “the precedent of an underground media system makes it easier for one to rise
again.” 325 And this is precisely what has happened between 2005 and now. The main difference
is that the underground media rose again in an electronic form and from citizen journalists in the
diaspora.
Although the press has been relatively free since the return of civilian rule in 1999, it has,
for the most part, engaged in self-censorship. 326 This is probably a consequence of the need to
escape the time-honored accusation that the strident strictures of the press on the failings of
political elites during civilian rule have often provided the alibi for the military to stage a comeback. Commenting on this, Ette remarks that the “adversarial attitude of the press toward
politicians also weakened press support for democracy. This was a manifestation of an attempt
by Nigerian journalists to emulate the antagonistic and cynical attitude that journalists in the
West tend to adopt for the coverage of politics.” 327 Given the immense sacrifices that the
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independent press made toward the overthrow of military totalitarianism, this kind of criticism
can have a restraining effect on their investigative editorial temperaments.
It could also be that the independent press was overcome by the smug self-satisfaction
that came from the shifting of political power to Nigeria’s southwest, which is home to the
guerrilla press and many of Nigeria’s independent media. Although the attacks of the press were
mostly on the military as an institution, these attacks often assumed ethno-religious dimensions
because the military dictators that have ruled Nigeria since 1966 have been northern Muslims
(except for the first military coup in 1966, led by Christians from the south, which was crushed
after only six months, and again between 1975 and 1978 when a southern Christian became head
of state after a Muslim military head of state was assassinated). So it is entirely possible that the
comfort of the election of a southern born-again Christian can induce a crippling, unaccustomed
complacency. 328
However, behind the façade of the new democratic government hid many issues that
needed to be investigated. Although some sections of the independent media indeed rose to the
challenge of calling attention to governmental indiscretions, their efforts were not sufficiently
robust. 329 This is also perhaps because since 1999 many wealthy politicians, some them elected
state governors, have set up influential newspapers that compete with the independent media. For
instance, Nigeria’s most widely circulated newspaper today, the Sun, is published by the former
governor of the southeastern state of Abia. Other influential papers published by former and
current state governors are the Independent (owned by James Ibori, former governor of the oil-
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rich southern state of Delta), the Nation (owned by Bola Tinubu, the former governor of Lagos
State, Nigeria’s commercial nerve center and most populous state), and the Compass (owned by
Gbenga Daniel, the current governor of the southwestern state of Ogun). The crowding of the
media landscape with these mouthpieces of often corrupt politicians further contributes to
demoting investigative journalism to the backburner, even more so since the core of the editorial
staff of these newspapers are drawn from the independent, commercial, including the previously
guerrilla, press. Furthermore, the void this situation created provided the entry point for the
diasporan online media I will be examining in subsequent chapters.
In light of the foregoing review of the history of the Nigerian press, it seems fair to say
that the Nigerian press was born out of missionary evangelism and the necessity for colonial
propaganda, remade by the contingent nationalism of an emergent marginalized local elite,
matured in party politics, radicalized in advocacy anti-military journalism and weakened by the
smug self-satisfaction that resulted from their role in the restoration of constitutional rule. But a
new, transnational dimension is emerging in the history of the Nigeria media, and this is the birth
and flowering of online journalism by Nigeria’s expanding diaspora in the West, especially in
America, which the next chapter examines. In order to properly contextualize the emergence of
this diasporan online journalism, it is appropriate to introduce the reader to the history and
character of the Nigerian diaspora in America, which is at the vanguard of the nascent
transnational online journalism that this study explores.

112
3.9

The Nigerian Diaspora in America

The last two decades have witnessed the phenomenal migratory flows of Africans to the West,
especially to the United States, at a proportion outpaced only by the Transatlantic Slave Trade. 330
In the case of Nigeria, which leads all African countries in migratory flows to the United
States, 331 this deterritorialization has had and continues to have a profound impact on the politics
of the domestic public sphere. Many scholars have studied how Nigerians in the diaspora, using
the transnational cultural and political capital that their privileged territorial displacement has
conferred on them, established strategic linkages with domestic activist civil society groups to
form the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), which became a central and symbolic locus
of political mobilization in the long and arduous struggle to dislodge totalitarian military regimes
in Nigeria in the 1990s. 332 As would be expected, when democratic rule was restored in 1999,
the newly elected government acknowledged the struggles of Nigerians in the diaspora by
formalizing associative relations with them. The government inaugurated the Nigerians in
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Diaspora Organization (NIDO) and even created liaison offices for Diasporan Nigerians in major
Western embassies. 333
However, while the political and economic consequences of the migratory flows of
Nigerians to the United States have been captured fairly robustly in the scholarly literature on
globalization, 334 there is scant attention to the transnational online journalistic practices of
Nigerians in the diaspora and what impacts these practices have had and continue to have on not
just the form and content of journalistic practices in Nigeria but also on the national post-military
politics of the country.
The first noticeable wave of numerically significant Nigerian migratory flow to the
United States began in the 1960s. 335 However, the United States did not become an attraction for
permanent residence by Nigerians until the late 1980s. In the past, most Nigerians who came to
the United States on student visas went back to the homeland upon completion of their studies.
There were valid reasons for this. The Nigerian economy was vibrant then and could
comfortably accommodate and sustain the middle-class aspirations that the foreign qualifications
and exposure to life in the United States inspired. Sakah Mahmud, for instance, points out that in
the early years of her independence, Nigeria actually attained “self-sufficiency in agricultural
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production, enough for both domestic consumption as well as for export.” 336 In addition to
achieving self-sufficiency in food production, Nigeria also witnessed what has been
characterized as “bonanza development,” 337 which Richard Joseph insightfully defined as
“earnings from petroleum exports considerably above the country’s actual expenditure.” 338
This rosy picture changed in the 1980s with the collapse of the economy in part because
of IMF/World Bank-inspired structural adjustment programs 339 and the unprecedented
institutionalization of venality at the highest levels of government by the totalitarian,
unaccountable military regimes that seized power from the democratically elected government in
1983. Thus, from the late 1980s, a steady stream of Nigerians began to migrate to the United
States and other parts of the Western world. According to the Immigration and Naturalization
Service figures, 112 immigrants admitted for legal permanent residence in 1986 identified
Nigeria as their country of birth. By 2000, the figure rose to 4,355. The 2001 figures from the
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U.S. Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services indicate that there are 134,940 legal
permanent residents in the United States who were born in Nigeria. 340
It is important to note that this figure excludes a large number of Nigerians who fall
outside the classificatory category of “permanent legal resident.” For instance, it excludes
thousands of undocumented people who are in the country because they overstayed their student,
tourist or professional exchange visas, people who came to the United States illegally, and
students who are studying in various colleges and universities in the United States and who are
unlikely to return to the homeland in the immediate future upon completion of their studies.
More importantly, the figure has not captured the thousands of Nigerians who immigrate to the
United States on a yearly basis through the Diversity (Green card) Visa Lottery program. 341 If
these people are taken into account, there are probably up to two million Nigerians living in the
United States. If the present trend continues, it seems reasonable to expect that the United States
will surpass Britain as the second home of Nigerians. But what kind of Nigerian immigrants live
in the United States, and do their cultural assets enable them to influence the domestic public
sphere through their media?
The demographic characteristics of Nigerian immigrants in the United States especially
conduce to the cultural capital they wield in the homeland. Scholars who have studied Nigerian
immigrants point out that they are usually middle-class professionals with at least a college
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degree and are often significantly more educated than most immigrant groups in the United
States. 342 The most recent statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau show that 43.8 percent of
African immigrants (of whom Nigerians have an overwhelming numerical dominion) have
obtained a college degree, compared with 42.5 of Asian-Americans, 28.9 percent for immigrants
from Europe, Russia and Canada, and 23.1 percent of the U.S. population as a whole. As a
Chicago Tribune columnist notes, “That defies the usual stereotypes of Asian-Americans as the
only ‘model minority.’ Yet the traditional American narrative has rendered the high academic
achievements of black immigrants from Africa… invisible, as if that were a taboo topic.” 343
A distinctive feature of Nigerian immigrants in the United States, according to Rachel
Reynolds and Scott Youngstedt, is that although their ancestral provenance is spatially located in
a postcolonial periphery, they are usually “structurally integrated into communities at the
core…working in finance, engineering, sales and management.” 344 This fact, which is in many
respects congruent with the experiences of many highly skilled Third World immigrants who are
“dislocated” to the First World, gives rise to a situation where “the familiar lines between ‘here’
and ‘there,’ center and periphery, West and non-West have to some extent become blurred.” 345
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Like most deterritorialized communities and displaced populations, the Nigerian diaspora
in the United States has a strong nationalist attachment to the homeland. 346 Even though the
country is usually polarized in the homeland along ethnic and religious fault-lines, the reality of
their shared experience of displacement in a strange cultural habitus has forced them to cultivate
and nurture a diaspora romantic nationalism often lubricated by the instrumentality of hometown
associations, the print media and lately the World Wide Web 347—what Appadurai would call the
“paradox of constructed primordialism.” 348 In fact, many Nigerian immigrants in the United
States have transcended their previous diaspora nationalism that was disaffiliated from the
politics of the homeland to one that actively engages with the domestic public sphere through
transnational, diaspora-generated online media outlets.
As a consequence of these demographic characteristics of the Nigerian diaspora in the
United States, members of this community have historically been media savvy and among the
first to embrace the opportunities that the digital space provides for social interaction and the
cultivation and nurturing of an idealistic diaspora nationalism. Misty Bastian’s research on the
Nigerian Diaspora community in the United States shows that as early as the early 1990s the
community had its newspapers, magazines, television and a listserv called Naijanet that were
used to foster a sense of community and to familiarize members with “news from home.” 349 The
first steps “toward developing a Nigerian online network took place in 1991” when a Nigerian at
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Dartmouth College began forwarding to select friends e-mail news about the home country. 350
From this modest beginning emerged Naijanet, which Anna Everett described as “one of the
Internet’s most robust and enduring Afrocentric virtual communities.” 351
Bastian reports that since 1992 “Naijanet has spun off at least six related online
networks,” and that at its height of influence and popularity in 1995 “Naijanetters” numbered
approximately 750. During this period, too, Mary Ebeling informs us, the Nigerian Diaspora of
the Ogoni ethnic minority extraction from the Niger Delta region of the country “used the
Internet as a political mobilizing resource very effectively” to call international attention to the
exploitation of their resources and the degradation of their environment by Shell Oil Company
and the military regime of General Sani Abacha. 352
The late 2000s saw the migration of most of the print media outlets of the Nigerian
diaspora to the Internet and the emergence of new online newspapers with no offline
antecedents. The dissolution of spatial and temporal boundaries that the Internet enables has
conferred a hitherto unthought-of transnational social capital on the diaspora media in ways that
fulfill Bastian’s 1999 vision of a convergence of Nigeria’s everyday realities, the concerns and
content of the diaspora’s online media, and the domestic politics of the homeland. Writing in
1999, Bastian prognosticated that
The wiring of Nigeria itself is probably inevitable, especially under the climate of
political transparency developing in the new Nigerian republic, and is awaited with great
impatience by Nigerian academics and businesspeople alike. At the moment when virtual
Nigeria becomes open to real Nigeria, there is the possibility of a new synthesis, a
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drawing closer of the electronic world of the brain drain diaspora and the real worlds of
both material diasporic experience and Nigerian quotidian life. 353
The emergence of popular diaspora online newspapers that now engage in perpetual political and
cultural dialogues with the homeland would seem to have bestowed an uncannily accurate
materiality to Bastian’s vision. There is now a robust synthesis between the digital media of the
Nigerian Diaspora in the United States and the “quotidian life” of Nigerians in the homeland.
With the progressive expansion of Internet facilities in country, this reality is expanding at a pace
that probably exceeds Bastian’s expectations.
The death of critical media in the Nigeria public sphere as a result of the defeat of
military absolutism has fertilized the growth and flowering of diasporan citizen online
journalism. The “brain drain” digital diaspora, as the next chapter shows, has now deployed its
exilic cultural capital to fill a void that emerged in the media landscape of the homeland.

353

Bastian, “Nationalism in a Virtual Space:”

120
CHAPTER FOUR
4

THE BEGINNINGS OF ONLINE JOURNALISM IN NIGERIA

Two momentous developments have occurred in the Nigerian journalistic landscape in the last
ten years: the migration of all major Nigerian newspapers to the Internet and the robust growth
and flowering of diasporan online news outlets that have actively sought and captured the
attention of both diasporan and homeland readers. On the surface, these developments seem
contradictory, even counter-intuitive. The migration of news content from homeland legacy
newspapers to the Internet should have functioned to satisfy the yearning for domestic news by
diasporan Nigerians and therefore obviated the need for diasporan news outlets. Nevertheless,
citizen diasporan news outlets not only compete with but vigorously undermine the credibility of
homeland newspapers. As this and the next chapter will show, two fundamental factors account
for this.
The first, as chapter three hinted, is the dearth— in fact, the death— of the brand of
investigative and advocacy journalism that characterized the anti-colonial and anti-military eras,
which found an especially concentrated expression in the guerilla press of the 1990s. The
absence of a virile, uncompromised domestic watchdog media system that is committed to
comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable in the face of the enormous venality that
has accompanied Nigeria’s return to democratic rule needed to be corrected. 354 Homeland
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newspapers have proved either unwilling or unable to rise up to this challenge. The second
reason for the rise and popularity of Nigerian diasporan online media is the technical deficiency
of the Web sites of homeland newspapers. Their Web sites are neither updated in real-time nor
are they sufficiently interactive and multi-platform in the fashion of contemporary legacy media
Web sites in the West with which diasporan Nigerians have become familiar. So, in an
interesting reversal, while the mainstream media in the West ventured into online journalism out
of anxieties about the potentially disruptive effects that the emergent citizen online journalism
might have on their professional authority, 355 the Nigerian mainstream media’s lack of
sophisticated Web presence partly inspired the emergence of Nigerian citizen online journalism,
which now potentially disrupts the authority and dominant journalistic practices of the homeland
mainstream media.
Mark Deuze identifies three features that are fundamental to the possibility and vitality of
online journalism: interactivity (the ability for readers or audiences of online content to react to
or interact with and even adapt news content presented to them), multimediality (the technical
possibility for news content to be presented in multiple platforms such as text, video, audio, and
animated graphics), and hypertextuality (being able “to connect the story to other stories,
archives, resources and so forth through hyperlinks”). 356 Deuze explores these three broad
characteristics in terms of four types of online journalism: “mainstream” news sites, “index and
category” sites, “meta and comment” sites and “share and discussion” sites. “Mainstream” and
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“index and category” sites, he points out, are characterized by “moderated participatory
communication,” while “meta and comment” and “share and discussion” sites are characterized
by an “unmoderated participatory communication.” 357 In reality, though, most online news sites
are hybridized; they have a bit of all of these dimensions of online journalism.
John Pavlik, for his part, identifies three stages in the evolution of online journalism. 358
In the first stage, mainstream newspapers merely recycled their print content to the new online
platform. This is often derisively called “shovelware” in industry vernacular. 359 The second stage
in online journalism improved on the first and involved some interactivity with news content
posted on news Web sites. Content was regularly updated on Web sites as news broke. So news
appeared on news Web sites first before it appeared in the print editions. The third and current
stage is very convergent; it features dynamic content that is not necessarily the same as the print
content and that has a lot of multimediality. This is the contemporary phase of online journalism
where lengthy interviews that cannot be published in whole due to the traditional constraints of
newspaper space are posted online, where the audio and video files of interviews published in
print can be uploaded onto news sites, and where exclusively video- and audio-based or
photographic reports that can not possibly be captured by the print medium are featured on the
Web. It is anybody’s guess what the next stage will be. So, online journalism evolved from
textuality to hypertextuality and finally to multimediality. While some people prognosticate that
the next stage might witness the death of the traditional media, others caution against such
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gloomy, apocalyptic projections, insisting instead that “newspapers can coexist with the Internet
while surrendering some tasks, such as archiving factual background, becoming instead more
analytical advocates.” 360

Stage 1
Print on
Web
Content
not
dynamic or
updated

Shovelware

Stage 2
Text
Picture
Hyperlink
Content
regularly
updated

Hypertextuality

Stage 3
Audio
Video
Animation
Content regularly
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User feedback

Multimediality

Next Stages
The future
?

Future Coverage

Table 1: Three Stages of Online Journalism 361

The Web sites of Nigerian homeland newspapers fail the requirements of Deuze’s
multimediality and hypertextuality and seem to be stuck in Pavlik’s first stage in the evolution of
online journalism. The defunct Post Express, the first Nigerian newspaper to migrate its content
to the Internet in 1996 under the direction of the late Dr. Stanley Macebuh, 362 merely recycled its
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print content to the Web. Since then, subsequent Nigerian newspapers that appeared on the Web,
for the most part, also repurposed static shovelware from their print versions. There were
exceptions, though. The Nigerian Guardian, which prides itself on being “the flagship of
Nigerian journalism,” 363 used to be interactive. The online forums and chatrooms it created for
discussing its news content were so popular between the late 1990s and the early 2000s that it
was the first port of call for homesick Nigerians living in the West. A participant in the chatroom
discussions who lived in the UK at the time called it the “rallying point for Nigerians at home
and abroad to meet and discuss common issues of national importance.” 364 However, realizing
that its forums had become wildly popular, the paper decided to commercialize participation. It
required people to pay upfront before being allowed to participate in the online discussion
forums. The paper lost nearly all of its participants. Nobody was prepared to pay a fee in order to
be able to discuss across spatial and temporal boundaries. Instead, this move to commercialize
participation in the Guardian’s chatrooms inspired diasporan Nigerians to set up their own
discussion groups.
To require people to pay a fee before interacting with a newspaper’s content was a
thoughtless and unimaginative business strategy. The Guardian could have used one of the many
strategies the DailyMail.co.uk deployed to earn money from its message boards, including
advertising overlays and sponsorship, use of “intelligent hyperlinks” within postings, etc. 365
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Now, the Nigerian Guardian’s Web site does not even provide any kind of platform to interact
with or comment on its stories. It has reverted to posting shovelware versions of its print edition
and does not even have a functional, intuitive search feature, nor does it have an online archive
of its content—all features that are basic and integral to the architecture of the Web sites of
almost all mainstream Western news media.
A recent notable case of a Nigerian newspaper that could be said to be in the second stage
of Pavlik’s periodization of online journalism is the Abuja-based Leadership newspaper. The
paper’s Web site provided a robust platform for readers to react to and interact with its stories.
Reader comments were uncensored and unfiltered. However, in time it attracted Internet trolls
who turned the forum into avenues for throwing caustic vitriol not only at the writers, editors,
and reporters of the paper but also at other Nigerian ethnic groups. The site was also hacked
through the message boards. 366 The paper took a decision, after about one year of uncensored
comments, to require that readers be registered first before they can have the right to post
comments on the site. The policy drove most readers away.
Other Nigerian newspapers that currently experiment with some form of interactivity in
their Web sites are Daily Trust (based in Abuja, Nigeria’s federal capital), P.M. News, Vanguard,
Punch, and the Nation (all based in Lagos) and the up-and-coming multi-media news platform
called NEXT, which is led by Dele Olojede, the Pulitzer Prize-winning Nigerian journalist who
served as the foreign editor for Newsday. At the time of writing this, NEXT is the only
mainstream Nigeria-based daily newspaper that streams video and audio, that is updated in real
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time, and that is truly hypertextual and fully searchable. 367 Most of the other Nigerian papers
with an online presence are stuck in the first stage of online journalism.
In many ways, the majority of Nigeria’s mainstream newspapers are guilty of the
criticisms that media critic Jon Katz leveled against the U.S. media in the late 1990s. He
criticized U.S. newspapers for remaining “insanely stagnant in an interactive age.” 368 Donald
Matheson attributes this to the mainstream media’s tendency to have a “rather static core set of
news practices” and to place “other journalistic practices at its margins.” 369 Business and
technology columnist Dan Gillmor, for his part, attributed the slow adoption of the blog by the
mainstream media to their “innate conservatism” and asserted further that “when big media
companies consider having a conversation with their audience, they tend not to push many
boundaries.” 370 These criticisms now seem dated in reference to the mainstream media in the
West, but they are still apt in reference to the mainstream media in Nigeria. In the case of
Nigeria, however, it seems more plausible to implicate low technological development and print
journalists’ unease with Internet technology for this state of affairs than the “static core of news
practices” or an “innate conservatism.”
It is precisely this structural and functional deficiency of traditional homeland
newspapers that provided the fillip for the emergence, popularity, and acceptance of citizen
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media by Nigerians who reside outside the shores of their native country; diasporan citizen
online newspapers merely took advantage of the weak online presence of Nigerian newspapers to
establish their relevance. Most of the Web sites that will be profiled in the next section clearly
belong in the third stage of Pavlik’s mapping of online journalism. Their content is active and
updated in real time. They are hypertexual, interactive, and multi-media. Because of these
qualities, they have beaten homeland newspapers, except perhaps NEXT, in breaking regular,
routine news stories. Typically in moments of political crisis the most popular diasporan Web
sites almost always shut down because of high traffic. Unlike the Web sites of homeland
newspapers, the diasporan online media outlets also provide video and audio clips of
newsworthy events, such as the video tape of a Muslim governor caught dancing with Arab
prostitutes and spraying money with reckless abandon at a Dubai night club 371 and an audio tape
of a serving Nigerian governor detailing plans on how he intended to rig elections using thugs
dressed in fake military attire who would intimidate voters. This quality—that is, accompanying
stories with multimedia features— redounds to the popularity and credibility of diasporan online
news sites. Most mainstream Nigerian newspapers have no technical capability or expertise, for
now, to report on the kinds of news stories that involve video and audio components and
animated graphics even if they so desired, and this is precisely why the institutional media in the
homeland are such poor competitors to their diasporan online counterparts.

4.1

371

Profiles of the Diasporan Online Media

SaharaTV, “Borno Governor, Senator Ali Modu Sheriff Dancing and Spraying Dollars in Dubai,”
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRCuvQZPlgw November 05, 2008 (accessed April 10, 2010).

128
As Chapter Three illustrates, members of the Nigerian diaspora, especially in the United States,
are early adopters of the discursive facility of the Internet. They have used it for debates and for
sharing information about the homeland and their immigrant/exile conditions. However, it was
only from 2005 onward that this technology has been deployed in a transnational fashion: to
engage with, and even influence, the politics of the homeland while being physically displaced
from it. The most notable of the online diaspora newspapers are Elendu Reports, 372 Sahara
Reporters, 373 the Times of Nigeria, 374 the Nigerian Village Square, 375 HuhuOnline, 376 and
PointBlankNews. 377.There are many others such as Empowered Newswire 378 (which operates
like a wire service agency), USAfricaonline.com (which prides itself on being the “first Africanowned U.S.-based professional newspaper to be published on the Internet”) 379 and IReportsNG.com 380 but, in the main, their influence in the Nigerian domestic public sphere has been
peripheral at best and nonexistent at worst. By far the most influential Nigerian diasporic
electronic newspapers are the first six identified above. Since their forceful emergence in 2005
and beyond, they have continued to break sensitive news stories that have radically altered the
journalistic practices and politics of Nigeria, as the case studies will show. These diaspora news
372
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outlets have gone beyond being instruments for the construction of subjectivities in the migratory
settings of their owners and consumers to being active change agents in the domestic politics of
the homeland. The next section profiles these sites and highlights some of their major news
stories.

4.2

Elendu Reports
Elendu Reports is published from Lansing, Michigan and is associated with Jonathan

Elendu, a former newspaper journalist with the Nigerian Daily Times. The fact of his being a
previous newspaper journalist who is now involved with citizen and alternative journalism brings
to mind Tony Harcup’s caution against the “binarism” so often evident in the conceptualizations
of alternative and mainstream media formations. Harcup’s research suggests that “there may be
some crossover of ideas, content, style, and, not least, people between what may be termed the
alternative and what may be termed the mainstream; that some of the alternative media’s
‘hybridized voices’… may on occasions resonate within the mainstream.” 381 This is certainly the
case with Elendu Reports, and it was especially true in the early period of its emergence.
Although the site is owned by Elendu, a former reporter-turned-citizen-journalist who is now a
legal permanent resident in the US, some of the most momentous news reports and investigations
on the site were contributed by diverse citizen reporters who had no previous journalistic training
or experience. 382 This illustrates “the existence of what might be termed a continuum, with
people, ideas and practices moving along this continuum, in both directions.” 383
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It is not only in the professional profile of its key personnel that Elendu Reports can be
said to represent a continuum between mainstream and alternative journalism practices. Even the
structural configuration of the site maintains a kinship with the Web sites of homeland
newspapers. For instance, unlike other diasporan citizen media sites, it does not post video and
audio content. Nor does it have a mechanism for readers to interact with its stories in the form of
reader comments. However, its content is updated in real time, making it a resource for domestic
newspapers in Nigeria and a port of call for Nigerians in search of up-to-date news about the
homeland.
Since its inception on May 20, 2005 to January 2011 when this study was concluded, 384
Elendu Reports has conducted nearly 900 investigative political stories and over 400 interviews
(which solicit questions from readers—its most interactive feature) that have had major impacts
in the homeland. A few of them will be cited. The first major story that the news outlet broke,
titled “Carlton Masters: Obasanjo’s Multi-Million-Dollar Lobbyist,” was an investigative story
on the shady dealings between Nigeria’s former president Olusegun Obasanjo and the Atlantabased Goodworks International, LCC founded by Mr. Andrew Young, the former United States
Ambassador to the United Nations. Carlton Masters, a co-founder of Goodworks, Elendu
Reports alleged, helped launch a presidential library campaign for Nigeria’s then president where
he blackmailed Nigerian public and private enterprises to contribute millions of dollars to the
project in violation of Nigeria’s laws. Wole Soyinka, Africa’s first Nobel Prize winner in

later fell out with Elendu and set up his own independent citizen media site called Sahara Reporters, which will be
profiled in the next section.
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Literature, described this as an act of “executive extortion.”385 The story also alleged that oil
contracts running into several millions of dollars were awarded to Goodworks without due
process. 386 One of Nigeria’s most widely read newsmagazines, The News, picked up the story
and reproduced it verbatim. 387 Other daily newspapers followed suit later. The story was
significant because it ruptured the image of transparency and honesty that the president had
managed to build around his public persona over the years. 388 Elendu Reports took advantage of
the Freedom of Information Act in the United States to check the records of Goodworks and
exposed many shocking details of the morally questionable relationship between Nigeria’s
president and his lobbyists in America. This became grist in the editorial mills of local Nigerian
newspapers. In fact, the Atlanta Journal Constitution picked up the story too from the reporting
of Elendu Reports. 389
Similarly, when Louisiana Congressman William Jefferson was embroiled in a bribery
controversy that also implicated Nigeria’s then vice president, Atiku Abubakar, local Nigerian
newspapers depended on Elendu Reports for updates on the story. In the past, they would have
had to depend on Western news agency reports, and if the news agencies did not show an interest
385
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in the story it would never have been reported in the local media. But a distinctly Nigerian
journalistic reporting and interpretation of the Jefferson bribery case, using the journalistic
resources of the United States, altered the nature and character of reportage on the issue in the
Nigerian local press. An evaluation of the archives of major Nigerian newspapers at the time of
the incident showed that the reporting and interpretive frameworks of Elendu Reports, not U.S.
news agencies or newspapers, informed the local reporting of the issue.
Another major story that the citizen media site broke in 2005 was the involvement of
former President Obasanjo’s 28-year-old son in the acquisition of multi-million-dollar property
in New York. The reporters showed documents to substantiate their claims. The news became so
widespread in Nigeria that the government was forced to respond to the allegations in the
domestic press, even though most domestic newspapers initially ignored the story for fear of
falling foul of Nigeria’s notoriously slippery libel laws. The government’s spokesperson said the
son of the president acquired the property with a mortgage from a U.S. bank. This turned out to
be false. Not familiar with the nature of record keeping in the United States, the government did
not realize that citizen reporters at Elendu Reports could easily disaffirm their claims by
investigating the lending history of the president’s son. The reporters’ investigation showed that
the president’s son did not get a mortgage to buy the property. 390 The local media got interested
in the story and picked it up. It became a major embarrassment for the government.
The newspaper also broke sensational stories about the U.S. investments and bank
accounts of serving Nigerian governors and other important government officials. The Nigerian
constitution forbids elected officials from keeping foreign bank accounts. Violation of this
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policy, the Nigerian constitution says, is sufficient ground for the impeachment and removal of
elected officials and for other kinds of stern disciplinary measures against appointed government
officials. 391 It also published pictures of the insanely expensive homes purchased by Nigerian
governors and ministers in Potomac, Maryland, and in London. 392
In time, however, Elendu Reports began to soften its criticism of the governor of the
northwestern state of Sokoto about whom it had done a series muckraking of reports. Its reports
had been picked up almost entirely by TheNews and the Nigerian Tribune and became the basis
for a motion to probe the governor by the Sokoto State House of Assembly, as the legislative arm
of the state government is called. The legislative committee that investigated the governor
“tendered in evidence to the Committee… copies of TheNews magazine, the Nigerian Tribune,
excerpts from Elendureports.com and other newspaper publications.” 393 Curiously, shortly after
he was exculpated by a pliant, rubber-stamp committee that putatively investigated him, the then
391
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governor called Jonathan Elendu to tell him that “the State Assembly has cleared me from the
trouble you started for me…. I am obviously very happy as you can tell.” 394 Subsequent stories
published on the site whitewashed the governor. 395 And advertorials from the governor began to
appear on the site with a regularity that many observers found curious. It later emerged that
Jonathan Elendu had struck a deal with the governor to become his “media consultant.” 396
Omoyele Sowore, Elendu’s main partner, was disillusioned and scandalized. He subsequently
stopped any professional association with Elendu Reports. 397 In 2006, after leaving Elendu
Report, he set up SaharaReporters.com.
Elendu Reports, as has been shown above, exposed corruption and challenged abuse of
power in radical ways, although its credibility has been tainted over the course of its existence.
Perhaps it is not surprising that the site turned out to be not the alternative news site that people
assumed it was—or that it started out as. The site indicatively describes itself as a “for-profit
company” but solicits contributions from members of the public, and insists that “your
contributions to the sustenance of Elendureports.com does [sic] not entitle you to anything or
create any obligations between you, the publisher, editors, and staff of Elendureports.com.” 398
Surprisingly, the site has almost no ads as of May 2010. It does not even have the easy-to-get
394
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Google ads to which many Web sites and blogs subscribe in order to earn some revenue,
although Websiteoutlook.com, a site that purports to be able to estimate the real-time worth of
Web sites, claims that Elendu Reports generates daily ad revenue of $8.6 and is worth $6278. 399
Although Elendu Reports’ credibility has been badly besmirched by its questionable
association with a governor it has reported to be corrupt, the Nigerian federal government still
found the owner of the site a sufficient source of concern to arrest and detain him when he
traveled to Nigeria. Details of this will be discussed at the end of this chapter. As I will show in
Chapter Six, ElenduReports exemplifies the difficulties of identifying what constitutes
alternative journalism. The main personality associated with the site was a former mainstream
newspaper journalist who chose to expose corruption in his homeland in ways that ruffled the
composure of the elite. Additionally, the site, by not having ads, gave the impression that its
politics and editorial choices were motivated by lofty, progressive ideals. In time, however, it
became profoundly implicated in the ills it fulminated against. Thus, it ultimately became no
different from the homeland legacy media whose loss of critical, investigative reporting tradition
was the basis for the popularity of the site. This shows the fluidity and hybridity of journalistic
genres and the inappropriateness of the binaries between alternative journalism and mainstream
journalism. It also illustrates that overt aversion to advertising is not necessarily an indication of
principled editorial independence.

4.3

SaharaReporters
Sowore Omoyele, a New York-based activist and permanent U.S. resident who had no

previous mainstream journalistic training or experience broke away from Elendu Reports to set
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up the Sahara Reporters. Sowore, a former radical president of the University of Lagos students’
union government, drew national and international media attention in 1992 when he led
thousands of students to protest against military rule. Police opened fire on the student protesters
and killed seven of them. Sowore miraculously survived the bloodbath and became a media
sensation. Before he relocated to the United States in 1999, he had been illegally imprisoned and
tortured by the law enforcement agents of Nigeria’s military regimes at least eight times. 400 The
journalistic practices of the site he founded are consciously modeled in the tradition of “guerrilla
journalism” in Nigeria—unconventional, uncompromising, adversarial advocacy journalism that
was used by certain weekly newsmagazines to confront brutal military dictatorships in Nigeria in
the 1990s. 401 The site’s “About Us” page sums up its founding philosophy and identity thus:
Sahara Reporters is an online community of international reporters and social advocates
dedicated to bringing you commentaries, features, news reports from a Nigerian-African
perspective. A unique organization, founded in the spirit of Article 19 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, comprising of ordinary people with an overriding
commitment to seeking the truth and publishing it without fear or favor. Because its core
members are unapologetic practitioners of advocacy journalism, Sahara Reporters also
serves as an umbrella outlet for objective reporting of verifiable and accurate news and
untainted social commentaries for anyone wishing to exercise their freedom of speech in
the public interest and common good [emphasis mine]. 402
Of all the Nigerian diasporan online media currently in existence, Sahara Reporters is the closest
approximation to the previously adversarial but now mainstream Nigerian guerrilla
newsmagazines. In fact, it has turned out to be more influential and more adversarial than these
400
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erstwhile alternative media platforms. Amory Starr has pointed out that the Web has now
become a veritable extension of the alternative press. 403 But in the Nigerian case, it is not an
extension but a reincarnation and intensification of the alternative press. The site’s explicit
revolutionary inclinations and almost compulsive opposition to all governments in Nigeria mark
it out as the most “alternative” of all the Nigerian diasporan media. Evidence of its revolutionary
commitments came to light in the story of a young Nigerian who applied to work for the site as a
citizen reporter from Nigeria. The young Nigerian who described himself as a faithful reader of
the site recalled his experience: “I wanted to be a Sahara reporter. I scribbled down an
application letter and sent by email, in a minute I got a reply to my mail.” The response he
received, which he reproduced in his article, graphically captures the uncompromisingly
adversarial editorial philosophy of the site. It reads:
Dear you,
This is to acknowledge receipt of your application to the organization.
As part of [our] company policy, eligible candidates must possess the following: A penchant
for government dirty news, ownership of a covert camera, ownership of dual passports,
ownership of a face mask, ability to pick up arms and revolt, ability to incite the public
against the government, [and] guerilla warfare experience will be an added advantage.
If you meet the above mentioned qualifications, please feel free to give us a call.
Regards,
The Sahara team 404
The writer said he was perplexed. He said he expected to read about educational qualifications
and years of journalism experience as yardsticks to measure his suitability for “admission into an
enviable organization like Sahara Reporters.” He ended his rumination by criticizing the Sahara
Reporters brand of journalism. “My fellow Nigerians, yes we know all is not well with our
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nation [but] Sahara reporters is not doing us any good. We need to focus and re-strategize not
with the likes of Sahara reporters exposing our weaknesses like a cancerous growth. Corruption
and bad leadership [are] not exclusively Nigerian.” 405
In an interview with Tell, one of the erstwhile “guerilla” newsmagazines, Omoyele
Sowore was asked if he thought “Sahara Reporters does what Nigerian journalism is not doing?
How well is SR doing?” His response was as insightful as it was viciously censorious of
mainstream news practices at home:
Saharareporters is not a journalistic endeavor. It is a reportorial platform for Nigerian
citizens. It is a place where citizens report news – where they report themselves. We do
not lay claim to the practice of journalism. We do not write or keep journals. We report
events, news and write reports of real time issues. It is our response to the failure – the
refusal or lack of will on the part of professional journalists – to report real news to the
people. The goal of Saharareporters is like asking citizens to prepare their own food
instead of eating junk food. SR is doing well in that regard. We have broken the sound
and speed barriers of reporting authentic, evidence-based news [emphasis mine]. 406
In the same interview, he told the magazine that “Nigerian journalism… is going through its
worst moments today. There is a difference between journalism and the circulation of press
releases written by state governors and their media aides.” When he was asked what message he
had for Nigerian journalists, he said, “The message for them is on Saharareporters. They know
how to get it.” And in response to a question about what awards he had won since starting Sahara
Reporters, he said he did not venture into adversarial citizen journalism to garner awards.
I have received lots of threats: those are my awards for what I do. It comes with the
territory. The threats and harassment, just like awards, are the inspiration that push this
work. Each time I am threatened, I interpret it to mean that we must necessarily create a
society where no one is threatened for expressing his or her opinion and for using his or
her talents. 407
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Similarly in an appeal for financial assistance on its site in 2008, Sahara Reporters announced,
“We want to remain true to our dream of providing average readers with the tools that can help
them make informed decisions about how their nations are run in the Sub-Saharan African
region...” and vowed to “remain the authentic, independent, and investigative citizen reporters
who unearth what has remained hidden from the public eye.” 408
Sahara Reporters is far and above the most popular and the most politically consequential
Web-based newspaper with Nigerians both at home and in the diaspora. It gets millions of hits in
a month and its news stories generate hundreds of reader comments. 409 No other Nigerian Web
site comes even close to this. It is highly interactive, hypertextual, and multimedia—all the
elements of the third stage of online journalism identified by Pavlik. It also has a devastatingly
effective photo essays section that graphically chronicles corruption among Nigerian elite and a
huge “E-library” containing incriminating documents—such as convictions— against prominent
government officials. More than any Nigerian media outlet—whether mainstream or citizen— it
has a huge, fanatical online community of readers and commenters that also supports it
financially through voluntary contributions. In moments of political uncertainty in Nigeria, the
site literally shuts down due to extremely high traffic. For instance, when news from the
grapevine filtered through that Nigeria’s then ailing but now dead president, Umar Musa
Yar’adua, had been flown back from Saudi Arabia (where he was receiving treatment) to Nigeria
in an air ambulance in order to stop his vice president from assuming acting presidential duties,
millions of people turned to Sahara Reporters. The site crashed and had this message on its site:
408
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Please accept SR's apologies. As expected we were hit with high traffic leading our
server resources to max out. We are gradually back online and should be fully back later
today, check out www.saharareporters.com for the latest information on Yar'adua's
mysterious and highly secretive return to Abuja early today!
This has happened more than ten times since the site has been monitored for this study. No other
Nigerian news site witnesses this volume and intensity of Web traffic. Editors and reporters of
local Nigerian newspapers monitor it closely for scoops and breaking stories that they consider
“safe” to republish. 410 Although the site’s reportorial practices sometimes verge on
premeditatedly extravagant exaggeration in its bid to run down corrupt governments, its
credibility has not been called into question in any serious way. It exposes incumbents as much
as it hits opposition politicians who actively seek office.
Increasingly, it is also attracting the attention of international news organizations like
CNN and BBC, and international wire services like the Associated Press, Reuters, and AFP.
When, on December 25, 2009, news of the Nigerian underwear bomber broke, for instance,
American and other international news media, including wire services, turned to Sahara
Reporters for inquiries on the background of the would-be bomber. In fact, the first photos of the
would-be suicide bomber used in the Western media were obtained from the site. 411 This gave
the site more international visibility and an added importance at home. Many Nigerians wrote
articles to celebrate this feat. 412
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The site’s biggest draw is its uncanny capacity to exploit the discontent and intra-class
wrangling of the Nigerian ruling elite to get sensitive scoops and its ability to “on several
occasions…[report] stories months before they break in the local Nigerian media.” 413 In an
interview with another major Nigerian newspaper called the Sun, Sowore said he achieved that
feat because he had “moles” even in the closets of Nigeria’s presidents. “When Obasanjo was
president, I had people among those who travel[led] with him that gave me information. And
when I report[ed] it, everybody would be wondering where we got the information from. I have
moles inside the closet of Obasanjo when he was president of this country. But we don’t have to
reveal such people.” 414
Sahara Reporters’ first major story that shook the Nigerian state was an interview with
the first son of Nigeria’s president in 2006, Olusegun Obasanjo. The president’s son made many
shocking revelations about his dad, the country’s vice president, and corruption in high places.
He said, for instance, that his dad had a “libido problem,” that his dad’s close lieutenants desired
to extend his stay in power beyond the two terms of four years mandated by the Nigerian
constitution, and that the vice president of Nigeria at the time was corrupt and greedy. 415 The
interview was reproduced in its entirety by almost all Nigerian newspapers and magazines. The
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presidency panicked and sought to control the damage of the allegations in the interview. The
president’s son later denied ever granting any interview to Omoyele Sowore and sued Sahara
Reporters, including select Nigerian newspapers and editors that republished the interview. 416 In
retrospect, however, almost all the issues revealed in that interview came to pass. The president
and his vice president later fell out acrimoniously and publicly, it later emerged that top officials
of the president were indeed trying to manipulate the Nigerian National Assembly to amend the
constitutional provision that imposed presidential terms limits and, more sensationally, the
president’s son divorced his wife and told the court that his putative children were actually sired
by his father, the former president. 417
Some of the site’s other major stories that called attention to it are the publishing of the
pictures of a governorship candidate in morally compromising circumstances. Although the
pictures were not reprinted in Nigerian newspapers because of their lurid nature, they were
viewed widely by Nigerians at home. The pictures were printed off the Internet and widely
distributed to people who had no access to the Internet. This scandal outraged the moral
sensibilities of the establishment and caused the political party of the governorship candidate to
withdraw his nomination for election. 418
In 2007, the site also broke stories of allegations of certificate falsification against a
governorship candidate and even the chair of the Independent National Electoral Commission,
416
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the organ of government charged with the responsibility of conducting elections at the federal
level. Both the governorship candidate, identified as Andy Uba, and the chief electoral officer,
Maurice Iwu, indicated in their resumes that they were educated in U.S. and British institutions
respectively. But inquiries from these institutions by Sahara Reporters showed that the
governorship candidate and the electoral umpire either fabricated some certificates outright or
exaggerated their educational attainments. The story captured the imagination of the local media
and the Nigerian public.
In spite of the site’s uncompromisingly adversarial stance against government officials,
it receives attention from official circles. For instance, Nigeria’s then vice president Atiku
Abubakar, who was at loggerheads with his boss over political differences, granted Sahara
Reporters a full-length interview where he made stunning allegations against the president. A
day after the interview was posted on its Web site, Nigerian newspapers picked it up and
splashed it on their front pages. On a daily basis, government representatives respond to negative
stories written about them. To their credit, Sahara Reporters gives them the right of reply.
Although Sahara Reporters is sustained mostly through donations from its readers, it also
welcomes adverts on its site from different sources: Google Ads; U.S.-based online universities
like Capella University, Phoenix University, etc; ads from Nigerian businesses such as banks and
oil companies; and Nigerian politicians, including corrupt politicians. Interestingly, however,
throughout the five-year period that this site was observed, there has never been an instance of a
reciprocal editorial acknowledgement of the advertising patronage of corrupt politicians who
advertise on the site. In fact, there have been instances when politicians placed ads on the site
and the following day a very negative story about them would appear. A powerful instance of
this concerns the governor of the oil-rich state of Delta in Nigeria’s deep south, Emmanuel
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Uguaghan. The governor’s ads promoting his bid for a second term in office appeared on Sahara
Reporters regularly for much of the year 2010. But in May of the same year a story broke which
implicated the governor in a corrupt transaction involving his predecessor by the name of James
Ibori. 419 He was exposed. But his ads continue to appear on the site nonetheless. Interestingly,
many Nigerian print newspapers and magazines also advertise on the site. This is particularly
true of emerging publications seeking to be noticed and also older publications that want to tickle
potential readers’ attention about scoops they have uncovered.
It is noteworthy that coming to terms with Sahara Reporter’s brand of “insurgent
journalism,” as James Curran and Jean Seaton 420 call alternative journalism, did not occur as
smoothly as my analysis might seem to suggest. It was first resisted by the mainstream domestic
media; however, when the resistance had the effect of vitiating the credibility of the local
newspapers because news-hungry Nigerians either rushed to Internet cafes to read the stories
directly from the site or printed off the stories in bulk for sharing with people who could not
afford the cost of reading a paper online, the newspapers were forced to reprint and occasionally
add more local color to some of the stories published on the site. This is true for some of the
other diaspora citizen media. In a bid to undermine their authority, however, the diasporan media
are not usually given credit for the stories lifted from them; they are often just nebulously
referred to as “agency reports” or “offshore news sites.”
So the relationship between the “insurgent” Sahara Reporters and the local press is at
best ambivalent. It is sometimes mutually beneficial (such as when the local press utilizes the
419
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investigative resources of the diaspora press to expose certain governmental corruption—and in
the process give the diaspora press more “mainstream” national visibility) and at other times
adversarial, such as when the domestic media ignore the exposés by the diasporic media of
politicians connected to the owners of some Nigerian newspapers. Such a stance usually imposes
strains on the credibility of the domestic press. Often, opposition politicians who benefit
politically from investigative stories against politicians that the domestic press ignore recruit
young men to make large printouts of the online stories and distribute to people free of charge.
What the profile of SaharaReporters tells us is that commercialism and critique are not
mutually exclusive. The fact that the site accepts ads from corrupt politicians has not stopped it
from exposing their sordid corruption. This fact is a challenge to the dominant strand in
alternative media scholarship that insists that freedom from commercial pressure is the sine qua
non of alternative journalism. Although advertising does indeed subtly (and in some cases
overtly) control editorial content in media organizations, SaharaReporters has shown that it is
possible to resist this control. The contrast between Elendu Reports and SaharaReporters is
particularly noteworthy: although Elendu Reports does not accept advertising from any source,
its editorial output has been found to be thoroughly compromised whereas SaharaReporters has
shown remarkable editorial independence in spite of the fact that it accepts ads even from the
people it torments through its adversarial journalism.

4.4

The Times of Nigeria

Another notable diasporan citizen media outlet that exerts some influence on politics and
journalistic practices in the homeland is the Times of Nigeria (TON). Unlike Elendu Reports and
Sahara Reporters, however, TON is not a muckraking news outlet. It is more mainstream and
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traditional in its reportorial temperaments than all the diasporan citizen media examined in this
study. Its strongest point from its inception has been it ability to break exclusive news stories
about Nigeria. Started in 2005, it is owned by a Maryland-based Nigerian journalist by the name
of Sunny Ofili who is a former reporter with the defunct African Guardian. He immigrated to the
United States in 1993 “with the resolve to become successful in that country.” 421 The TON,
which likes to call itself an “online newspaper,” describes itself as “an African initiative by
journalists with significant experience in Africa and international coverage” and says its goal is
to “break news as it happens. We will provide an authoritative, comprehensive, authentic and
analytical coverage of the political process as well as other facets of life in Nigeria and the
African continent.” 422 Elsewhere, it describes itself thus:
TheTimesOfNigeria.com is Nigeria’s first independent online newspaper committed to
providing real time, dynamic and dispassionate news from Nigeria and Africa. We
recognize that, often, news about Nigeria and indeed Africa lack [sic] depth and balance.
We intend to remedy this anomaly. TheTimesOfNigeria.com will report Nigerian and
African news events from an African perspective. 423
The site’s strength, especially in its early days, was the richness and reliability of its news
sources. Local newspapers look up to it for breaking news and for scoops. A measure of its
acceptability in the political mainstream in the homeland was that all the major presidential
candidates in the 2007 presidential elections in Nigeria advertised on its Web site. In fact, when
Nigeria’s then ruling party presidential candidate, the late Umar Yar’Adua, physically collapsed
during one of his campaign events prior to the elections and was rushed to a German hospital for
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medical attention, it was the Web site that broke the story before the local or other diasporan
citizen media carried it. In time, rumors spread that the then presidential candidate had died in
the German hospital where he was admitted. Even the normally authoritative Elendu Reporters at
the time reported that Yar’adua had died. 424 Interestingly, when he heard news of his death while
in his German hospital, the first news medium he called to confirm that he was alive was the
Times of Nigeria. 425 A day after publishing the interview with the then presidential candidate on
its home page, the local media picked it up and splashed it on their front pages. 426 The paper also
has the distinction of having interviewed the Nigerian vice president, former presidents and
military heads of state and several other top political figures.
Perhaps TON’s strongest point is that it is the medium of choice for propaganda by Niger
Delta militants protesting the desperate poverty amidst vast oil wealth in their communities and
the unconscionable environmental despoliation of their farming communities by oil companies.
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the most prominent group in
the Niger Delta, often releases scoops to the TON first before any other media organization. For
instance, in 2007, CNN asked its then African correspondent Jeff Koinange to do a story on
Niger Delta militancy, which often involves the kidnapping of Western oil workers for
ransom. 427 But Koinange and leaders of MEND could not agree on a time for them to take him
round their base of operation. But because he had to meet his deadline, he arranged for a group
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of youths to pose as members of MEND. He then interviewed them and sent a staged report to
CNN as an authentic news report.
In the video, we see menacing, hooded “militants” dancing themselves to a state of
“trance,” aiming their guns at purportedly kidnapped Pilipino oil workers, and insisting that they
would only grant CNN an interview in the middle of the river for “spiritual” reasons—all plots to
make the report seem real and make it conform to the prevalent fantasies about Africa in the
West. The wild gyrations and exaggerated, even theatrical, show of militancy and
bloodthirstiness of the people in the video were simply out of step with the image of a people
who were angry. Naturally, the Nigerian government protested and charged that the report was
staged. MEND also dismissed the report as staged. This created a strange positional confluence
between the Nigerian government, which did not like the report because it portrayed the
government in a bad light, and members of MEND who had hoped that CNN would tarry a little
while, speak to the real MEND, and give wider publicity to their grouse against the Nigerian
state.
CNN stood its ground that the report was real. 428 For a while, it seemed like both the
Nigerian government and MEND were unfairly accusing CNN of reportorial fraud. Then MEND
contacted the TimesofNigeria.com and gave them the log of the email correspondence between
CNN reporter Jeff Koinange and their leader, a certain Jomo Gbomo. It turned out that CNN
contacted MEND to arrange for CNN cameras to be brought to their operational base in the
Niger Delta creeks, but both parties could not agree on the time for this to happen. In frustration,
CNN’s Koinange got a group of Niger Delta youths, paid them some money and told them how
to act and what to say for the report.
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In the email correspondence published by TimesofNigeria.com, Koinage told MEND’s
spokesman Jomo Gbomo that “CNN is been[sic] given the GREEN LIGHT to come into the
Delta” and that he wanted to “check with you first and make sure this is a legitimate ‘invitation’
from you and that your [sic] aware of it.” Gbomo responds: “Hi Jeff, do not waste your time with
those criminals…misleading the Nigerian government and oil companies into believing they
have a relationship with us. They can arrange a few boys who will take you on stage trips
through Delta State alone. They do not represent MEND or the people of the Niger Delta.” He
advises CNN’s Koinange to “kindly wait till I give you the green light to come down here” and
then adds that the “Nigerian government has been working through such traitors to infiltrate and
destroy our group.” Koinage appeared to be convinced. He wrote: “In that case, my Brother, I
shall wait for your WORD and will only come when you are ready for us,” adding that he was
getting “a lot of pressure from my headquarters in Atlanta to come and do this story.” 429
He apparently could not wait for the legitimate MEND. Perhaps because Koinage was
“getting a lot of pressure from [his] headquarters in Atlanta to come and do this story,” he
dispensed with the real MEND and preferred to “arrange” a “stage trip” with “criminals.” The
result was a histrionic journalism on CNN that earned the condemnation of both the Nigerian
government and MEND. But when Koinange was interviewed on CNN he lied, claiming that he
had no reason to believe that he was not talking to the real MEND. The leakage of the email
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correspondence between him and MEND spokesman on the TimesofNigeria.com put a lie to his
claim. He was later fired by CNN as a result of the report. 430 It is instructive that MEND did not
choose a domestic Nigerian newspaper to leak the email correspondence to. Nor did it send the
incriminating emails to CNN or any international news organization.
The Times of Nigeria has rich, colorful graphics, is interactive, and also streams video. It
has citizen correspondents in Nigeria, especially in southern Nigeria, who compete with local
newspapers for routine news stories. However, TON’s editorial temperaments, for the most part,
seem like those of traditional newspapers. It also seems to have a lot of connection with state
governments in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta from where the owner of the site hails. Many state
governments from that part of Nigeria, especially Delta State, advertise copiously on the site.
This is perhaps not altogether unexpected. Many of the stories the site carries about the often
corrupt state governments in the area are mostly uncritical at best and gushingly laudatory at
worst. The advertising on the site by the state governments is clearly a reciprocal
acknowledgement of the site’s compliant reporting. In fact, on TON’s Facebook page, it is a fan
of many pro-government groups such as “Deltans Want Uduaghan Again,” a Facebook group
championing the re-election for a second term of the governor of the oil-rich Delta State, “Youth
Alliance for Emmanuel Eweta Uduaghan,” another propaganda group for the Delta State
governor, “Atiku for President 2011,” a Facebook group for the promotion of the presidential
aspirations of Atiku Abubakar, Nigeria’s corrupt former vice president, etc. In fact, on the site’s
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front page, Ofili proudly proclaims himself the “Coordinator—Delta Professionals for
Uduaghan.”
Interestingly, since the site’s founding in 2005, it has never exposed any act of corruption
by any government. On the contrary, it often functions to refute unflattering stories published
against certain government officers, especially anti-corruption stories by SaharaReporters and
other muckraking citizen media sites. A sample of recent stories on the site proves this. 431
Perhaps because the site survives through direct advertising patronage from state governments in
the Niger Delta, it does not solicit voluntary contributions from its readers like other diasporan
citizen media do. It also does not have Google ads but has a lot of advertising from Nigerian
banks. Websiteoutlook.com estimates that the site generates at least $8.88 per day in revenue and
puts its net worth at $6482.4 as of May 2010. 432
TimesofNigeria.com, clearly, is not an alternative media site in the sense that
SaharaReporters is. It can, however, be said to be a site of resistance for Niger Delta struggles, a
site for exclusive news about Nigeria’s political intrigues and a site of cynical official
propaganda, although there is no evidence that it is bankrolled by any government. Its greatest
significance in the media politics of Nigeria is that it has helped to broaden the availability of
news. It obviously has access to top politicians in the country and to Niger-Delta militants and
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the advantage of its online platform makes it desirable. In this sense, it qualifies only as a citizen
media site.

4.5

The Nigerian Village Square

The Nigeriavilagesqaure.com was founded in 2003 by a group of immigrant Nigerians based in
the United States. The main person associated with it is Philip Adekunle, a Chicago-based
computer information systems specialist. The site was set up to serve as a locus for the
untrammeled exchange of ideas and opinions about the homeland by Nigerians both at home and
in the diaspora. 433 It is the reinvention, in an electronic form, of the deliberative content of the
“village square” in the pre-colonial African social formation where “people from all corners
[met] at the Village Square after a hard day's work to sip unadulterated palm-wine, share news,
gossip, jokes, music, dance, events and opinions.” 434 In many respects, the pre-colonial African
village square that the owners of this Web site are making reference to has many resonances with
the early European bourgeois public sphere that Habermas historicized; only that the African
village square was pre-modern, pre-bourgeois and did not function as a counterweight to the
ruling class, nor did it have any purposive, codified normative ideals that guided its deliberative
practices. But it was a core cultural institution that was crucial to the intergenerational
perpetuation of traditions, customs and mores, which were shattered with the advent of
colonialism.
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The reincarnated village square in electronic form, however, both replicates and
transcends the structures and discursive practices of its predecessor. Although the
NigeriaVillagesquare.com has guidelines on the form of articles to be posted on its front pages
and in its discussion forums, the site is largely unmoderated. It accepts opinion articles, news
commentaries, trivia, and even fictional creative writing from all Nigerians and non-Nigerians
interested in Nigerian affairs. Contributors to the site do not have to be subscribers or registered
users to submit articles, although they need to be registered to participate in online discussions of
materials posted on the site. This speaks to the site’s inclusivity.
Although the site is not primarily a news site, it publishes breaking news stories, has a
citizen media project called “iWitness,” 435 which collates reports from citizen reporters from all
over Nigeria especially during periods of conflicts, and it is often the interim medium for many
of the diasporan citizen media projects. For instance, after breaking with Elendu,
SaharaReporters’ reports were first published on the Nigerian Village Square for months before
an independent Web site was secured for it. Huhuonline.com also first published its stories on
the Village Square before getting its own independent site. Many of the strictly news citizen
media sites still share their news stories on the Village Square’s message boards, and a great
number of politically consequential citizen reports that went on to change state policy started on
this site.
The site also has links to the Web addresses of major Nigerian newspapers that have an
online presence, periodically posts high-impact and controversial news stories both from the
domestic newspapers and from diasporan online newspapers on its front page, and invites
discussion from subscribers. This feature has made it one of the most popular Internet sites for
Nigerians both at home and in the diaspora. The debates in the site’s forums are not only robust,
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and sometimes frenzied, even emotional, but also evince a studious concern for civility in public
discourse. Aware that Internet deliberation is easily susceptible to degenerate into ad hominem
attacks, the site has what it calls the “Nigerian Village Square Publishing Guide,” which not only
gives instructions on how commentaries should be posted on the site but also the ground rules for
deliberation. It stresses the importance of eschewing emotive language and embracing what
Habermas would call rational-critical debate. And one of the mechanisms established to ensure
that this rule is observed is the formation of what is called the “village dumpster” where articles,
comments and discussions that are deemed irreverent or overly personal and insulting are
consigned. 436 The decision about what posts should be pushed to the “village dumpster” is often
arrived at through the votes of registered members of the site. This structural check has imposed
self-moderation on many discussions in the forum, but it also occasionally raises allegations of
majoritarian tyranny.
It is instructive that over the years the site has transformed from being a mere cyber salon
for quotidian dialogic disputations to a close-knit cyber community where deliberations and
decisions about national politics take place. For instance, in 2006, when the immediate past
president of Nigeria wanted to manipulate the national legislature to amend the constitution to
allow him to run for a third term, “villagers,” as members of the discussion forums on the site
call themselves, started an Internet petition drive to stop the move. They generated petitions from
thousands of Nigerians in the diaspora and contributed money to send a representative to deliver
the petition to the President of the Nigerian Senate and the Speaker of the House of
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Representatives. It was also delivered to the president when he visited the United States. 437 This
move generated publicity in the national media and contributed to the defeat of the president’s
third-term bid. Similarly, in the same year, when a Nigerian immigrant by the name of Osamuyia
Aikpitanhi was murdered by Spanish immigration officers, the “villagers” not only vigorously
deliberated on the issue, they contributed money and sent a delegation to Spain to demand an
explanation on the circumstances of the death of their compatriot. The delegation also met with
the parents of the deceased Nigerian and gave them a $1,200 check that the “villagers”
contributed. It was robustly covered by Nigeria’s biggest, state-run television network, the
Nigerian Television Authority, more popularly known by its acronym NTA. 438 Similarly, they
had a meeting with Nigerian government officials and got the president and the Nigerian
legislature to request that Spanish authorities explain the circumstances surrounding the death of
the Nigerian and to pay compensation to the family if need be. Weeks after this visit, what would
have been an ignored issue was elevated to a major diplomatic row between Nigeria and
Spain. 439 At last, the Spanish government set up a commission to investigate the murder of the
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Nigerian and issued an interim apology to the Nigerian government while the investigation was
in progress. 440
The “villagers,” many of whom have never met physically except through the virtual
village square, directly intervene in many domestic political issues. Another prominent example
is the petition drive that was started in the village square in the midpoint of 2007 to force the
Nigerian Vice President to declare his assets. Although the Nigerian constitution does not require
public officials to declare their assets publicly, Nigeria’s then newly elected president, in a bid to
show his seriousness in fighting corruption, publicly declared his assets for the first time in the
country’s history. 441 This singular act earned him praise, but it also paved the way for citizens to
demand the same forthrightness from other elected representatives. The vice president insisted
that because he was under no constitutional obligation to declare his assets publicly, he would
not be railroaded into doing so. Again, members of the Nigerian Village Square started a petition
drive to which hundreds of Nigerians in the diaspora appended their signatures. A representative
physically went to Nigeria not only to deliver the petition but to attract wide media attention to
this event. 442 This pressure contributed to forcing the vice president to publicly declare his
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assets. 443 Efforts were doubled to shame other well-placed public officers into publicly declaring
their assets.
The media attention that the interventionist activities of members of the
Nigerianvillagesquare.com has generated has given it a lot of visibility and clout in government
circles, and many well-known personalities in government are known to be registered members
of the forum either anonymously or with their full names. A case in point is that of Mr. Olusegun
Adeniyi, the former spokesperson for the late Nigerian president, Umar Musa Yar’adua. In the
wake of withering attacks against him over a frivolous trip he undertook to the United States, 444
he appeared in the forum in his name to defend himself. 445 In no way, however, can this be
construed as an infiltration of the forum by the government. On the contrary, it represents a
dialogue with citizens who would ordinarily not have had the privilege for this deliberative
exchange had they sought the traditional means of communication with the government.
As most scholars argue, at the heart of most conceptions of the public sphere, especially
the Habermasian one, is the idea of conversation, which this Internet forum seems to enhance in
more ways than spatially bounded notions of deliberation can. Indeed many scholars contend that
conversation in the public sphere is a precondition for democracy. Michael Schudson, for
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instance, notes that “Democracy is government by discussion.” 446 Bruce Ackerman also states
that “Dialogue is the first obligation of citizenship.” 447 This Internet discussion group does
certainly make possible the type of categories necessary for most, if not all, of Habermas’ “ideal
speech situation” to occur.
The communicative acts that take place in this Nigerian virtual village square confirm, to
a large degree, that the Internet is capable of facilitating discourse that replicates the central
construction of rational-critical debate and that, in a variety of ways, approximate the
prerequisites of the Habermasian public sphere. It is discursively inclusive, as evidenced in its
policy of not moderating its discussions and in not requiring potential contributors of articles to
the site to be registered members. Participation is also entirely voluntary and not the product of
coercion by government or corporate interests, and the site’s deliberative practices have so far
had impacts on governance in the homeland. What is more, although members of the forum
come from different social backgrounds—professors in US, UK, and Nigerian universities,
engineers, doctors, students, Nigeria-based working-class people, and so on—there has not been
any record of open social discrimination in the discursive enterprise. However, although the
main preoccupation of the forum is politics in the homeland, it also features short story fictions,
trivia, and can sometimes get bogged down by petty personality disputes.
James Bohman notes that a crucial deficiency of Internet public spaces is that they have
no linkages with structures of power, a condition, he says, that divests them of the capacity to
“secure the conditions of publicity but also in order to promote the interaction among publics
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that is required for deliberative democracy.” 448 Bohman’s arguments are difficult to sustain when
applied to the Nigerian Village Square since the activities of this Internet site generate a lot of
media attention in Nigeria. Nancy Fraser’s recent exposition of what constitutes a transnational
public sphere also strengthens the case for the Nigerian Village Square to be ascribed the status
of a transnational online public sphere. According to Fraser, “a public sphere is supposed to be a
vehicle for mobilizing public opinion as a political force. It should empower the citizenry vis-àvis private powers and permit it to exercise influence over the state.” 449 This Web site’s
continually productive engagements with the Nigerian state on domestic policy issues certainly
elevate it to a politically consequential public sphere.
It must still be admitted, though, that the relative numerical inferiority of this Internetbased public sphere, and the uncertainty that it can sustain its activities, potentially detracts from
its potency. Similarly, although many contributors to the forum are identifiable by their names,
several others use anonymous handles. Scholars have debated whether the incidence of
anonymity on the Internet invalidates the notion of conversation in news groups and chat rooms
in the real sense of the word. This concern is perfectly legitimate, but, as Jodi Dean reminds us,
“anxieties around authenticity on the Net function primarily to reassure our trust in the
authenticity of other sorts of mediated interactions, indeed, to pathologize our justifiable
paranoia.” 450 The point, therefore, is that while some of the Net’s shortcomings significantly
detract from the Habermasian status of the public sphere that many scholars ascribe to it, there
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are certainly important respects in which it fulfils this requirement, as the analysis of the
Nigerian Village Square suggests.
The foregoing, though, does not seek to institute the relative discursive openness of the
Nigerian Village Square as representative of the sort of interaction that takes place on all
Nigerian online media forums. While several such examples abound on the Internet, there is also
a multiplicity of Web sites that do not have deliberative democracy—or anything remotely
related to that—as their raison d'être. Although it is incontestable that the Internet meshes with
existing, even pre-existing, social functions and extends them in many fresh, sometimes newfangled, ways, it does not fit easily in comparison to characteristically modern organizations or
stereotypically idyllic early modern social and cultural institutions such as the Habermasian
public sphere. The new peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of the Internet can only become
intelligible if a conceptual frame of reference is adopted that does not limit the discussion of the
Internet from the outset to predetermined and pre-given patterns of interpretation. More
importantly, the Nigerian Village Square has shown the possibility for the co-existence between
online communities and citizen journalism. The site provides the platform for citizen reports, for
discussions about politics in the homeland, and for direct action. This fits the outlines of the
traditional conceptions of alternative journalism. However, the Village Square is a loose
collection of disparate people and interests that are not all united by notions of progressive
ideology like SaharaReporters is. In more ways than one, it problematizes the boundaries
between alternative and citizen journalism in that it provides an arena for both forms of
journalism.

4.6

Pointblank News
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Pointblanknews.com was launched on January 20, 2007 by a Nigerian immigrant in the
United States by the name of Jackson Ude. 451 Other people associated with the site are Oladimeji
Abitogun and Churchill Umoren, who are also based in the United States. 452 The restlessly
muckraking but sometimes over-the-top site is published in New York. It describes itself as
an independent online news magazine created to bring about more professionalism in
online Journalism [sic]. It has no affiliation with any political party, ethnic groups;
religious or social groups within the United States or any where [sic] in the world.
PointBlankNews.com is primarily committed to the freedom of speech… fundamental
human rights and the journalism ethical responsibility of balance[d] reporting [sic]. 453
It added that it is inspired by the desire to “promote developmental Journalism” and foster a
platform “for people to be able to interact, share opinions and proffer solutions to the many
political, social and economic problems facing Nigeria and Africa at large.” 454 It is curious,
though, that an implacably anti-government, investigative online news outlet like
Pointblanknews.com would choose a label like “development journalism” to describe itself.
Development journalism has been conceived as a counterpoint to Western conceptions of news,
which are said to stress displacement of routine, oddity, and conflict supposedly at the expense
of “development,” which Third World countries are said to be sorely in need of. But this concept
has been ridiculed as a cover-up for “government-say-so journalism.” 455 In fact, some scholars
have pointed out that many repressive African governments have exploited the press to
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“consolidate and perpetuate power in the name of development journalism.” 456 It is entirely
possible that the site used the phrase “development journalism” out of ignorance of the term’s
conceptual subtleties, historical trajectory, and ideological underpinnings.
The site is multi-media, allows for a robust interaction with its content, and liberally lifts
stories from the Web sites of Nigeria’s domestic papers on its front page. But it also has an
“exclusive news section” that contains only stories that the site’s citizen reporters have reported.
Before venturing into online publishing, Pointblanknews.com’s editor-in-chief had edited the
African Post, a periodic publication that catered to the Nigerian immigrant community in the
Bronx area of New York. Prior to this, he had no journalistic experience. The major story that
brought Pointblanknews.com to the attention of Nigerians at home and abroad was its exposé of
a former Nigerian state governor, Orji Uzor Kalu, who was standing trial for corruption and who
forged a letter from the Brigham Women’s Hospital in Massachusetts as a ploy to run away from
the country. The letter, purportedly written by a Dr. Black to Orji Kalu, requested the former
governor’s presence in the United States for his wife’s surgery. The letter reads in part:
Dear Kalu,
The Brain Tumour Programme [sic] at Brigham and Women‘s Hospital and Dana Farber
Cancer Institute provides a multi-disciplinary brain tumour [sic] clinics in radiation
therapy, chemotherapy and neurosurgery, a tumour [sic] board and radio surgery
evaluation and is a closely-coordinated effort between Dana Farber Cancer Institute and
Brigham and Women‘s Hospital.
A comprehensive evaluation and long-time management of your spouse‘s present health
condition… necessitates a repeat of neurosurgery of the nervous system…. This decision
was reached at our board meeting on Friday, July 27, 2007.
At present, based on our evaluation, Ifeoma‘s basic cognition is inadequate to offer
consent for this surgery to proceed. We, therefore, as required by Massachusetts General
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Law, request your presence to offer your consent as next-of-kin for this immediate
needed care to proceed.
Please be advised that your immediate attention is required as the surgery is scheduled for
Wednesday, August 8, 2007 at 6.30 a.m.....
On the basis of this fraudulent letter, Kalu asked the Federal High Court in Abuja to grant him
permission to travel to the United States. “I have just received information through Victor
Onochie (by fax) to the effect that my wife is due for a major surgery on 8th August in Brigham
and Women‘s Hospital in Massachusetts, USA,” he said in a sworn affidavit. But
Pointblanknews.com found out that the letter from the Brigham and Women’s Hospital was, in
fact, a forgery. “When Pointblanknews.com confronted the Hospital with the letter,” the online
news outlet reported, “Dr. Kwan said, ‘that is not Dr. Peter Black’s signature. It is obviously
forged. This hospital does not issue such letters.’” It further quoted the doctor to have said, “This
is strange and we are not taking it lightly. We are looking into it and we might require the police
to come in.” 457
Many mainstream and diasporan Nigerian newspapers, apparently instigated by the
Pointblanknews.com scoop, did a follow-up and found exactly the same information: the letter
was forged. 458 As a result, the former governor was denied permission to travel. The site also
busted another corrupt former governor of Jigawa State in Nigeria’s far north by the name of
Saminu Turaki who also forged a letter from a Singaporean hospital to aid him in escaping trial
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for corruption. 459 In fact, the entire mission of the site seems to be to expose corruption in high
places, especially corruption with international dimensions. Of the 358 stories in the site’s
“exclusive news archive,” 320 unmask high-level corruption in government at all levels. 460 It is
no surprise that of all the diasporan online media outlets, it is this site the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), Nigeria’s anti-corruption agency, chooses to advertise
with. The most prominent ad on the site’s front page for much of the first quarter of 2010 is an
ad from the EFCC. It also has context-specific text, image, and video ads from Google Adsense
and other Web-based ad-serving applications.
However, the site’s reports are not always accurate or responsible. Many of their
sensational reports have turned out to be mendacious and scurrilous attacks on innocent people.
The most outrageous of this was the site’s allegations that the wife of Vanguard newspaper
publisher, Mrs. Oyindamola Sam-Amuka, had murdered a 14-year-old boy for ritual sacrifice.
“According to Pointblanknews.com extensive investigations, during the rituals, Oyindamola, a
native of Owo in Ondo State, held onto the already hypnotized boy’s head and chanted
incantations before the helpless boy was eventually beheaded,” the site alleged. 461 It said its
citizen crime reporter in Nigeria “stumbled on the scene and surreptitiously captured everything
with his lens. He also put a call across to police detectives who arrived at the scene,
unfortunately at a time the boy had been beheaded. Four police detectives soon arrived from the
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Crime Investigation Department (CID) Panti, Lagos.” 462 According to the story, the newspaper
publisher’s wife’s motivation for the crime was that “her husband was dating another woman
whom she wanted the ritualists to kill through supernatural means. Besides, she took along
names of some Vanguard directors and editors whom she believed were obstacles to her gaining
financial control over the newspapers.” 463 It further alleged that the woman, upon being
apprehended, bribed the police the sum of 4 million naira (equivalent to about $50,000). The
story was complete with pictures, which made it seem credible. 464
Shortly after the story broke, the Pointblanknews.com citizen reporter was arrested by the
police and charged with extortion and blackmail. 465 But the site vouched for the credibility of its
story. While insisting that “Pointblanknews.com is owned and operated by a team of seasoned
Nigerian Journalists based in the United States who have practiced both in Nigeria and in the
United States with strict professional ethics and integrity,” it defended its decision “to publish
the story of the alleged involvement of Mrs. Oyindamola Amuka-Pemu, wife of the Publisher of
Vanguard Newspapers in the alleged killing of a 14 old year boy for ritual purposes… out of our
responsibilities as journalists who owe it a duty to the public to inform and educate.” 466 It added
matter-of-factly:
Since we live and work in the United States, we know the seriousness of corruption and
we operate by the highest ethical standard possible. It is preposterous for Vanguard
Newspaper, [and] the Amuka family to think or even imagine that we would blackmail
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anyone for any reason. It is on record that we have exposed several corrupt public
officers, (in and out of service), involved in cocktails of graft. We have never for once
been accused of blackmail. 467
However, while the back-and-forth exchanges and court case between Vanguard Newspaper and
Pointblanknews.com raged, the boy whom Pointblanknews.com alleged has been beheaded by
the wife of the Vanguard publisher appeared in court. 468 Pointblanknews.com was forced to eat
humble pie and apologize for misleading their readers. 469 It was a high-impact story that kept the
whole country on edge. It later came to light that Pointblanknews.com’s citizen reporter in
Nigeria (who also freelanced for local print publications) actually attempted to extort and
blackmail the wife of the Vanguard publisher through a devious photoshoping that made it seem
as if a boy’s head was actually being beheaded by the woman for ritual purposes.
While it is entirely possible that the U.S.-based owners of Pointblanknews.com were not
part of the extortion, this case dramatizes the negative uses to which diasporan online
publications can be put. Their geographic distance from Nigeria and the insulation this affords
them make them attractive media for blackmail, extortion, and mendacious reporting. This is
particularly possible because the diasporan online media do not suffer any legal consequences
for libelous publication, although as I will show in the concluding section of this chapter, there
have been several attempts by Nigerian governments to sue many of the radical diasporan online
media in U.S. courts.
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4.7

Huhuonline.com

Huhuonline.com, published from Arlington, Massachusetts, by a former Nigerian newspaper
journalist by the name of Emmanuel Emeke Asiwe, is the least editorially impactful of the six
diasporan online media profiled in this study. This multi-media, highly interactive, and
graphically rich medium started publication in 2007. Its editor-in-chief, Mr. Asiwe, apart from
being a former reporter with ThisDay newspaper, one of Nigeria’s notable newspapers that is
nonetheless also notorious for gross ethical infractions and pro-government reporting, was also a
media assistant to two government ministers. 470
The site describes itself as “an independent e-news medium established for the purpose of
presenting objective and impartial reporting of events” and brags that it is the “first news site to
engage in the ground breaking idea of publishing wholly captioned pictures.” 471 Saying that it is
“Renowned for hard truth,” the site claims “we owe allegiance to no political party, ethnic
community, religious or other interest groups. Our primary goal is to fiercely promote justice,
constitutionalism and free enterprise.” 472 This goal of fierce promotion of, among other things,
“free enterprise” perhaps has roots in Mr. Asiwe’s background as a former World Bank
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consultant. He describes himself as “an alumni [sic] of Harvard Business School… [who] had a
brief stint with the World Bank, before he veered into Journalism in 1998.” 473
Apart from its multimedia, interactive, and graphic features, Huhuonline.com also utilizes
“thin-media,” like Sahara Reporters, to disseminate its stories. But its thin-media updates are
more frequent than Sahara Reporters.’ It has an extensive database of email addresses of
Nigerians at home and abroad, which it uses to alert readers each time it updates its homepage
with news and opinion articles. Sitelogr.com, a site that provides free data on every Web site on
the Net, puts Huhuonline.com’s value at $32,268 and estimates its daily income at $44. 474
However, the reliability of this data is suspect since the site is not subscribed to any Web-based
advertising programs such as Google Adsense. Most of the ads on the site are from Nigerian
banks and the (Nigerian) Economic and Financial Crimes Commission. It is therefore
conceivable that the site’s worth is much higher than sitelogr.com’s estimates.
The site’s editorial temperaments are a mix of radical and routine reporting. Although it
is not known for independently digging up dirt on corrupt Nigerian politicians, it republishes
anti-corruption stories published on SaharaReporters.com and Pointblanknews.com. A good
portion of its content is also made up of stories culled from homeland newspapers. What it does
best, however, is to break routine news stories before domestic newspapers and sometimes
before other diasporan online media outlets.
Huhuonline.com first got noticed on an international scale when it exposed a series of
corruption scandals in a Nigerian mega church based in South Africa. The church is called Christ
Embassy Church. Huhuonline.com reported on the church’s “stage-managed miracles,” brazen
embezzlement of church funds contributed by unsuspecting South Africans who believed in the
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“miracles” of its Nigerian pastor known as Chris Oyakhilome, the profligate and debauched
lifestyles of its Nigerian pastors, and the impoverishment of its South African suckers. In a
particularly dramatic example, it reported the case of
a lady that had been sitting on a wheel chair in the healing line… for hours while waiting
for the man of God to come and minister to her. When nature called, she forgot she was
supposed to act paralyzed. And there she was standing and running to the toilet. Minutes
after that, she received serious tongue-lashing from the Healing School pastors for the
great embarrassment she caused. No one really understood this because she was not
allowed to return to the wheel chair as people had seen her dash off to the toilet. Her
empty wheel chair was wheeled out of the room. 475
In more than ten investigative reports, the site revealed other scandalous shenanigans of the
church. Many newspapers in Nigeria, South Africa, and Ghana reproduced the stories. This
became the basis for the investigation of the activities of the church by the South African
government.
But the site has also been known to be unashamedly partisan in its support for—and
viciously scurrilous in its attacks against— certain personalities in Nigeria’s corporate battles for
supremacy. For instance, when a crisis broke out between two Nigerian billionaires, Aliko
Dangote and Michael Otedola, who were former business associates, over mutual allegations of
share manipulation in the Nigerian Stock Exchange Market, Huhuonline.com consistently carried
negative stories that demonized Dangote and exculpated Otedola. 476 It never made even the
vaguest pretence to balance and fairness. Curiously, however, many Nigerian newspapers’
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coverage of the controversy was shaped by Huhuonline.com’s reporting. 477 The site always had
exclusive reports that no other Nigerian media had, suggesting that the publisher of the site had a
close relationship with one of the parties in dispute.
But perhaps what gave Huhuonline.com its greatest visibility was the arrest and detention
of its editor-in-chief, Emmanuel Asiwe, by Nigerian security forces when he traveled to Nigeria
in 2009. Nigeria’s national security agency said he was being “questioned over matters of
national security.” 478 After pressure from human rights groups worldwide and from the United
States government (Asiwe is a dual citizen of Nigeria and the United States), Nigerian courts
declared his arrest illegal. 479 Arrest of U.S.-based Nigerian bloggers, as the next section shows,
is only one of the several ways the Nigerian government has responded to the growing influence
of diasporan citizen media in homeland politics.

4.8

The Nigerian Government’s Response to the Diasporan Citizen Media

The reaction of the Nigerian governments and corrupt politicians to the piercing scrutiny of their
activities has ranged from blackmail, arrest and detention of bloggers, attempts to block
diasporan citizen media sites from being viewed in Nigeria, Web counteroffensives, hacking of
the diasporan citizen media, and cooptation of oppositional bloggers, to the initiation of
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expensive libel suits against the particularly radical online media like Sahara Reporters and
Elendu Reports in its earlier form.
SaharaReporters’s Sowore Omoyele revealed in an interview that the Nigerian
government made several overtures to him and pleaded with him to “join them” in
government. 480 In 2007, the then Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo sent a secret bill to the
National Assembly (the Nigerian Congress) to give legal endorsement to block certain Internet
sites from being viewed in Nigeria. 481 The exposé of this secret bill by diaspora online new sites,
which was also published in the domestic press, thoroughly embarrassed the government. The
bill was abandoned.
More recently, however, in response to the virulent criticism of government and the
divulgence of acts of corruption in high places by Sahara Reporters, the Nigerian government
sponsored an ad hoc organization with the paradoxical name of “Network for Good Governance”
to attack the credibility of the online media outfit in Nigerian newspapers. In paid advertorials
titled “Who is Behind Sahara Reporters?” that were published in major Nigerian newspapers, the
group alleged the following:
That the Editor of SaharaReporters Mr. Omoyele Sowore who has no visible means of
livelihood in New Jersey USA has over four properties in the United States is an
indication that there are people funding him. And the question is who are they, what is
their interest and why are they interested in bringing the government down?...The ideal
thing would have been to ignore their puerile ranting and negative journalism, but greater
wisdom demands that such tissues of lies be exposed to avoid unsuspecting public
attaching weight to their lies. 482
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The advertorial went on to list the putative properties Sowore owns in New York and New Jersey
and charged that “It is a shame that a man like Omoyele Sowore who cannot shun illicit
acquisition of wealth in favour of reputation is masquerading as an apostle of accountability and
good governance. We must be vigilant!” 483 The problem was that the list of property Sowore
allegedly owns is actually only a list of his past rented apartments. The first house listed in the
advertorial “was the first apartment that [Sowore] was put in as a ‘pro-democracy refugee’ when
he first arrived in this country in 2001. He was sharing it with three other co-refugees.” 484 The
second property listed on the advertorial is a rented one-bedroom apartment he moved into after
his initial stay at the “pro-democracy refugee” camp. The third house, funnily, was the Columbia
University student housing where Sowore stayed when he was a graduate. And the fourth
property was his then current rented apartment. 485 It turned out that the agents of the government
merely entered his name on sites that offer a variety of people search tools and public records
data. To their discredit, the government agents were not savvy enough to discriminate the
information they got from their searches.
The inaccuracy of the charges against Sowore soon became public knowledge and the
Nigerian government and its agents became the butt of jokes. A Nigerian professor of African
history at Vanderbilt University wrote:
In a sense, then, the high-ranking Nigerian officials who commissioned such a shoddy
inquiry are the second biggest suckers in all of this, next to Nigerian taxpayers whose
monies were probably used to finance this charade. The smart crook at the dirty core of
this mischief swindled the sponsoring officials by playing on their ignorance of advanced
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public record-keeping and of the banality of the information marketed to them as a
product of painstaking, esoteric inquiry. Given the desperate irrationality of guilt-ridden
Nigerian officials, it is plausible that they even paid the opportunistic crook to travel to
the US on a mission to uncover Sowore’s purported property ownership only for him to
simply steal into one of Nigeria’s Internet cafes to do a simple people search on one of
the search engines. A fancy printout from some foreign-managed search engine would
have blown the desperate minds of his IT-challenged sponsors. 486
The unintended effect of these mendacious and puerile charges against SaharaReporters was that
it increased the site’s popularity in Nigeria and galvanized its supporters in the diaspora to give it
more financial support. Several commenters on the story said they had just donated to the site in
protest. SaharaReporters itself not only exposed the government agents, the amount of money
voted by government to fund the character assassination campaign, and the search engines used
to carry out the “investigation” (which it famously called the use of “simple data Websites that
offer ‘fast-food’ type information on individuals who live in the West – especially the US and
the UK”), it used the moment to solicit financial support to do more investigative reporting on
government corruption. 487 It showed, for instance, that all that the government agents did was to
pay Intelius, a controversial Washington-based public record business, the sum of $1.50 and then
entered the names of Sahara Reporter’s editor-in-chief, Omoyele Sowore. Sahara Reporters
illustrated this by paying $1.50 to Intelius and entering the name “Omoyele Sowore.” It turned
out that the list of so-called Sowore’s choice properties that was published in Nigerian
newspapers was “in the exact order provided by INTELIUS. One of the buildings, 547 Riverside
Drive, New York, is a Columbia University student hostel.” 488
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When attempts to diminish the credibility of the editor-in-chief of Sahara Reporters
failed, the government made several attempts to hack the site “but [it] survived owing to the
foresight of its managers. 489 Not done, the government mandated its lawyers to threaten the US
Webhost of Sahara Reporters with a lawsuit if they did not shut down the site. In a letter to the
Webhost, written in all caps, the government agents claiming to be “solicitors and advocates”
with Reardenilson and Associates wrote:
We are aware that Domains by Proxy is a reputable company. We are worried that a Web
site http://www.saharareporters.com/ hosted with Domains by Proxy is being used for
subversive dissemination of information against the president and people of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria. We have read the terms of registration of Websites which say that
any Website used for illegal purposes, morally objectionable/defamatory and libelous
articles will be closed down. Please note that http://saharareporters.com/> has violated
the laws by writing articles that are treasonable offence [sic] in Nigeria. We therefore
request that as a responsible company that you are to shut down
http://saharareporters.com/ immediately to avoid any legal proceedings which may affect
your company and affect your business.” 490
Although the law firm was apparently based in Nigeria, it nonetheless scared the US-based
Webhosting company enough to warn SaharaReporters to desist from publishing libelous
materials. It subsequently shut the site down. 491 In a widely distributed press release, Sahara
Reporters said “our Webhosting company complained to us that our Website was 'abusing their
server and using their cpu at 100%' and as such had to shut down SAHARAREPORTERS
because it was rendering others sites on their server 'inoperable'.” It however dismissed this
technical explanation for shutting the site as mere obfuscation, saying “There is a conspiracy to
put our site out of existence. However, this will not happen, as such we will be working round
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the clock to resume our activities online ASAP.” 492 It also asked for suggestions on how Sahara
Reporters could get its own server and avoid having to go through third parties. The response
was overwhelming: readers contributed funds to buy an independent server for the site.
Then the government’s battleground shifted. A string of threats against the site started.
Several law firms in Nigeria and the US wrote to threaten legal action against SaharaReporters
and also Elendu Reports. In fact, early in the life of SaharaReporters, former Nigerian President
Olusegun Obasanjo’s “personal legal counsel on international matters” wrote a widely publicized
press release asking the site to withdraw a “malicious defamation of President Olusegun
Obasanjo.” 493 A month after, the same “personal legal counsel” to the president wrote a “cease
and desist” letter to SaharaReporters regarding what the lawyer called the invasion of the privacy
of a woman that SaharaReporters had identified as the president’s mistress, whom it said had
been a beneficiary of many corrupt deals. 494
In 2008, the director-general of a government agency called the National Food and Drug
Law Administration, Dr. Paul Orhii, sued Sahara Reporters in a Texas court and asked for $25
million in punitive damages. The Media Legal Defense Initiative, the London-based NGO that
provides “legal support to journalists and media outlets who seek to protect their right to freedom
of expression” said Dr. Orhii’s case was being handled by “the high-powered Cook law firm in

492

See NigeriansinAmerica.com, “The Haunted Guys at Sahara Reporters,” accessed May 13, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriansinamerica.com/vbulletin/showthread.php?t=7553.
493

Kunle Fagbenle, “Re: Malicious Defamation of President Olusegun Obasanjo,” November 7, 2006; accessed
May 15, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4226&catid=111&Itemid=
46.
494

Kunle Fagbenle, “Cease and Desist Letter: Re: Invasion of the Privacy of Chief (Mrs.) Lamide Adegbenro by
www.saharareporters.com, et al,” Nigerian Village Square, December 13, 2006; accessed May 15, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4512&catid=111&Itemid=
46.

176
Houston.” 495 The NGO linked up with the US-based Media Law Resource Center, which
provided Julie Ford, an experienced Texas-based media lawyer, to defend SaharaReporters for
free. “She defended Mr Omoyele on grounds of personal jurisdiction, arguing that since the
publication was clearly aimed at a Nigerian readership and the defendant had no links with
Texas, the Houston courts had no jurisdiction.” 496 The judge was persuaded and the case was
dismissed on March 31, 2009. 497 But this was not the end of the legal challenges that Sahara
Reporters has had to contend with. The same month that the Texas judge dismissed the suit
against the site, another U.S.-based lawyer for the Nigerian federal government sued Sahara
Reporters in a Maryland court for libel. 498 Again in April 2010, Nigeria’s ambassador to the
United Nations, Mrs. Joy Ogwu, notified SaharaReporters that she would begin a multi-milliondollar law suit against the Web site over “exposure of improper contracts awarded by her at the
nation’s Permanent Mission.” 499
Olumhense, a respected Nigerian journalist who now lives in New York, sums up the
strategies of the Nigerian government against SaharaReporters in the following manner: “So that
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is the line-up: technological warfare designed to make SR unpublishable; a scorched-earth
campaign to discredit Mr. Sowore personally; a gigantic lawsuit by an interested party; and a
political appeal to Internet hosts to take the site off the air.” 500 These actions are scripts created
out of an elaborate $5 million budget by the Nigerian government to dilute the growing influence
of diasporan online citizen media and to “ensure that Websites like Saharareporters.com and
others are stopped from taking root in Nigeria.” 501 Part of the plan included sponsoring rival
diasporan citizen media and unleashing an army of pro-government commenters on the
discussion boards of the radical and popular sites like SaharaReporters.com to subvert the growth
of “critical blogging culture that is taking the Nigerian nation by storm and effectively replacing
the mainstream local media.” 502 But this has not worked.
So the government experimented with a more desperate measure: the arrest of diasporan
citizen journalists who traveled to Nigeria. The first diasporan citizen reporter to be arrested by
Nigeria’s security forces was Jonathan Elendu, the owner of Elendureports.com. He was arrested
when he traveled to Nigeria from his base in the US. He was accused of being the sponsor of a
“guerilla news agency.” 503 The charge against him was later amended to include “money
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laundering and sedition.” 504 It later emerged that the Nigerian government thought he was
aligned with Sahara Reporters. 505 Curiously, the arrest of Elendu generated more buzz among
Western media NGOs than it did in Nigeria. It was virtually blacked out in the Nigerian domestic
media. A Nigerian writer wrote: “Although the incident took place within their vicinity at the
Nnamdi Azikiwe airport Abuja, it was the online publications - Pointblanknews and
Saharareporters that broke the news.” He added, “Even when the publisher was charged with
sedition by the State Security Service (SSS), only Punch gave it wide coverage.” 506 He attributed
the indifference to, or inadequate coverage of, Elendu’s arrest by Nigerian traditional journalists
to the fact that journalists in Nigeria do not regard online journalists as colleagues.
However, it was not just the traditional Nigerian media that failed to show sufficient
enthusiasm in publicizing Elendu’s arrest and detention; even diasporan Nigerians did not. For
instance, a Facebook group set up to secure his release called “Free Nigerian Blogger Jonathan
Elendu” had only fifty-nine members. 507 In fact, the discussions on many Nigerian online
discussion boards were dismissive of Elendu’s brand of journalism. The following is a sample of
comments on Nairaland.com, one of the most popular Nigerian online discussion forums:
I prefer to call it imaginative journalism, because the standards of that publication are so
low!
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Their stuffs [sic] sometimes reflect publicity stunts, they also churn out unsubstantiated
facts, which is sometimes caused by Jonathan Elendu's hallucination, what one of my role
model [sic] Edgar Hoover calls mental halitosis.
I think these guys are just 'sensational gangster-style' journalists. I thought I was over
critical of the quality of Elendu's reportings [sic] until I read the views of other people. I
can't substantiate this fact, but I believe Elendu is making money from the
sensationalism...If you read his story about the Sokoto State government before and after
his visit to the state (God knows what transpired during the visit, I hear journalists too
collect brown envelopes) you will wonder where his objectivity lies.
He also seems to be partisan in his views of the Nigerian politics. I suspect he might be
on some politician's payroll going by his write ups. 508
This dismissive attitude toward Elendu is broadly representative of the opinions that many
Nigerians expressed about his brand of journalism. Many critical readers recalled the mercurial
twists in his site’s editorial temperaments and attributed this to his choice to ingratiate himself to
corrupt politicians whose muck he pretended to rake for the public good. It is no surprise that the
credibility of his site has gone down the drain. In more ways than one, this illustrates the agential
power of readers and of their capacity to discern and make judgments about the hidden messages
encoded in news stories. For any online news outlet to survive and enjoy respect, it must
continually win the trust and confidence of its readers.
Whatever the case is, the Nigerian diasporic Internet-based media are transforming both
the form and content of Nigerian journalism in ways that at once enrich and complicate the
dynamics of informational flow from the core—in this case, a privileged diasporic “peripheral
core”— to the periphery where the ancestral roots of the migratory elite that are now spatially
situated at the core are located. As we have seen, the Internet-based diaspora news outfits have
become so influential that, in many cases, opposition politicians fed up with the domestic
media’s double standards and timidity— and even government officials hoping to fly kites or
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expose government secrets for personal gain—bypass the mainstream domestic Nigerian media
and get across to territorially displaced citizen journalists in the diaspora. Once a story gets
prominence in the diaspora online press, it almost always eventually becomes the editorial staple
of the traditional domestic press at some point, even if there is initial reluctance from the
domestic media to give such stories prominence.
It is anybody’s guess where and how the emergent diaspora online journalism will end
up. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that the citizen media of the Nigerian diaspora will
continue to make incursions into the mainstream of the Nigerian political arena in light of the
restoration of constitutional rule in the country since 1999. In a significant respect, the profiles
and activities of the diasporan online media examined here represent a rejection of the binarism
between notions of the “diasporic public sphere” and the “domestic public sphere.” Here, we are
witnessing a progressive hybridization that dissolves the barrier between diasporic media and
domestic media and ruptures the distinction between alternative journalism and mainstream
journalism. The citizen media sites have annihilated the barriers of space and times and welded
the home and the diaspora.
Similarly, many of the Web sites profiled here defy easy categorization. While a few can
be safely described as citizen, non-alternative media sites, others straddle the categories. A Web
site that started out as an unrelentingly adversarial and anti-corruption platform, and therefore
deserving of being characterized as an alternative media site, became enmeshed in the moral
putrefaction it called attention to. We have also seen Web sites that occasionally evince flashes
of radicalism but relapse to the tepidity and safe editorial formulas of much of the homeland
traditional media. But we have seen a Web site that is almost exclusively defined by its
compulsively—and consistently— uncompromising opposition to governmental corruption.
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However, all of these Web sites, in a sense, collectively constitute a challenge to the homeland
media formation and to the political power structure. The fact that their emergence represents a
novel dimension to the political economy of news flow in Nigeria is itself “alternative.” Yet, it is
not “alternative” in the traditional conception of the term: it is not anti-capitalist, does not
employ “native reporting” in the sense in which the term is generally understood, and is not
always a purposively counter-informational storehouse. But, as the case studies in the next
chapter reveal, the critical sections of the Nigerian diasporan citizen media formation not only
expose corruption in government, they also bring to light the unreported corruption in the
domestic mainstream media with the kind of effectiveness that alternative media in the West do
not seem to have. As I point out in Chapter Six, these realities call for an expansion of the
epistemological boundaries in the conceptions of alternative journalism.

CHAPTER FIVE
5

MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF THE DIASPORIAN CITIZEN MEDIA
The online media of the Nigerian diaspora, as has been adverted in previous chapters,

have competed favorably with, and in some cases actually supplanted, the homeland media in
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charting the course of far-reaching national discourses and in confronting and exposing
corruption both in government and in the media. Chapter Four illustrated some of the ways by
which the diasporan news media exposed high-level corruption among the Nigerian domestic
ruling elite, although some of the diasporan media, as we saw, were not always immune from the
ills they railed against. This chapter will highlight and discuss four more case studies that
instantiate the ever more rising significance of the Nigerian diasporan online citizen media. It
will show that in addition to being consequential enough to cause governmental policy changes,
the diasporan citizen media have also exposed corruption in the Nigerian press and thereby
weakened the legitimacy of a hitherto vibrant but now thoroughly compromised traditional
national media formation.
The case studies in this chapter will be organized and thematized as follows: cases where
online citizen media stories have led to homeland governmental policy changes and cases where
the diasporan online media exposed high-level corruption in the local media. All case studies
selected for this chapter have had momentous consequences in the domestic public sphere and
are likely to define the form and substance of the relational dynamics between the Nigerian
diasporan online citizen media formation and the traditional media and politics of the domestic
public sphere in the foreseeable future. How the diasporan citizen media chose to report on the
cases highlighted in this chapter will enrich and complicate the extant literature on the modalities
and singularities of citizen reporting and also illustrate how what Deborah Chung and her
colleagues called “a form of amateur journalism” is challenging the role of traditional journalism
in a transnational setting. 509
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5.1

How Diasporan Citizen Media Reporting Caused Governmental Policy Reversals

One dramatic case that exemplifies the power of the Nigerian diasporan online media to compel
homeland government to reverse policy decisions is the controversy over a proposed “capacity
building” training for Nigeria’s thirty state governors at Harvard University. On May 25, 2009,
Bukola Saraki, governor of the north-central state of Kwara and chairman of the Nigerian
Governor’s Forum—the ad hoc but nonetheless politically powerful association of all elected
governors in Nigeria—announced, through his press secretary, that the governor’s forum had
signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Harvard University “on [the] provision of
academic support for the governors on capacity building, best practices and good
governance.” 510 The agreement, which the statement said had been signed on behalf of Harvard
University by a Professor Robert Rotberg, who had been identified as the director of Harvard’s
Kennedy School of Government, would have all of Nigeria’s thirty-six governors attend the
training in batches.
This news outraged the sensibilities many Nigerians at home and abroad. 511 For many
Nigerians, the purported training was no more than a convenient official cover for the governors
to not only waste public resources but to invest their stolen wealth in America. 512 In a searingly
biting piece, for instance, one Sam Amadi, a human rights lawyer who is also an alumnus of
510
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Harvard University, captured the universal sentiments of many Nigerians about the vain,
profligate Harvard adventure of Nigeria’s notoriously corrupt governors:
It is irresponsible for a governor elected on guarantee that he possesses the expertise and
virtues to provide public good to abandon his responsibility to attend a non-descript
capacity building program in Kennedy School or in Cambridge University. Such a
governor treats his or her responsibility flippantly and is in breach of the ethic of
responsibility. It is even worse when the academic misadventure involves all the 36 state
Governors. 513
Amadi is here pointing to an emerging trend in Nigerian elite circles to acquire a Harvard
education, however trivial and inconsequential, and advertise it as a badge of honor, as a basis to
legitimize their continued exploitation of ordinary Nigerians. But to have all thirty-six of Nigeria
governors attend a crash course at Harvard is the height of absurdity. Nigeria’s most influential
newspaper, the Guardian, was even more withering in its censure of the governors’ “capacity
training” agreement with Harvard. It described it as “offensive, self-demeaning, wasteful and
most unacceptable. The MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] should be thrown into the
dustbin where it rightly belongs.” 514 In spite of the upsurge of opposition against the governors’
proposed Harvard training, however, the governors insisted they would go ahead with it. They
said it would be “funded by donor agencies and not from the states’ coffers as wrongly reported
[in the media].” 515 They even enlisted the support of U.S.-based Nigerians 516 and top Nigerian
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newspaper columnists 517 to help justify the training. A cornucopia of articles on the Internet and
in Nigerian newspapers began to appear in support of the governors’ extravagantly wasteful and
dubious Harvard training agreement. It is reasonable to assume that the write-ups were sponsored
by the governors’ forum, given the way Nigerian governors have become adept at manipulating
journalists to doctor opinions in their favor through pecuniary gratification. The later portion of
this chapter highlights the ways the governors do this.
However, the conversation changed when a Canada-based Nigerian by the name of
Majek Adega conducted what he called a “citizen investigation” about the so-called
Memorandum of Understanding signed between Harvard University and the Nigerian
Governors’ Forum. The citizen investigation was a simple email requesting clarification from the
authorities at Harvard University about the content and status of the memorandum. Mr. Adega
first sent an email to Harvard University’s Communications Office seeking clarification on the
nature and compass of the agreement the school signed with Nigerian governors. The office
denied the existence of any agreement with Nigerian governors and directed him to contact the
Kennedy School of Government’s director, Robert Rotberg. The lengthy, angry email he sent to
the school’s director is worth quoting at some length because it gives expression to the feelings
of a lot Nigerians about the purported training agreement Harvard signed with Nigerian
governors:
You may be surprised to know that the trip to Harvard University may have cost the
Nigerian taxpayers millions of dollars in airline tickets for the governors and their retinue
of assistants/girlfriends, payment of bloated official allowances and hotel
accommodation. [And] the trip may actually have been used as a cover for the primary
purpose of squirreling looted funds out of Nigeria and into American bank accounts….
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The real victims of the Harvard University jamboree are the ordinary Nigerian people
who could have had several boreholes installed for them but for the jamboree. The real
victims are the new born babies and mothers dyeing [sic] because of lack of basic
medical supplies, including incubators. The victims may not be in front of you, you may
never meet them, your knowledge of them maybe [sic] limited to figures/statistics, but
they are real human beings. They are people’s children, parents, brothers, sisters, uncles,
aunts, husbands and wives. Think about them when you deal with these politicians.
There is a groundswell of anger against your esteemed university. The perception is that
your university is conniving with notorious Nigerian politicians to further deplete an
already depleted treasury. 518
The email was designed not only to prick the moral conscience of Harvard University for its
questionable relationship with corrupt governors but to play on the heartstrings of university
officials who signed the agreement. It does this by calling attention to the real material
consequences of their action. The strategy worked. Less than one hour after he sent the email,
Rotberg, the director of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, responded. He said his
school did not sign an agreement to train Nigerian governors and that “there will never be an
agreement.” 519 What had happened, he said, was that after four Nigerian governors visited
Harvard University, the governors and the school’s Kennedy School of Government drafted a
Memorandum of Understanding on mutual cooperation on good governance. Rotberg stated
further:
The MOU was meant to be the first step in the exploration of a possible training program
and as a means of signifying the intent on both sides to work together to craft such a
program. Neither that document nor even the possibility of developing a joint ForumHarvard Kennedy School training project had as yet been brought before the Kennedy
School for consideration or approval, so it was premature for an announcement to have
been made in Nigeria. 520
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Citizen reporter Adega, who is an attorney in Canada, shared his findings with all the major
U.S.-based Nigerian diasporan online citizen media. 521 The following day, all the major
newspapers in Nigeria picked up the story. 522 For more than a week this was the grist in the
editorial mills of most Nigerian newspapers. It is interesting that until an untrained citizen
journalist conducted a random act of inquiry, it did not occur to Nigerian journalists to find out
more information about the Harvard “capacity training” for governors, which had attracted a
whirlwind of criticisms back home. All that the local media did was to provide a platform for the
push and pull of arguments in favor of and against the issue, which did nothing to cause a policy
shift. It took the casual act of journalism of one geographically displaced Nigerian to avert what
would have amounted to a huge waste of national resources. Of course, the governors would
devise more inventive ways to corruptly enrich themselves and waste public resources, but it is
significant that this one was prevented by an individual through the instrumentality of a
previously inconsequential diasporan citizen media formation.
It is apparent that Harvard was indeed interested in exploiting the greed and vanity of the
Nigerian governors to make a quick buck. The director of the Kennedy School of Government
admitted that there was indeed a Memorandum of Understanding with the governors. His only
problem was that it was prematurely announced before it was concretized with the appropriate
authorities. It is entirely conceivable that had the Nigerian diasporan “citizen investigator” not
shamed Harvard University through his guilt-inducing emails, which he shared widely with the
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Nigerian diasporan online media and which were subsequently picked up by the domestic media,
the school would not have disowned the governors. For, although Harvard denied ever having
signed an agreement for a periodic training of the Nigerian governors, the governors showed
documentary proofs that such an agreement had indeed been signed. 523
In the aftermath of the heat and embarrassment that the controversy generated, especially
after Harvard disowned the governors, dissension ensued between the governors. One of the four
governors who had widely been identified as the person who signed the agreement with Harvard
on behalf of the governors’ forum repudiated it. He said he did not need a Harvard education to
govern his state. 524 The governor’s forum fired back and accused him of duplicity. In the end, the
governors collectively decided to cancel the program, both because Harvard University had
earlier hinted that it was no longer interested in the partnership and because the intensity of the
opposition against the training had heightened considerably after the result of the citizen
investigation became more widely dispersed in the domestic public sphere. 525 This act of citizen
inquiry achieved three things simultaneously: it shamed Harvard University into repudiating a
questionable agreement with corrupt Nigerian governors, deprived the governors of the
opportunity to waste public funds and stash even more in U.S. banks, and exposed the laziness
and reportorial incompetence of the Nigerian national media, which could not perform a simple
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act of sending inquiries to Harvard University to conform or disconfirm the claims of the
governors.
In another respect, the simultaneous shaming of Harvard University and the Nigerian
governors introduces a novel dimension to the theory of “boomerang effect,” which traditionally
accounts for how local and international NGOs can cause dictatorial, unaccountable governments
to change state policies through shaming them and provoking mass outrage against their policies
in the global court of public opinion. In their seminal work, Activists Beyond Borders, Margaret
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink observed that transnational advocacy networks have become core
instruments for tilting the balance of power between states and individuals and for the
“redistribution of knowledge”:
[I]n a world where the voices of states have predominated, networks open channels for
bringing alternative visions and information into international debate. Political scientists
have tended to ignore such nongovernmental actors because they are not ‘powerful’ in
the classic sense of the term. At the core of the network activity is the production,
exchange, and strategic use of information… When they succeed, advocacy networks are
among the most important sources of new ideas, norms, and identities in the international
system. 526
Here, the authors are concerned primarily with how organized advocacy networks deploy the
power of information to shame recalcitrant and dictatorial regimes. They point out that “voices
that are suppressed in their own societies may find that networks can project and amplify their
concerns into an international arena, which in turn can echo back into their own countries.” 527
The authors characterize this strategic deployment of informational resources to effect policy
changes in erring nation-states as “leverage politics” and argue that “by leveraging more
powerful institutions, weak groups gain influence far beyond their ability to influence state
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practices directly.” 528 For them, this phenomenon is illustrative of the waning power of the
nation-state because the increasing capacity of non-state actors to compel states to change
policies undermines modern states’ “absolute claims to sovereignty.” 529
But it is also often said that it is only weak, peripheral states that are subject to the
boomerang effect of transnational NGO activism and that, more often than not, it almost always
requires the overt and subtle threats of strong nation-states in the West for weak, erring,
dictatorial nations in the developing world to give in to international pressures. As Chetan
Kumar observes, the “right circumstances” that can enable transnational activism to effect the
dislodgement of “nasty dictatorships” necessarily incorporate “a specific interest on the part of a
major power capable of using force.” 530 And as Martin Shaw points out, “the activists of
globalist organizations, such as human rights, humanitarian and development agencies, make a
reality of global civil society, by bringing the most exposed victims among the world’s
population into contact with more resourceful groups in the West.” 531
Well, here a powerful educational institution like Harvard University, which is not only
located in the West but is, in fact, one of the West’s most recognized intellectual powerhouses,
has been shamed into reversing an agreement it entered into with corrupt governors of a Third
World country, not through whipping up international public opinion against it but by merely
creating an online citizen media buzz, which then reverberated to the local Nigerian media, with
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a potential to go beyond that. It is entirely conceivable that Harvard University quickly rescinded
its agreement with the Nigerian governors because it did not want the story to be picked up both
by the U.S. media and the U.S. blogosphere, which would have likely created a colossal public
relations disaster for the institution. Whatever the case, the lone, random act of “citizen
investigation” by a marginal diasporan Nigerian had the effect of shaming a corrupt local elite
and a powerful institution in the West in ways that the Nigerian domestic media would have been
incapable of doing, challenging Thomas Hargrove and Guido Stempel III’s conclusions that
citizen media “presents little threat to mainline news media.” 532 This shows that the online
citizen media of a politically consequential Third World diaspora can both instigate a
conventional boomerang effect against their homeland governments and a reverse boomerang
effect against powerful non-state actors in the West.
Another instructive, paradigmatic case of how diasporan citizen media reporting shamed
the Nigerian government into reversing a governmental policy occurred in late 2009. Nigeria’s
former Federal Capital Territory minister, Nasiru el-Rufai, and former chairman of the anticorruption agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, Nuhu Ribadu, emerged as
prominent opposition figures against the government of Nigeria’s late president, Musa Umaru
Yar’adua, whom the duo had helped to install. After these personalities fell out with the
government of the day after a short honeymoon, they relocated to the United States from where
they fought the government. They used foreign media organizations and the diasporan online
media outlets for their battles.
In retaliation, the government charged el-Rufai to court in absentia over “abuse of office”
and misappropriation of public funds. Sensing danger, he fled Nigeria to the United States. The
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new leadership of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission declared him wanted and
enlisted the support of Interpol to have him arrested and deported back to Nigeria. 533 Nuhu
Ribadu, a former police officer, was demoted, dismissed from the police, and declared wanted
too. He fled to the United States because he was nearly assassinated while in Nigeria.

534

Matters came to a head when the government gave a furtive directive that the two
opposition figures should never be allowed to renew their passports in any Nigerian consular
office in the West. The point of this directive was to get them stranded and unable to move
around the world. Mr. el-Rufai went to the Nigerian High Commission in London to renew his
passport, oblivious of the fact that a directive had been handed down that he and his friend
should never be granted a passport renewal request. Officers at the High Commission told him
his passport could not be renewed. “On further enquiries in the High Commission and Abuja, I
confirmed that President Umaru Yar'Adua gave the order through the National Security Adviser,
Abdullahi Sarki Mukhtar, and then to the Director General of the Nigeria Intelligence Agency,
NIA, Mr. Imohe.” 535 Interestingly, news of the denial for him to renew his passport was carried
only by the diasporan online news outlets and by NEXT, a newspaper in which the former
minister has substantial investments. All the domestic media organizations blacked it out.
However, when the government was compelled to deny el-Rufai’s claims that he was denied the
right to renew his passport at the instance of the government, all the local newspapers carried the
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denial. The government said el-Rafai had never been denied passport renewal, nor had any
directive been given that he or any other Nigerian should be denied one. It said the former
minister merely wanted to whip up public sentiments against the government.
The back-and-forth between the spokespersons of the government and the self-exiled
opposition politicians would have lost steam had SaharaReporters not stumbled on the original
memo instructing all Nigerian embassies and high commissions in the West to refuse the
reissuance or renewal of the passports of el-Rufai and Ribadu. The online citizen media outlet
said it was in possession of original documents which instructed embassies and high
commissions to deny both el-Rufai and Ribadu passport renewal privileges. “Referring to a
‘continuous and unyielding campaign of calumny against the Federal Government abroad’ by the
two men, it said a decision had been taken ‘at the highest level’ to deny them ‘consular
assistance of any form.’” 536 The site later published scanned copies of the original memos.
Almost immediately, local newspapers in Nigeria, which had ignored the story, picked it up. 537
In no time, harsh criticisms of the directive filled Nigerian newspaper pages. Nigerians in the
diaspora also initiated an online petition drive to compel the government to reverse its directive.
The petition, which had hundreds of signatories, declared that based on reporting by
SaharaReporters, it had “incontrovertible evidence” that the Federal Government of Nigeria had
instructed its missions abroad not to renew the passports of certain citizens of Nigeria, saying it
is a “tragic reminder of the dark days of brutal military dictatorship when the confiscation of the
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passports of political opponents, human rights activists and pro-democracy campaigners was the
order of the day.” It concluded by saying,
We shudder at the thought that those of us in the Diaspora who criticize the government
of the day for any reason may suddenly become passport-less and hence be unable either
to carry out our jobs that require international travel, visit our families back at home, or
worse still be subject to deportation by our host governments. We shudder at the thought
of our Nigerian compatriots inside the country who can become shut in and hence cannot
travel to visit their families abroad or carry out official or professional duties simply
because their passports have been preemptively seized due to non-renewal. 538
The Nigerian federal government was embarrassed by the exposé of its secret memo and the
flurry of condemnations that followed. The then Nigerian president quickly disowned the memo
and fired the director general of the Nigerian National Intelligence Agency, who purportedly
originated the memo. 539 To save face, the president even ordered a probe into the activities of the
NIA boss. 540 He then directed the foreign affairs minister to send a cable to all Nigerian consular
services worldwide to ignore the previous memos that mandated them to deny consular services
to the two opposition politicians. In a cable message, which was again intercepted and
reproduced verbatim by SaharaReporters, the government said, “all Nigerian missions should
give requisite consular assistance to any Nigerian repeat any Nigerian [emphasis original] that
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requests for such assistance in any Nigerian mission abroad….” 541 But Nigeria’s most influential
newspaper, the Guardian, reported that the director general of the Nigerian National Intelligence
Agency was merely “sacrificed” to save the president from an “international embarrassment.” 542
Not surprisingly, after the resolution of the passport renewal controversy in his favor, Mr. elRufai singled out diasporan Nigerian citizen journalists for commendation. In an interview with
the Daily Trust, he said,
I am particularly grateful to the patriotic Nigerians that got those documents out and
published them. Without those documents, the government would never have backtracked on its decision. Clearly you can see from the contents of the documents that this
decision came from Yar’Adua himself, in spite of his lame attempts to deny it. 543
Although he gave the credit to diasporan Nigerian citizen reporters for exposing the government
memos that caused a reversal of a government policy against him, it is obvious that he was the
source of the authentic copies of the memos published on SaharaReporters. He revealed as much
in his own ruminations after the incident. In a blog post in the Nigerian Village Square, he wrote:
After I was branded a liar by the authorities when I told the world of my ordeal (a lie
which a lot of Nigerians unwittingly bought into) I determined to expose my tormentors.
With the help of well wishers and men of conscience right at the heart of the government
in Abuja, I was able to get documentary evidence to prove that what I had said was true
and that what the administration said was a blatant lie. Thus exposed, the administration
chose to sacrifice the Director General of the National Intelligence Agency, a man that I
know and respect for his sterling gentlemanly qualities. 544
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By admitting that he was “able to get documentary evidence to prove that what I said was true,”
he clearly implied that he was the source of the documents that SaharaReporters published.
However, it is interesting that he chose a diasporan online citizen media to give these exclusive
documents to and not homeland newspapers, not even NEXT, his newspaper, which has the same
multi-media and hypertextual capabilities as SaharaReporters. This fact underscores the
increasingly preeminent position of diasporan online citizen media outfits in charting national
discourses. Had he given the documents to homeland newspapers, the story would not have had
the same effect as it had. The papers would probably not have touched the documents with a
barge pole for fear of running afoul of the laws of sedition, which forbid and criminalize the
unauthorized publication of classified government documents. 545
Here, the lesson is that alternative online newspapers do not necessarily have to adopt
“native reporting” or such other subversive reportorial practices to upset the power structure.
They can exploit the internal dissensions of the ruling elite to subvert the system. This is a
system of reporting that SaharaReporters has perfected; it accepts confidential documents
exposing the dirt of various ruling class factions, assures sources confidentiality but does not
spare these sources if dirt about them is exposed by competing elites. The geographical distance
of the diasporan citizen media especially makes this possible.
But, more importantly, what redounds to the formidability and effectiveness of the
diasporan online media is the greater capacity they have to shame governments and politicians at
home than do the domestic media, especially because the diasporan media have now become
such an important fixture of the Nigerian media landscape that they have attracted the attention
of the US government and of Western international news organizations. In a report about
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SaharaReporters titled “Africa’s WikiLeaks,” Daily Beast’s Philip Shenon reported that Sahara
Reporter’s “impressive muckraking has drawn the support of that most august of American
philanthropies—the Ford Foundation, which has given SaharaReporters $175,000 over the last
two years.” He quoted Calvin Sims, a former New York Times foreign correspondent who now
works for the foundation and is overseeing the grant, as saying, “I hadn’t seen anything like this.
The impact it’s having—holding political leaders to account—is very impressive,” pointing out
that Sahara Reporters could be a model for similar sites throughout the developing world. 546
It is precisely because of the increased international exposure of the Nigerian citizen
media outfits that governments back home are so afraid of them. It is interesting that part of the
reason the government quickly rescinded its decision to deny consular services to opposition
politicians after the memo was exposed was the fear of being exposed to “international
embarrassment.” In other words, the diasporan media have an enormous capacity to bring a
boomerang effect to bear on the governments in ways the homeland can only dream of.

5.2

Watching the Watchdogs: Exposing Corruption in Homeland News Media

The diasporan citizen media have not only been a thorn in the flesh of governments and corrupt
politicians, they have also been exposing corruption in homeland newspapers and, in the process,
eroding their legitimacy. In the run-up to the 2011 president elections, for example, the diasporan
online media, especially SaharaReporters, have particularly been hard on the media. Sahara
Reporters, for instance, reported that the editorial board chairman of the Punch, an influential,
widely circulated national newspaper, had attended a “nocturnal meeting” with former corrupt
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military dictator Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida (IBB) who, at the time of this study, was
campaigning to be elected president again. The muckraking citizen medium alleged that the
Punch journalist, along with other top media executives, collected huge sums of money from the
former dictator to launder his image in the media. The Web site obtained the photograph that top
media executives took with the former dictator and published it. 547 The management of the paper
was embarrassed and fired the man. 548 The unmasking of this secret meeting by Sahara
Reporters, which had been kept away from public knowledge, led to a huge media firestorm and
debate. 549
The site also published a secret text message that the editor of the same paper sent to its
reporters and section editors instructing them to never write any negative stories about the
incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan, who is also a contestant in the presidential race. 550 The
publication of this text on SaharaReporters caused a hurried policy reversal and the deliberate
publication of a rash of negative stories against the president to prove the story wrong. But in this
chapter I will focus on only two dramatic, far-reaching stories that shook the roots of traditional
media practice in Nigeria: exposure of land allocations to top Nigerian editors to stop them from
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writing about a corrupt government minister and the practice of editors and reporters serving as
“consultants” to corrupt politicians and shady businesses.
In early 2009, SaharaReporters exposed the ugly underbelly of Nigerian journalism when
they revealed that a former minister of Nigeria’s Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Aliyu
Moddibo, had bribed top Nigerian editors and chairmen of editorial boards with juicy land
allocations in 2008. The site scanned and published the original documents of the land
allocations. The minister at the time was being investigated by the Nigerian Presidency over an
“extensive corruption dossier” that had been established against him, and the Economic and
Financial Crimes Commission’s (EFCC) new chairperson, Mrs. Farida Waziri, was instructed to
lead the investigation. In order to appease his investigators to write a favorable report on him, he
allocated choice pieces of land to the anti-corruption chief and to twenty three Nigerian editors,
including prominent columnists who had made a career of railing against corruption on the pages
of newspapers. “[A]n official at the EFCC familiar with details of Modibbo’s corrupt deals told
SaharaReporters that the former minister's decision to allocate lands to Mrs. Waziri alongside top
newspaper editors was… to ensure that the transaction was not reported – and that Modibbo’s
extensive scams at the FCT were covered up.” 551
The report was the most damning evidence of the rot in the Nigerian media industry.
Among the editors mentioned in the reporter were previous “guerilla” journalists who had
cultivated the public personae of anti-corruption crusaders. One of the editors, Bayo Onanuga,
interestingly, was a mentor to the publisher of SaharaReporters, Omoyele Sowore. His
newsmagazine, The News, and its sister publication, P.M. News, also had an operational
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relationship with SaharaReporters; they regularly republished stories that appeared on Sahara
Reporters, and SaharaReporters sometimes republished their stories. That Sowore would publish
stories that destroyed the legitimacy of his mentor underlines the fierce independence of the
brain behind SaharaReporters.
Although Nigerian newspapers refused to publish the story and censured all opinion
articles about it, it damaged their credibility greatly. As we will see later in this chapter, this land
deal has become the reference point in discussions about corruption in the Nigerian media.
Meanwhile, several opinion articles sprang up in the Nigerian blogosphere that ridiculed the
Nigerian journalists mentioned in the Sahara Reporters story. 552 Some demanded explanation
from the editors. Yet others initiated an online petition drive to request the Nigerian National
Assembly to investigate the land allocations scam. This was a decisive moment in the corrosion
of the legitimacy of Nigerian journalists. The fact that all the newspapers kept a conspiracy of
silence over the land allocation scandal, which has been viewed by millions of Nigerians at home
and abroad, did not help their reputation. Predictably, more than half of the reader comments that
accompany the punditry of the Nigerian editors identified in the SaharaReporters stories have
been taunts and raw anger. But a worse crisis of credibility was to be exposed by the diasporan
citizen media.
On March 4, 2010, a little-known Indiana-based diasporan citizen media outlet called
iReports-ng (“ng” is the domain name associated with Nigeria), whose motto is “Truly
Independent. Truly Yours,” published the story of high-profile corruption in the top editorial

552

A commentator picked on an old article written by one Reuben Abati, editorial board chairman of the Guardian
who was mentioned in the report. In the article titled, “How Much Land Does a Man Need?” Abati pontificated
about the virtues of modesty and railed against corruption and greed. The commentator titled his critique of Abati,
“How Much Land Does Reuben Abati Need?” (See, Osita Mba, “How Much Land Does Reuben Abati Need?”
Nigerian Village Square, January 18, 2009, http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/osita-mba/how-much-landdoes-reuben-abati-need.html (accessed October 4, 2010).

201
echelon of the Punch, Nigeria’s most widely circulated newspaper which, as the previous
discussion shows, has been dogged by ethical scandals. The trigger for the story was a petition
against Azubuike Ishiewene, the former editor of the paper who was also its executive director of
publications at the time of the petition. Mr. Ishiewene also wrote a wildly popular, punchy, wellregarded anti-corruption column on the back page of the Punch. The petition against him was
written by the editor of the paper, Steve Ayorinde, who had recently been fired at the instance of
the executive director of publications, to whom he was directly answerable. In the petition he
addressed to the chairman of the newspaper group, the former editor alleged that his boss caused
him to be fired because he allowed stories to be published that diminished the governor of Lagos
State, to whom the executive director was a “media consultant” and from whom he received the
equivalent of thousands of dollars in monthly upkeep for protecting his interests in the paper. “It
was an open secret that the ED Publications regularly attended meetings of the media consultants
to the Lagos State Government, made up of a few Senior Editors and Chairmen of Editorial
Boards,” Ayorinde wrote. He also pointed out that, “The need to watch the government’s back
and either woo over or change unfriendly editors and journalists, where possible, was the charge
to those senior editors.” 553 He backed up his claims with strong, unassailable evidence. Other
allegations against the executive director of publications were that he owned a public relations
and advertising firm and, in contravention of existing rules in the newspaper company he worked
for, used his position to plant favorable stories and to “kill” negative ones for his clients, while
using his popular column to nurture a public persona of an anti-corruption crusader. The Web
site captured the substance of the petition this way:
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The petition details how Ishiekwene, known for his open and persistent criticism of
corruption in Nigeria through his back page column in The Punch, intimidated, displaced
and forced about five editors and several other editorial staff out of their job in a bid to
protect and promote several individuals including corrupt politicians he collects millions
of naira from as well as organisations where he serves as a consultant or director
designate. The latest of such that brought out the exposé against him is the allegation that
he collected N15 million among other benefits from the Lagos state government to entrap
and sack the most senior editor of The Punch, Mr Steve Ayorinde, over the latter's failure
to stop publishing negative stories against Lagos State government believed to have
engaged Azu, as he is often called in Nigerian media circles, as a consultant. 554
The explosive petition, which runs into several pages of ethically damning indictments against
not just Mr. Ishiekwene but a slew of senior Nigerian journalists, was initially ignored by the
management of Punch. Nigerian newspapers also refused to publish it. This was predictable. The
petitioner did not only indict his boss of editorial compromise and dalliance with corrupt
politicians, he also accused “senior editors and chairmen of editorial boards” of prominent
newspapers of being complicit in these ethical infractions. Realizing that local newspapers would
not touch the petition, iReport-ng.com wrote, a director in the newspaper company decided to
reach out to the Nigerian diasporan online citizen media. The Web site quoted the director as
saying,
What I have read about the young man at the centre of the allegations is incredible and I
know that his friends in the Nigerian media won’t want to expose one of their own and I
think that is why you online publishers out there have to help us expose these too many
scandals to save a reputable organisation like The Punch from going down to ignominy
[emphasis mine]. 555
It really does speak to the increasing centrality of the diasporan citizen media in the politics of
the Nigerian domestic public sphere that even directors of established national newspapers look
up to them for the coverage of news stories that the traditional media, for any number of reasons,
will not touch. The Web site quoted the director as disclosing that attempts were being made by
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vested interests to “cover up the allegations” against Mr. Ishiekwene and that if recourse to the
diasporan online media did not yield the result he expected, then he would be compelled to
forward the petition to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).
A day after the IReport-ng.com published the petition, it was picked up by almost all the
other diasporan media outlets. It also circulated widely on Nigerian online discussion boards and
was shared copiously on Facebook and Twitter. Although the story had not yet made it to the
pages of Nigerian newspapers, the management of Punch was compelled to react. In a reaction
published on its front page, the newspaper’s management chose to pick holes in the reporting of
the scandal by IReports-ng.com. It said, “In reporting the petition, the website made some
introductory remarks which were clearly intended to cause disaffection among the directors of
Punch,” adding that “Mr. Ayorinde’s account of the circumstances of his forced resignation are
incomplete and inaccurate.” 556 The management was concerned more by the disclosure that the
petition was submitted by an unnamed director than by the substance of the allegations. It did not
want the reading public to get the impression that the newspaper company was a divided house.
Days later, however, it suspended the accused director of publications pending the outcome of its
independent investigation of the allegations. Meanwhile, the chairman of the newspaper
threatened legal action against iReports-ng.com and enlisted the support of Nigerian security
agencies to track down the owners of the Web site. 557 The strategy was to intimidate the Web
site into not publishing more unflattering disclosures about the company. But it backfired, as
many anti-corruption and media NGOs, such as the Coalition Against Corrupt Leaders (CACOL)
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and Media4Democracy, joined calls for an independent investigation into the allegations against
Mr. Ishiekwene. 558
Emboldened by the wild sensation that the report generated on Nigerian cyberspace and
the impact it had had at home, another crack investigative reporter who was eased out of Punch
by the same corrupt director of publications made available to IReports-ng.com a petition he had
written against the man two years ago, but which was ignored by the management of the paper.
In the petition, the reporter alleged that well-investigated stories against three corrupt governors
were “killed” by Mr. Ishiewene. He also wrote:
I recall that early this year, I filed a story on EFCC’s investigation of the wife of Vice
President Goodluck Jonathan for money laundering but it was killed for yet unclear
reasons. And over a month ago, I was advised against doing a story on the curious
withdrawal of N3.6 billion from Rivers Government account with Zenith Bank. What
could have been a great and exclusive story for our newspaper was spiked for reasons
still unclear to me. The matter has, through smaller newspapers, however come to the
public domain, with PUNCH having no option than [sic] to participate in its reportage. 559
The petition was ignored and, in protest, the reporter left the newspaper for NEXT, an up-andcoming multimedia newspaper funded by former opposition politician Nasir el-Rufai. Upon the
publication of this petition on iReports-ng.com, several reporters and editors at the paper
revealed more sordid details of the allegations. For instance, it was revealed that the chairman of
the company actually acted in cahoots with Mr. Ishiekwne to protect politicians who paid huge
sums of money to ward off negative stories about them. A particularly dramatic case involved
the wife of then Vice President Goodluck Jonathan (who is now president of Nigeria at the time
of this study) who was caught by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission while trying
to launder millions of dollars. The story had already been written and was being printed for the
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next day’s edition when the director of publication, Mr. Ishiekwne, called the Vice President’s
press secretary and informed him about it. The press secretary requested that the story be killed
in exchange for favors. As the source put it,
No sooner had printing started than the editor ran down to the press to order that printing
should stop and that all that had been produced be condemned. He had received a call
from the Chairman, Chief Ajibola Ogunshola, that anything relating to the VP and his
wife in the paper for the next day and subsequently be suspended…. We later learnt the
VP paid the bill for the next day’s total print and the adverts to get the chairman to order
the destruction of the copies already printed. That was the end of the report. So, in trying
to nail the ED, we should not forget the involvement of the Chairman in this whole
thing. 560
This revelation further inflamed and outraged the Nigerian cyber community. To pay for the
entire print-run of Nigeria’s largest circulating newspaper, including paying for all the adverts
that were contained in the edition, would certainly add up to millions of dollars. This is what
makes the corruption in the media a double-edged tragedy: it not only involves journalists who
corruptly enrich themselves by protecting corrupt government officials, it also entails
government officials embezzling massive public resources to bribe the news media on a
sustained basis. In time, the story percolated into the pages of the domestic media; it could no
longer be ignored. A well-known New York-based columnist for the influential Guardian
newspaper, Sonala Olumhense, was the first to bring the discussion to the mainstream. In his
popular column in the Guardian he wrote an article titled “The Nigerian Mass Media on Trial.”
He argued that what the news of the scandal at Punch had done was to give a face to the wellknown journalistic perversions that have become endemic in mass media practice in Nigeria in
general. In a witty yet blistering critique, he wrote:
In retrospect, the Ayorinde story is not about The Punch at all, but about journalism in
Nigeria. One cannot read Mr. Ayorinde’s protest without coming away with the
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frightening impression that many senior journalists have now adopted a loose lifestyle of
selling their influence to government officials and businessmen in exchange for cash and
gifts without the slightest concern for any conflict of interest. This is a terrible burden
because the power of the press lies in its credibility. If stories are being paid for, or
editors bought in order to ensure specific kinds of coverage, a newspaper is, in effect, a
doctored and worthless document. 561
This incisive commentary activated a flurry of condemnations of the Nigerian press in
cyberspace and in the traditional domestic media. One commentator, for instance, characterized
the Nigeria press as the “fourth estate of graft,” 562 an apparent witty inversion of the popular
characterization of the press as the “the fourth estate of the realm,” a phrase first coined by
Thomas Babington to describe the coffeehouses of Restoration England, 563 but which the
rhetoric of nineteenth-century liberalism ascribed to the modern mass media. 564
A Nigerian media NGO reported that the scandal at Punch had “become the talk of the
town in most newsrooms with many journalists of the view that the allegations would damage a
profession that is already suffering from a credibility crisis.” 565 But the consequences of the
damning revelations against Mr. Ishiewene reverberated beyond Nigeria and its digital diaspora.
The CNN MultiChoice African Journalist Award, the prestigious body that rewards excellence in
African journalism and on whose panel of judges Mr. Ishiekwene served, dismissed and replaced
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him with another Nigerian editor. 566 This effectively dimmed his rising international profile. On
April 16, Mr. Ishiekwene could not stand the heat and voluntarily retired from the Punch
newspaper. But, in a widely circulated statement, he said, contrary to stories in the papers and on
the Web, he was not forced to resign his job, and that he voluntarily recused himself from
serving on the Award panel in light of the weighty allegations against him, pointing out that the
committee set up to investigate him found him innocent. 567
This story has far-reaching significance. It brought into bold relief the complicity of the
Nigerian traditional media in the institutional corruption that plagues the country, which the
media is supposed to expose and fight. The editor who called attention to this media corruption is
clearly not innocent either. Several comments, including Mr. Ishiekwene’s rebuttal, pointed to
his own entanglements in corrupt deals and in the “killing” of unfavorable stories for his clients.
The second petition against Mr. Ishiekwene actually mentioned the ousted editor as having acted
in conjunction with the director of publications to cause stories that were unfavorable to certain
government officials not to be published. In fact, he was forced to resign his position as editor
because he was caught planting a story for the political rival of Mr. Ishiekwene’s “client.”
The heat that this exposé on corruption in the media generated brought to renewed
limelight the report that SaharaReporters has done earlier, but which did not pick up much steam
outside the Nigerian cyber sphere. Many commenters on the series of stories about the scandals
at Punch did make the connection between the SaharaReporters story on the land bribery of top
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editors and editorial board chairmen and what now became public knowledge about the coziness
of certain top journalists with government officials. One commenter remarked thus:
I'm surprised that this is the first time a corruption allegation against media executives is
receiving serious attention. I could remember that sometimes [sic] last year,
SaharaReporters wrote about some senior editors of different newspapers involved in a
land allocation scam in Abuja. Nothing came out of this revelation. Nobody followed it
up. I think all sections of Nigerian Media should be investigated, especially the print
media, not just The Punch, in order to restore people's confidence in their info. 568
The cumulative, although as yet unconfirmed, effect of the series of exposés on the corruption in
the traditional media in Nigeria is that the general public is beginning to lose faith in them and
are now turning to the plethora of diasporan online citizen media for their informational needs.
This could very well be the single most important factor that will cause the death of traditional
newspapers in Nigeria. This is especially so because Internet penetration is deepening every day
in Nigeria and people there are increasingly using the Internet to find information. In fact,
according to the International Telecommunications Union’s 2010 report, forty percent of all
Internet traffic from the whole of Africa comes from Nigeria. It also says the country has at least
forty-three million active Internet users. 569 Advertisers whose patronage sustains newspapers are
taking notice. The crisis of the Nigerian domestic newspaper market will deepen once advertisers
migrate in large numbers to citizen reporters. But the malaise that plagues the media in Nigeria
may migrate online, too. In fact, as the example of Elendu Reports shows in chapter four, this is
a real possibility.
It is at yet unclear where this will all lead. What is clear, however, is that the legion of
diasporan online citizen media that have sprouted in the Nigerian diaspora have reversed the
568

Nicholas Ibekwe, “Allegations Against Punch Director Sad, Says Journalism Teacher,” NEXT, March 11, 2010,
http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5538392-146/allegations_against_punch_director_sad_says.csp
(accessed October 10, 2010).
569

Michael Malakata, “Nigeria Claims Top Internet Spot in Africa,” ComputerWorld, August 10, 2010,
http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=5DBFEB28-1A64-67EA-E470DF5BE0AA9E10 (accessed October 10, 2010).

209
unidirectionality that hitherto characterized news flows between the homeland and the diaspora.
They have increased and enriched access to Nigerian news for Nigerians everywhere. Most
importantly, by taking over the watchdog role that the homeland media had traditionally
performed, they could potentially supplant the homeland news media. What implications do
these realities have for the way we theorize news flows, citizen and alternative journalism and
emerging forms of journalism? The next chapter answers these questions.

CHAPTER SIX
6

EVALUATION AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

This chapter critically discusses and evaluates the data that has been presented in the preceding
chapters in a bid to provide answers to the research questions in Chapter One. In what follows,
the research questions posed in Chapter One are reproduced, followed by a ruminative and
perspectival synthesis of the data presented in chapters three, four, and five in response to the
research questions. Subsequent sections of this chapter consist of the summary of the findings of
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the study, conclusions, implications that can be adduced from the study’s data, and
recommendations for future research.

6.1 Response to Research Question One
1. How and why did online citizen news media emerge in the Nigerian digital diaspora
with their current characteristics?
The emergence, popularity, and progressively soaring impact of the Nigerian diasporan citizen
media examined in previous chapters were actuated and propelled by six underlying factors. The
first is the death or dearth of a critical press tradition in Nigeria—especially the adversarial
guerilla press tradition that reigned in the 1990s—in the face of the profound moral putrescence
that the restoration of democratic rule has paradoxically inaugurated since 1999. At a time when
billions of dollars are brazenly stolen and salted away in foreign bank accounts by political office
holders and when bald-faced cronyism and avarice have overtaken the public sphere, the national
media, for the most part, have either looked the other way or have been actively complicit. This
state of affairs is inconsistent with the progressive, agitational, and inquiring disposition that had
defined the character, disposition, and performance of much of the Nigerian press since its
founding in the mid 1800s.
As was shown in Chapter Three, the Nigerian press has historically been vigorously
critical of the powers that be. It almost single-handedly dislodged colonialism and helped fight
against military dictatorship. The guerrilla press of the 1990s especially had a powerful impact
on the media practice and politics of Nigeria. One of its enduring legacies is that it has
predisposed Nigerians to expect their press to be robustly fearless, critical, and
uncompromisingly adversarial. But after winning the fight against military dictatorship, much of
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the national press lost its critical bite; the press appeared to have been anestheticized into a false
sense of triumphalism at a time when corruption by the emergent political elite it helped to bring
to the forefront took newer and more insidious forms. In many cases, the traditional Nigerian
press was co-opted into the mindless looting of the national treasury that has attended the
restoration of democracy, as the case studies in chapters four and five illustrate. Top editors and
reporters of influential newspapers and magazines are now political consultants to corrupt
politicians and dodgy businesses. They censor unfavorable stories about their clients and punish
idealistic reporters and editors who still innocently cherish the virtues of good old investigative
journalism. This widespread assault on basic journalistic norms has given birth to a drab, pliant,
colorless, and boringly predictable national media.
The absence of a watchdog media, therefore, created a yawning void, which many of the
diasporan citizen media are filling. Although not all the online diasporan citizen media are
critical of the hydra-headed corruption in the homeland, many of them expose it in more
vigorous and effective ways than the homeland media. The most popular of them, indicatively,
are those that fearlessly and evenhandedly call attention to acts of corruption and abuse of power
in the domestic public sphere. Thus, it is only in the online media of the Nigerian digital diaspora
that critical journalism is now practiced. And this critical journalism, more often than not, also
involves the uncloaking of corruption in the traditional homeland media themselves, as the case
studies in chapters four and five demonstrate. It is the diasporan media, for instance, that
divulged the sordid dalliance between top editors and editorial board chairmen of major Nigerian
newspapers and corrupt governors of states and thereby brought to the forefront of public
consciousness the depth of the compromised nature of news reports and analyses in the national
press.
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This state of affairs, which had been known to the discerning reading public for a long
time, had eroded the credibility of the domestic media. An indication of the loss of confidence in
the local media by the Nigerian reading public even before the emergence of the diasporan
online media is the fact that such global news media outlets as CNN, BBC, and Voice of
America, had outcompeted the domestic media as sources of credible news. As Ayo Olokoyun
notes, Western international news media have for long dictated and influenced the editorial
direction of the Nigerian news media. 570 With the rise in the credibility and reputational capital
of the Nigerian diasporan online media, however, the influence of the global news media in
Nigeria is receding. Similarly, with the rise, acceptance, and popularity of diasporan media
outlets, government-owned media that had wrestled with credibility problems right from their
very founding may be forced out of existence in the foreseeable future. A Nigerian researcher
who investigated the impact of the diasporan citizen media on government-owned media
concluded that “more people are increasingly relying on citizen media for news, information and
entertainment than [on] government-owned media. This gives a negative signal about the
survival of government owned media.” 571
The second reason for the ascendance in the popularity and acceptance of Nigerian
diasporan citizen online journalism is the backward state of the Web presence of the homeland
news media. As was demonstrated in Chapter Four, most of Nigeria’s traditional newspapers—
with the notable exception of NEXT, a new multimedia newspaper run by a Pulitzer Prize
winning Nigerian journalist—lack even basic multimedia and hypertextual capabilities and are
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therefore incapable of telling twenty-first century stories, which are increasingly not only videoand audio-based but also “networked” and interactive. 572 For instance, the story about a northern
Nigerian “Sharia” governor who furtively danced with prostitutes at a night club outside Nigeria
while harshly punishing similar activities in the state he governs can only be told with a video
post. SaharaReporters told that story videographically to maximum effect. Few, if any,
traditional Nigerian newspapers are technically equipped at the moment to do that. Similarly, a
secret audio recording of a Nigerian state governor conspiring to rig elections for his friend using
fake military personnel to intimidate voters that was published in SaharaReporters and other
diasporan citizen media sites would have lost its punch, vitality, and even credibility if it were
merely transcribed and published in a newspaper. Since the Nigerian traditional media at the
time of this study neither have the technical ability nor the inclination to report on such
multimedia stories, several such stories passed them by and caused diasporan online news outlets
to become popular for being the sole purveyors of such stories.
But it is not only the capacity to report on stories with multimedia and interactive
corroborations that give the diasporan media an edge, it is also their ability to report them in realtime. The majority of Nigeria’s homeland newspapers’ Web sites are mere “shovelware” of their
print editions. They are, in the main, aesthetically unappealing, unintuitive, non-interactive, and
lacking in such basic technical capabilities as archiving, as was shown in Chapter Four. They are,
in a way, stuck in the infancy of the evolution of online journalism that Pavlik perceptively
periodized. 573 For web-savvy, young Nigerians, including Nigerians in the diaspora whose
privileged geographic location exposes them to cutting-edge industry trends in the media, the
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Nigerian traditional media became woefully inadequate. It was only natural that when an
alternative or a complement was found for them, people would enthusiastically embrace them.
The third reason for the emergence of the diasporan online media is related to the second:
the technical incompetence and lack of initiative of Nigeria’s traditional print newspapers, which
ensures that their Web sites are often stagnant, lifeless, and slow to respond to breaking news. In
fact, until relatively recently, Nigerian newspapers never updated their Web sites even if a
politically consequential newsbreak occurred. Before the profusion of Web-based diasporan
media, news-hungry Nigerians always had to wait until the following day to get updates on
evolving news events. Evidence that the citizen media chosen for this study are partly popular
because of their capacity to update news stories in real-time can be seen in the number of times
the wildly popular SaharaReporters has crashed due to the massive traffic it received in moments
of breaking news and national uncertainties. For instance, in early 2010 when Nigeria was
enveloped in a cloud of political uncertainty as a result of the sickness of the late President
Umaru Yar’adua, Nigerians in their millions turned to SaharaReporters for updates. On the day
the late president was flown back to Nigeria in the dead of the night from Saudi Arabia where he
had been receiving treatment to avoid having to hand over power to his deputy, no traditional
Nigerian newspaper had the story on their site. It was SaharaReporters that broke the story and,
because millions of people logged on to it simultaneously for updates, the site crashed several
times within the week.
In this age of dizzyingly fast-paced informational flows across the bounds of time and
space, it is hardly surprising that Nigerians increasingly turn to news media that can give them
the news as it occurs, even if these news media are located thousands of miles away from the
physical scene of events that they cover. For the traditional media in Nigeria to reclaim their
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authority and readership, they need to not only catch up with the diasporan online media in
reporting news in real time and with rich, multimedia complements but also outrival them in
these emergent multiplatform news delivery mechanisms. But there is little evidence to inspire
confidence that this will happen soon. For one, most traditional journalists in Nigeria are
technophobic, disaffiliated from contemporary technological advances in the media world, 574 and
the newspaper organizations they work for are themselves hampered by excessive red tape of the
kind that stifles creativity and imagination. But going forward, the very survival of the traditional
media in Nigeria will be almost entirely dependent on how they navigate and come to terms with
the reality of the new demands of real-time, multiplatform, networked news delivery, especially
with the deepening Internet penetration in Nigeria and other parts of the developing world
through mobile phones, 575 aided even more by the fact that news-thirsty diasporan Nigerians
who number in their millions have easy access to the Internet.
Another factor that has contributed to the vigor and attractiveness of the Nigerian
diasporan citizen media is the comparative richness and reliability of their sources of
information, which has been made possible by the willingness of privileged but disgruntled or
conscientious Nigeria-based sources to confide in the citizen reporters of the diasporan media.
The diasporan citizen media built their credibility by publishing apparently off-the-wall stories
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about corruption and influence-peddling in high places in Nigeria that readers either initially
doubted or scoffed at but which turned out to be mostly true, as the case studies in chapters 4 and
5 show. In many cases, otherwise improbable stories are accompanied by vividly telling pictorial
and documentary corroborations. Perhaps the biggest gain in the credibility of the online
diasporan news media happened in December 2010 when cables released by the whistleblowing, secret-spewing WikiLeaks confirmed most of the stories that the diasporan online
media had published. SaharaReporters, for instance, ran a series of articles comparing its
previous stories about corruption in the Nigerian presidency with new revelations that came out
in WikiLeaks cables.
The geographical distance of the practitioners of diaspora citizen online journalism
confers many advantages on them. First, it assures would-be whistle-blowers in Nigeria that their
identities would be concealed and protected since U.S.-based citizen reporters are unlikely to be
under pressure to reveal their sources to Nigerian authorities. Nigerian traditional journalists, on
the other hand, cannot give such guarantees even if they wanted to practice adversarial
journalism because they have to contend with the ever-present reality of libel and sedition laws.
They can also be subpoenaed by the courts to reveal their sources. 576 Although two diasporan
citizen journalists were arrested and detained when they traveled to Nigeria in 2009, there was no
indication that they were forced to reveal their sources, even though they were both charged with
“sedition.” They were ultimately released after international pressure was brought to bear on the
Nigerian government.
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The geographic distance of the diasporan citizen journalists also gives them the
advantage of access to a lot of information about Nigerian political elites who have huge
investments in the West, especially in the United States and in the United Kingdom. Citizen
journalists take advantage of the Freedom of Information Act in the West to ferret out
embarrassing information about the shady foreign investments and indulgences of corrupt
Nigerian politicians and public figures. One-time American Ambassador to Nigeria John
Campbell recently disclosed that as a result of the intense scrutiny they have been subjected to by
Western governments, aided in part by the work of certain Nigerian diasporan citizen media,
corrupt Nigerian politicians are now increasingly moving their ill-gotten wealth to China and the
Middle East. 577 This is certainly a momentous setback on the efforts by critical sections of the
Nigerian diasporan citizen media to fight corruption, but it nonetheless underscores the power
and influence of a hitherto marginal media formation.
But, best of all, all attempts by Nigerian government officials to sue the critical sections
of the Nigerian diasporan citizen media have been unsuccessful, first, because it is almost
impossible for governments to win libel cases against the media in the United States and, second,
because the Nigerian government officials who have sued these media often have their cases
dismissed for jurisdictional incompetence. Additionally, many international media rights NGOs
often provide free legal defense to the diasporan citizen media practitioners who are sued by
Nigerian government officials in U.S. courts. So, ultimately, the citizen media have nothing to
lose for their adversarial journalistic practices. When you take into account the fact that entry
into citizen journalism is cheap and easy, it is not difficult to figure out why diasporan citizen
media have been growing by leaps and bounds over the last few years. As Davis Merritt
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observes, a primary reason for the unstoppable growth of citizen journalism worldwide is that “it
has the ability to operate from multiple platforms at minimal fiscal cost to either the creator or
the consumer, unlike the revenue-driven models of traditional journalism institutions.”578 It is
precisely this fact, more than any other factor, that would make it difficult for the traditional
media in Nigeria to stop the rising profile of Nigeria-focused citizen journalism and, with it, the
inevitable weakening of the homeland legacy media.

6. 2

Response to Research Question Two
2. How have the online citizen and alternative media of the Nigerian diaspora
influenced traditional journalistic practices in Nigeria?

It is evident that the popularity of diasporan online citizen media took the Nigerian professional
journalistic fraternity by surprise. As Chapter Four illustrated, the participation of diasporan
Nigerians in online discussions about news in the homeland initially took place in the few online
forums provided by traditional newspaper organizations with a Web presence. By the mid 2000s,
however, that reality changed. The people formerly known as the diasporan Nigerian audience of
domestic Nigerian newspaper content, to paraphrase Jay Rosen, decided to practice what J.D.
Lasica famously called random acts of journalism. 579 They were initially ignored, their
emergence dismissed as a flash in the pan, and their journalism thought to be too amateurish to
have a staying power. However, when the diasporan citizen media sites began to break stories
and write about issues that were beyond the reach of the domestic media and that began to attract
the attention of people that matter in the Nigerian society and beyond, the traditional media
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redefined their attitude to the emerging diasporan media formation. Their attitude changed from
insouciance or indifference to cautious embrace. They initially found the newfangled diasporan
citizen media to be useful sources of information, especially for stories about Nigeria that
originate in the United States. But the cautious embrace changed to cold hostility when the
online citizen media began to compete with the local newspapers for local Nigerian stories.
Because Nigeria’s traditional journalists had assumed that many Nigerians at home had no
access to the Internet, they had imagined that most of their readers would not have access to the
diasporan citizen media. So they often lifted and republished, in many cases without the timehonored journalistic courtesy of attribution, agreeable stories, such as stories that further the
political aspirations of their sponsors and political allies. In time, Nigeria’s professional
journalists realized that many ordinary Nigerians increasingly had access to the Internet and
could often tell—and did, in fact, point out in online comments— stories that had been lifted
directly from diasporan citizen media sites. This created a crisis of credibility for the homeland
industrial news media, a crisis that got exacerbated when the diasporan citizen media reported
the squalid sleaze that now characterizes traditional, legacy media practice. Then the relationship
turned to ambivalence.
As of late 2010, the traditional media in Nigeria seemed to have come to terms with the
reality that the diasporan citizen media are not the flash in the pan they had envisaged or hoped
they would be. These geographically displaced, amateur citizen media now drive national
conversations. Their exclusive stories, which have on many occasions forced governments and
politicians to react through the national media, are now the grist in the editorial mills of many
Nigerian newspapers. To cite just one addition to the case studies in chapters 4 and 5,
SaharaReporters in late November, 2010 broke the story of an embarrassing presidential
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corruption scandal that became the subject of intense front-page newspaper coverage, editorial
commentaries, denials, and affirmations in the Nigerian domestic public sphere for more than
two weeks. The Nigerian president, who is seeking to extend his tenure for another four years,
invited members of a prominent civil society organization by the name of Save Nigeria Group to
a clandestine meeting. After the meeting, he bribed them with $50,000 in cash—and in U.S.
denomination. The president of the NGO, Tunde Bakare, who is a church minister, declined the
bribe and returned it to the president through one of his close aides. SaharaReporters broke the
story of the details of the meetings and the exchange of the bribe a few minutes after the event
happened, which was past midnight Nigerian time.
The following day, the presidential aide to whom the money was returned for onward
delivery back to the president issued a tepid, tongue-in-cheek denial of the story, but the church
minister confirmed it to SaharaReporters the same day, saying only that what the president had
offered them was not a bribe but “transport money.” Other members of the NGO who attended
the meeting with the president confirmed SaharaReporters’ story in its entirety as well. The
back-and-forth exchanges between members of the NGO—who swore that they did not leak the
story to SaharaReporters—and government spin doctors dominated the news cycle for days on
end. Curiously, however, almost all the Nigerian newspapers never referred to SaharaReporters
by name; it was often identified as “an online news site,” an “online news agency” or sometimes
an “offshore news agency.” And this was not an exception. Increasingly, when the traditional
news media lift stories from or make reference to the diasporan citizen media, they never identify
them by their names lest, it would appear, they help make these competitors more popular and
more formidable than they already are. This illustrates the increasing agenda-setting powers of
the diasporan online media and the professional anxieties of the traditional media about this
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reality. This professional anxiety is reflected in the labels homeland journalists deploy to identify
the diasporan citizen media. By refusing to identify them by their names, the homeland
journalists seek to denude them of professional legitimacy and visibility before the Nigerian
domestic reading public. This was the subject of a recent comment by well-regarded Nigerian
columnist Sonala Olumhense who railed against Nigeria’s Guardian for choosing WikiLeaks
founder Julia Assange as its 2010 Man of the Year while ignoring SaharaReporter’s Omoyele
Sowore who had leaked stories about graft in Nigeria that WikiLeaks confirmed months after
and whose Web site predated Assange’s by one year. He concludes thus:
If whistleblowing and unearthing official secrets that are of great importance to a nation
is the subject, nobody has done that with greater dedication in the Information Age than
Saharareporters. Somehow, however, in the past five or six years The Guardian—unlike
several other Nigerian newspapers— does not seem to have noticed Saharareporters,
despite the impact it has made on the nation. 580
Although the writer thinks only Nigeria’s most influential paper ignores SaharaReporters, the
fact is that those that acknowledge it—and other diasporan citizen media—do so with a
hypocritical contempt. They monitor the media fervently, get stories and story ideas from them
but often fail to give them credit. Wherever they grudgingly give them credit, they seek to
undermine through referencing them with unflattering descriptive markers.
In spite of the thinly veiled hostility toward the diasporan citizen media, however, an
evaluation of the Facebook fans and Twitter followers of the major diasporan online media
outlets showed that almost all Nigerian journalists are fans and followers of especially
SaharaReporters. 581 Interestingly, the diasporan citizen media seem unfazed by the professional
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snub of the homeland newspapers. They appear to take solace in the fact that, in the past five
years, the traditional homeland media have declined as the dominant force in the public sphere.
The diasporan news media have now somewhat assumed the role of agenda setters for the
Nigerian national media. There is an interesting parallel between this development and what Ben
Syre and his colleagues found in the relationship between the traditional American media and
their new social media competitors over the coverage of California’s Proposition 8. 582 They
found that the “traditional media system may be losing some of its agenda-setting ability to
emerging social media.” 583 Thus, the emergence of Web-based citizen journalistic forms is
adding new dimensions to what has been called the agenda-setting function of the media in mass
communication research. 584 This increasingly seems to be the case in Nigeria as the diasporan
media is mainstreamed in the domestic public sphere. This fact contradicts research cited in
Chapter Two, which concluded that rather than challenging the dominance of mainstream news
media, the plethora of citizen media that the Internet has spawned do no more than strengthen the
mainstream media’s dominance by further circulating, if not amplifying, their discourses. The
researchers who arrived at these conclusions, therefore, characterize citizen media as having
‘‘derivative’’ 585 and ‘‘parasitic’’ 586 relationships with the mainstream news media and that
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online citizen media, by this fact, are more the ‘‘online echo chamber of mass-mediated political
views’’ 587 than ‘‘alternative spheres of news and views.’’ 588 But the Nigerian diaspora citizen
media are not only alternative spheres for the dissemination of news and views in their own
right, they also influence what the domestic mainstream media write about and report on,
although they can also, on occasion, serve as online echo chambers of the discourses of the
domestic, traditional media. The available evidence at the moment suggests that citizen media
will continue to co-exist with the traditional media and be engaged in an as yet indeterminate
push and pull of influence in the foreseeable future.
Significantly, the old model of doing journalism in Nigeria—and elsewhere—is being
more and more challenged, and the overwhelming power and cultural capital that the traditional
media enjoyed for many years are being diminished. Hierarchical, centralized, traditional
structures for news production and distribution are now being confronted by a networked,
heterarchical structure typified by the robust proliferation of many-to-many information flows
and amateur but technically efficient and occasionally radical citizen news sites. The traditional
media in Nigeria are responding to these changes in different ways, but a majority of them have
now been compelled to appreciate the importance of interactivity and reader involvement in
newsgathering. When this study began in 2008, only two major Nigerian newspapers,
Leadership and Daily Trust, allowed reader comments on their stories. But by late 2010, many
Journalism and the Communal Ethos of the Blogosphere,” in Into the Blogosphere: Rhetoric, Community, and
Culture of Weblogs, ed. Minnesota Blog Collective, accessed September 12, 2009 from
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/culture_clash.html.
586

Alexander Halavais, ‘‘The Web as News: September 11 and New Sources of Web News,’’ Paper Presented at the
Annual Convention of the Association of Internet Researchers, Maastricht, The Netherlands, October, 2002.
587

Jane Singer, “The Political J-Blogger,” Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the Association for
Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Toronto, Canada, August, 2004, 23.
588

Guy Redden, “Read the Whole Thing: Journalism, Weblogs and the Remediation of the War in Iraq,” Media
International Australia Incorporating Culture & Policy 109 (2003), 162.

224
traditional newspapers not only allow reader comments, they have also inaugurated participatory,
“crowdsourcing” 589 platforms on their sites. For instance, the Vanguard newspaper came up with
the Vanguard Online Community in late 2010. The platform allows users to upload pictures and
videos, share news stories, blog, and play online games. The Daily Trust also has an “iReport”
page that allows readers to post unreported or under-reported stories in their communities. It is
conceivable that more Nigerian newspaper Web sites will incorporate participatory elements to
their sites—if they can overcome their technophobia, that is. What appears to be slowing down
this process is the fact that advertisers, the live wires of institutional media organizations, still
patronize the traditional media and are yet to migrate online in the same way that advertisers in
the West have done. 590

6.3

Response to Research Question Three
3. How and why have online citizen and alternative media of the Nigerian diaspora
caused the Nigerian government to change state policies?

The online diasporan media became politically consequential precisely because they have ruffled
the composure of governments in the homeland. As we saw in chapters four and five, the
Nigerian diasporan online media have caused an incumbent Vice President to publically declare
his assets after initially declining to do so. They also caused the country’s president to rescind a
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government directive to deny consular services to some self-exiled opposition figures after a
directive authorizing that they be denied the privilege of passport renewal was leaked and
published by the diasporan online media. And the publication of the pictures of the president’s
son bathing in loads of cash, including the leak of several troves of top-secret information
compelled the president to demand that all workers in the Nigerian presidency swear an
unprecedented oath of secrecy. But more than these, the majority of the diasporan media
attracted and retained the attention of the reading public through their continued unmasking of
the corruption of the ruling elite in Nigeria. From the very beginning, diasporan online news
outlets, such as ElenduReports and SaharaReporters, took advantage of their location in the
United States to not only dig up information on corruption of the Nigerian political elite but also
published pictures, addresses and other details of their investments. The enormous popularity of
these kinds of stories forced indicted government officials to react to the stories through the local
press.
This development had two effects. First, it helped popularize the diasporan media in the
domestic public sphere. People who did not have a chance to read the original stories—or who
were not aware that the diasporan news sites exited—looked out for them. Through
recommendation and word of mouth, their popularity grew exponentially. Second, although
suspicion that the new political elite spawned by the restoration of constitutional rule were
thoroughly corrupt had always been part of the national psyche, there had not been any
evidentiary proofs confirming these suspicions. Much of the local media, to make matters worse,
had either been unwilling or unable to investigate allegations of corruption against politicians.
Therefore, the rash of evidence-based citizen news reports in the diasporan media about
transnational elite corruption in Nigeria became an instant hit. In a country where cynicism
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against public officials has justifiably become a national culture, the forceful denials by
politicians and government officials of reports of corruption against them only served to confirm
the truth of the reports. Here, Claude Cockburn’s perceptive, if ironic, quip that we should
“never believe anything until it is officially denied” is particularly applicable. 591 The fact that
government officials were sufficiently concerned about stories of corruption against them to the
point of issuing forceful, impassioned rebuttals in the local press conferred credibility on the
purveyors of the stories. However, ignoring the stories, which were increasingly being read and
shared by many people, would not have been wise either; silence could be interpreted as
admission of guilt. In a way, the Nigerian political elite, because of the perception that they are
sunk in deep corruption, are mired in a catch 22, which makes the diasporan online news media
all the more popular.
Another reason that the diasporan online media have had the capacity to cause
governments at home to change state policies in response to their sustained reportage on issues is
the fact that they have often inspired the formation of episodic, informal but nonetheless
cohesive activist online diasporan communities that organize to effect change back home based
on stories published in the diasporan media. Online petition drives based on stories published on
diasporan citizen media sites, the sending of physical delegations of diasporan Nigerians to
appeal to governments in Nigeria to change certain decisions, and generating publicity for all
these are common occurrences, as detailed in Chapter four. This fact conforms to the broad
outlines of alternative media, which scholars characterize as consisting of “mobilizing
information,” 592 “information for action,” 593 “action on action,” 594 or simply “useful
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information.” 595 In other words, unlike the mainstream news media, alternative media go beyond
publishing ostensibly disinterested information; they go beyond reporting the news and invite
readers to take action based on the information they provide in their reportage. They encourage
readers to initiate online petition drives or to be part of an offline, on-ground protest in order to
cause governments to change unpopular policies or practices. The Nigerian Village Square and
SaharaReporters (which indicatively has a section called “Take Action”) are the best examples of
Nigerian diasporan citizen media sites that effectively put this principle to practice.
Concerns about being exposed to international ridicule, especially in the eyes of Western
governments, is another reason the diasporan media have been able to influence governments in
Nigeria. Many of the diasporan media, as stated in previous chapters, have acquired international
clout. SaharaReporters, for instance, has been profiled and referenced by such powerful Western
news organizations as the Associated Press, CNN, BBC, MSNBC, and so on. This publicity led
the site to be noticed by the U.S. government and donor agencies like the Ford Foundation,
which now partly funds it. But more importantly, the relationship between the U.S. government
and SaharaReporters appears to go beyond financial assistance. The site has broken many stories
and leaked state secrets that embarrassed the Nigerian government, which all seemed to have
emanated from U.S. government sources. It has also quoted anonymous State Department
sources for many sensitive stories. Clearly certain people in the State Department in possession
of sensitive information against the Nigerian government leak it to SaharaReporters. The
WikiLeaks cables about Nigeria have confirmed this. It is supremely ironic that the U.S.
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government is miffed when WikiLeaks does to it what its employees do to another government
in a developing country.
Since Nigerian governments have historically worked to win the approval of the U.S.
government, they are often sensitive to stories that put them in a bad light. It also seems likely
that Nigerian government officials interpret leaks to SaharaReporters from the State Department
as coded diplomatic messages to them from the U.S. government. More specifically, the
diasporan citizen media have often taken advantage of the reality of the “boomerang effect”
discussed in Chapter Five to effect changes in the homeland. The “boomerang effect” accounts
for how advocacy networks, in this case diasporan citizen media, deploy the power of
information to shame recalcitrant and dictatorial regimes. In their influential book Activists
Beyond Borders, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink point out that “voices that are suppressed
in their own societies may find that networks can project and amplify their concerns into an
international arena, which in turn can echo back into their own countries.” 596 In the Nigerian
case, as a result of a domestic media formation that has become compromised and therefore
unable to expose corruption as it should, online citizen media sprouted in the Nigerian diaspora
and helped bring to light homeland corruption to both domestic and international audiences. It is
entirely conceivable that had the diasporan citizen media been viewed only in Nigeria, their
effect would not be as great as it has been; what appears to make them forces to reckon with is
the fact that they are inserted in the discourse and politics of an activist international arena,
which gives their stories significance and visibility beyond the bounds of Nigeria. Fear of
“international embarrassment,” as we saw in Chapter Five in the case of two self-exiled
opposition politicians who were initially denied consular services on the orders of the president,
is a powerful incentive for change of policies in Nigeria. And there is no better structure to bring
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this about in the Nigerian situation than citizen media outfits managed by Nigerians who are
located outside the borders of Nigeria.

6.4

Response to Research Question Four
4. How have the online media of the Nigerian digital diaspora disrupted traditional
notions of news flows between the media of the homeland and the people in the
diaspora?

Traditionally, the scholarship on diaspora media studies has focused on three areas: how
diasporans set up niche news media to construct and negotiate their identities and to come to
terms with their new culture and environment; how the mainline media in the host countries
construct exilic ethnoscapes in dominant media narratives; and how diasporans keep up with the
politics, culture, and other singularities of their homelands through the consumption of their
homeland news media. 597 Indeed, until 2005, the Nigerian diaspora in the West, as Misty
Bastian’s insightful work shows, had media that exclusively catered to their informational needs,
and they looked elsewhere for news to quench their nostalgia about the homeland. 598 When
Nigerian newspapers began to migrate their content to the Web in the early 2000s, diasporan
Nigerians flocked to their sites to read up on news about the homeland and to discuss common
topics of concern. This was a radical improvement on the previous state of affairs when
Nigerians who were displaced from the homeland waited for the occasional newspapers from the
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homeland from people who traveled home or from the few Nigerian newspapers that sold hard
copies of their papers in such Western cities as New York and London. 599
But from the mid 2000s all that changed. Diasporan Nigerians ceased to be mere
consumers of news from the homeland; they also became producers of news and have now
graduated to being editorial agenda setters for the mainline news media in the homeland. So the
hitherto unidirectional flow of news from the homeland to the diaspora has now given way to a
new flow which is not just bidirectional but, in fact, circuitous. News flows from homeland news
media seep out to the diaspora through the Web in a faster way than was ever the case, but news
about the homeland that has never been reported in the homeland also gets back to the domestic
news media—and, ultimately, to the domestic public sphere— through the citizen media of the
diaspora. In an interesting way, both media formations have become echo chambers of each
other. The relational dynamics between diasporan citizen media and the established vehicles of
informational flows in the homeland moved from cooperation to competition and finally to thinly
veiled confrontation. The diasporan citizen media were first regarded as additional sources of
news for the homeland traditional media. For as long as they were not perceived as threatening
the authority and credibility of the homeland news media, Nigeria-based journalists accepted
them, if halfheartedly. However, when it became obvious that they were assuming a position of
centrality in the news dissemination enterprise, the homeland news media saw them as rivals,
and the online citizen media themselves began to act in ways that suggest that they saw
themselves as competitors of the homeland news media for the eyeballs of Nigerian readers. This
fact inspired the traditional journalists in Nigeria to begin an artful patrol of the boundaries of
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journalistic authority. One of the ways they attempted to do this, as was hinted at earlier, was to
denude citizen media practitioners of the social capital that comes from being identified with the
tag of “journalists” or from being regarded as legitimate news sources. Stories culled from or
inspired by the citizen media, as pointed out before, were either never acknowledged outright or
were attributed with pejorative identification labels like “offshore guerrilla news agency” or
simply “an Internet site”; they ceased to be mentioned by their names. This got worse when
some of the diasporan citizen media started to expose corruption in the domestic media, which is
having the effect of making homeland newsmen lose grip of their much cherished journalistic
authority and credibility.
The Nigeria-based journalists were being beaten at their own game by people who have
neither formal journalistic training nor elaborate institutional support, and who lack the
locational advantage that living in the homeland should confer on newshounds. However, the
relational tension between Nigeria’s traditional journalists and the U.S.-based Nigerian citizen
journalists fits a pattern that has been observed in many other contexts. Many journalism
scholars have pointed out that professional journalists in the mainstream media perpetually seek
to consolidate their professional legitimacy and power by appealing to their authority and by
denigrating alternative sources that question their news judgment or undermine their professional
confidence. 600 More specifically, Barbie Zelizer argues that journalists often tend to deploy three
kinds of narrative strategies to assert their authority. She identifies them as synecdoche,
omission, and personalization. 601 In the Nigerian case, they not only subtly invoke their
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professionalism as a strategy to assert their authority and undermine the diasporan citizen media,
they also call attention to their locational advantage by labeling the diasporan media as
“offshore” news sources and eliding them as mere “online sources.” Zelizer, in a different article,
observed a similar phenomenon in American journalism where “reporters use the authority
culled from their local placement within the event to expound on its more general
significance.” 602 Here, she is talking about the privilege and capital that “eyewitnessing,” “being
there,” “being on the spot,” and such other signifiers of positional vantage confer on journalists
in contradistinction to non-journalists who might have legitimate grounds to question the
narrative fidelity of journalistic accounts but who would potentially be undermined by an
absence of this privilege. Nigeria’s traditional journalists, it would seem, discursively constitute
their actual physical presence in Nigeria, as against the virtual “presence” of the diasporan
citizen media, as a form of cultural capital to preserve their authority and competence. But the
growing importance and centrality of the diaspora media in the Nigerian public sphere suggests
that these rhetorical strategies have not been effective.
Now, although diasporan media that exclusively report on the conditions, concerns, and
anxieties of Nigerian diasporans in the West still exist,603 they are progressively either dying out
or changing focus to report on issues that pertain to the politics of the homeland. At the last
count, there are at least fifteen diasporan citizen media sites—all of which are curiously based in
the United States—with correspondents and informants in Nigeria. As noted earlier, these online
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diasporan citizen media break stories faster than the domestic media, leading a commentator to
note that “In Nigeria, the greatest threat to traditional media seems to come from online bloggers
who are more often than not based outside the country. It is interesting to note that a greater
percentage of news about Nigeria is being broken by online citizen media.” 604 In sum, the
cartography of news flows between Nigeria and its Western diaspora has been complicated by
the emergence and rising significance of diasporan online citizen media and this fact is
threatening the very life of the traditional media in Nigeria. The one-dimensionality that had
hitherto characterized news flows between the homeland and its diaspora has now given way to a
labyrinthine multi-dimensionality, which in turn has profound implications for the traditional
scholarly conversation about news flows between the Western core and the Third World
periphery.
As was noted earlier, the rise of diasporan online media in Nigeria has significantly
dimmed the influence of Western news organizations. Here we have a fascinating situation
where indigenous ethnoscapes are now assuming the roles previously occupied by Western
“media imperialists.” Although Western news organizations still exert a tremendous influence in
Nigeria’s media landscape, their influence is being progressively diminished by the Nigerian
diasporan online media. The diasporan citizen journalists have the “native credibility” that
Western news sources lack, but they share in the cultural capital that being located in the West
confers. This unique positional vantage has earned the diasporan citizen journalists credibility
both with Western news sources seeking to find “local color” to stories they report on from their
Western locations and from Nigerians at home who value them for their privileged location and
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uncommon access to news sources that are often unavailable to traditional journalists back home.
What this means is that stories in Western news media about Nigeria that were usually
uninformed or slanted because of inadequate information owing to the difficulty in getting local
sources will now benefit from the input of the legion of Nigerian citizen journalists in the West.
We saw that with many Nigerian stories, such as the December 25, 2009 attempted bombing of
Delta Airline by a Nigerian, all the major Western news organizations turned to the diasporan
citizen media for pictures, background and even perspectives on the story. This may very well
provide a template to reverse time-honored concerns about the disproportionate flow of news
from the West to the developing world. But more importantly, this development has provided
novel dimensions to the notion of “contra-flows” that has been theorized to point out the
inadequacy of classical notions of media and cultural imperialism. The reality of the weakening
of the influence of Western news organizations as a consequence of the emergence of diasporan
citizen online journalism by Nigerians living in the West, and the increasing dependence by
Western news organizations on these citizen media outlets for Nigeria-related stories emanating
from the West, provides grounds to speculate that this may constitute the basis for an African
“contra-flow.” 605
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6.5

Response to Research Question Five
5. What dominant influences—such as advertising, political affiliations, emancipatory
politics, etc—actuate the citizen journalism of the Nigerian diaspora?

Although the diasporan citizen media sites selected for this study, for the most part, enrich and
expand Nigeria’s informational space, different motivations and impulses can be isolated for
their existence. Elendu Reports, for instance, started out as an uncompromising, anticorruption
alternative news media site. It published pictorial proofs of the corruption by the Nigerian
political elite, wrote many piercingly hard-hitting stories that embarrassed government officials,
brought down public officials, and caused many more to be investigated and pilloried. It was the
“go-to” site for alternative news in Nigeria. The fact that the site had no advertising of any kind
strengthened its progressive credentials. 606 So it seemed for a while that it was the ultimate
insurgent, emancipatory citizen media site that had capitulated neither to capital nor to politics.
But it soon emerged that the proprietor of the site, Jonathan Elendu, was in bed with the same
corrupt politicians about whom his site raked muck. This discovery dented his credibility and led
to the decline in the popularity and significance of his site. In retrospect, the Web site actually
characterizes itself as a “for-profit company,” which nonetheless solicits donations from the
public but which insists that donations to it do not entitle donors to preferential editorial
treatment. What is apparent from all this is that the site was set up primarily as a commercial
venture. Its initial radical and populist reportorial comportment was a mere marketing strategy to
call attention to it. After the attention was secured, the proprietor turned himself into a “political
consultant” to the same corrupt politicians his site railed against. It is a crass Internet-enabled
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journalistic mercantilism of the kind that has become prevalent in the domestic Nigerian media,
which certain other diasporan sites have taken pains to unmask, as we saw in Chapter Five. This
reality should impose some restraint on the urge to conceive of all the diasporan citizen media as
necessarily wholly distinct from their homeland counterparts. It is particularly noteworthy that
Mr. Elendu was a traditional journalist in Nigeria before migrating to the United States. But it is
equally remarkable that citizen media sites that betray their readers’ trust and confidence often
lose credibility and patronage faster than do the homeland traditional media. This is, of course,
the consequence of the amplified power and centrality of what one might call “Netizen readerparticipants” in the news business. 607 The progressive irrelevance of ElenduReports in the
Nigerian blogosphere and in the domestic public sphere is a telling proof of this reality.
The Times of Nigeria, Pointblanknews.com, and Huhuonline.com are also obviously
motivated by the same commercial imperatives as traditional, corporatized news media in
Nigeria. Although they have published many anti-corruption stories, they also aggressively
solicit advertising and have taken partisan stances in defense of certain sections of Nigeria’s
political and financial elites. They accept advertising from governments, corrupt politicians, and
private companies in Nigeria. There is evidence from the archives of these sites that there is
some reciprocal editorial acknowledgment of advertising patronage in the form of favorable
coverage. For instance, the governors of the corrupt oil-rich states of Nigeria’s deep south who
lavishly advertise on these site are, for the most part, spared from critical scrutiny. In some cases,
in fact, they are whitewashed and fended from attacks from more radical citizen media sites like
SaharaReporters. Nevertheless, this fact has not hurt their credibility, first, because they did not
define themselves from the beginning as muck-raking, anti-government outlets and, second,
because they derive the social basis of their legitimacy and credibility from niche appeals. The
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TimeofNigeria.com, for instance, is the most reliable source of news about Nigeria’s volatile,
oil-rich Niger Delta region. Militants fighting for a fairer, more equitable distribution of the oil
wealth in the region often reach out to the site first before any other news organization.
Pointblanknews.com, for its part, appeals to readers who are attracted to bizarre scandals
involving people in high places. But some of their reports are not always faithful to the facts, as
we saw in Chapter Four where a newspaper publisher’s wife was wrongly reported to have
decapitated a boy for a ritual sacrifice. HuhuOnline is a “go-to” site for the unmasking of what
might be called clerical corruption, that is, the scandalous financial fraud of Nigeria’s
mushrooming church business, which the domestic mainstream news media have ignored.
The sites that can reasonably be said to be animated by democratic, progressive ideals are
SaharaReporters and the Nigerian Village Square. While SaharaReporters is an unabashedly and
uncompromisingly anti-government news site, the Nigerian Village Square is a fiercely
independent arena for untrammeled political discourse on Nigeria and for initiating and
coordinating transformative, transaction-oriented changes in Nigeria. Both sites go beyond
calling attention to what is wrong with Nigeria to actually physically doing something about the
problems they identify and inveigh against. An online petition drive and physical protests in
Nigeria, which were initiated in the online forums of the Nigerian Village Square, led Nigeria’s
then Vice President to publically declare his assets against his wish. Although participants of the
Nigerian Village Square are scattered all over the world and have never physically met, they
often contribute money through PayPal to send delegations to Nigeria to protest government
policies and to demand for change. Although SaharaReporters always encourages its readers to
“take action” on the basis of the stories it writes, the “actions” often take place in the Nigerian
Village Square, which has become a close-knit community of concerned and politically active
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Nigerian diasporan netizens who have cultivated mutual trust, in large part due to the leadership
and organizational effectiveness of the site’s founder, Philip Adekunle, an Illinois-based IT
professional.
Both SaharaReporters and the Nigerian Village Square accept online advertising from
Google ads and from Nigerian businesses and politicians. Interestingly, politicians who advertise
on the sites have never been able to influence the editorial and discursive directions of the sites,
lending credence to the observations of some alternative media scholars that commercialism does
not necessarily translate to depoliticization and compromise. But after getting $175,000 in
funding from the Ford Foundation, SaharaReporters discontinued accepting advertising from
governments and politicians. It bears pointing out, though, that before the grant from the Ford
Foundation, SaharaReporters got the bulk of its funding from voluntary contributions by its
readers. This is the case for the Nigerian Village Square as well. Both sites have a permanent
“donate” button and often embark on periodic solicitations of financial help from their loyal
visitors when they run into financial difficulties. By contrast, TheTimesofNigeria.com,
Huhuonline, and Pointblanknews.com do not raise funds from their readers. Lately, these three
sites have started a disturbing trend of lending uncritical support for corrupt politicians seeking
elective offices. But given that the people associated with these sites are, like Jonathan Elendu,
former newspaper journalists in Nigeria, it would not be surprising if it comes to light that they
have become paid “political consultants” to politicians.
What is evident from the foregoing is that freedom from commercial pressures and
location outside corporatized, institutional media structures in and of themselves are not
sufficient safeguards against editorial compromise. Association with, or lack thereof, of a higher,
overarching, progressive ideal is a more reliable predictor of the performance of non-corporate,
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citizen media. Although Huhuoline.com, ElenduReports.com, TheTimesofNigeria.com and
Pointblanknews.com are located outside the orbit of mainstream media formation, they are
subject to the same limitations that are denuding the traditional domestic media of their
credibility. This is because their performance is not actuated by any identifiable liberatory ideal;
they are mere additional, and not necessarily alternative, sources of Nigerian news, a distinction
that strikes at the core of the conceptual difference between alternative journalism and citizen
journalism, which will be discussed in more detail in the response to the next research question.
Similarly, although SaharaReporters and the Nigerian Village Square are subject to commercial
advertising pressures in order to survive, they have remained remarkably independent and have
been on record as offering witheringly devastating critiques of their advertisers. They have
reached such positions of prominence that advertisers desire them more for the eyeballs they
attract than for the politics of their news and editorial commentaries. So while advertisers need
them for their own commercial gains, they need the advertisers for survival. It is a relationship
that is sustained by self-preservationist rather than ideological considerations.
From the foregoing, it would seem that previous association with homeland Nigerian
journalism is key here. The diasporan citizen media found to have difficulty rising superior to
some of the grave limitations of Nigeria’s traditional journalistic practices are those whose
owners and writers were once inserted into— and who have internalized the conventions, mores,
and weaknesses of—Nigeria’s traditional journalistic practices. Diasporan media sites that are
refreshingly different and, for that reason enormously popular and influential, are run by people
who were never associated with corporatized traditional journalism in Nigeria. This may be
fortuitous. What is not fortuitous, however, is that the key to continued relevance in the Nigerian
blogosphere and in the domestic public sphere, it would seem, is the capacity to be transparently
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different from the Nigerian traditional media formation, which is broadly held hostage by
corruption, clannishness, and narrow political loyalties.
So far, only SaharaReporters and the Nigerian Village Square have risen to this
challenge. As a result, their power and influence is disproportionately higher than that of other
diasporan media sites. Although it can be argued that the Nigerian Village Square is not strictly a
journalistic enterprise in the way that SaharaReporters is, it is a site both for citizen reporting and
for news-inflected community and discursive participation. As Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel
have observed, since its materialization in seventeenth-century Europe, the “concept of
journalism” has always been wedded to the “concept of community and later democracy.” 608 The
Nigerian Village Square shares this preoccupation with SaharaReporters, and the success of both
sites shows that they provide a model for the future of journalism in transitional societies that
resemble Nigeria’s media and political systems, although their form and substance has yet to
reach stasis.

6. 6

Response to Research Question Six
6. How might the journalistic practices of the Nigerian diaspora complicate notions of
citizen and alternative journalism?

Before providing a response to this question it is important to reflect upon and categorize the six
citizen online media outlets analyzed for this study based on their profiles and preoccupations as
outlined in chapters four and five. Which of the diasporan online sites qualify as “alternative”
media sites and which are merely “citizen” media sites? This is important not only because the
preponderance of scholarship on online journalism tends to erroneously conflate these categories
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but also because classifying them helps to explain their content, character, performance, and
editorial temperaments. As we have seen in Chapter Two, the abiding characteristics of citizen
media outlets are that they are run by people who are not necessarily professional journalists, but
people who would ordinarily be classified as “audience” members in the traditional model of
mass communication, people whose journalistic output is random, episodic, and unburdened by
the demands of institutional journalism.
This definition concatenates the conceptions of citizen journalism separately postulated
by Kristen A. Johnson and Susan Wiedenback, 609 Joseph D. Lasica, 610 Jay Rosen, 611 and Joyce
Nip. 612 Jonson and Wiedenback’s notion of citizen journalism as the kind of journalism that is
practiced by people with no professional training, while reasonably admissible, fails to take into
account the fact that many professional journalists now practice citizen journalism both within
and outside the structures of traditional media formations. For instance, four of the six citizen
media sites examined for this study are run by former newspaper journalists. That is why
Lasica’s apt description of citizen journalism as “random act of journalism,” Rosen’s witty
characterization of citizen journalists as “people formerly known as the audience,” and Nip’s
insistence that the elimination of the “gatekeeper” in news flow is the central element in the
definition of citizen journalism all come together to define the essential singularities of citizen
media. This definitional clarification helps us to properly situate and characterize the sites that
have been analyzed for this study, which are a mix of people who have no professional training
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in journalism and those who have previously been journalists in Nigeria. Jonathan Elendu, the
owner of ElenduReports.com, was a journalist with the Daily Times, Nigeria’s oldest surviving
English-language newspaper. Similarly, Emmanuel Asiwe, publisher of HuhuOnline.com, was a
journalist with ThisDay, an influential, if notoriously compromised, daily newspaper in Nigeria.
Sunny Ofili, owner of the TheTimesofNigeria.com, was a journalist with the defunct African
Guardian newsmagazine before he relocated to the United States. And the two main people
associated with PointBlankNews.com, Jackson Ude and Churchill Umoren, were practicing
journalists in Nigeria before they migrated to the United States as well.
However, SaharaReporters.com’s Omoyele Sowore has no previous journalistic
experience. Neither has Nigerian Village Square’s Philip Adekunle and the army of ordinary
citizens who independently investigate news stories and publish on SaharaReporters.com and
NigeriaVillageSquare.com. But all these people are regarded as citizen journalists because their
journalism is not routinized, and is unencumbered by the dictatorship of the multi-layered
editorial gate-keeping typical of institutional journalism. Axel Bruns instructively characterizes
this as the transformation of journalism “from gatekeeping to gatewatching.” 613 Nevertheless, the
fact that these Web sites are becoming more or less regular sources of news from which their
owners increasingly earn a living challenges us to think of more appropriate terminologies to
capture their activities beyond the increasingly generic “citizen journalism” label. It seems
appropriate to characterize the journalism that takes place in all the media outlets studied for this
project—except the Nigerian Village Square which is actually more of a platform for random
news reports, analyses and opinionating than a strictly news site—as “standalone citizen
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journalism.” The term “standalone journalism” was first coined by journalist Chris Nolan to
describe citizen journalism that is fairly regular, that has a substantial reader catchment area, and
that is unaffiliated with a corporate news organization. She defines a “standalone journalist” this
way:
They are people who are using blogging technology—software that allows them to
quickly publish their work and broadcast it on the Internet—to find and attract users.
They understand that the barrier to entry in this new business isn’t getting published;
anyone can do that. The barrier to entry is finding an audience. That’s why their editorial
product is consistent, reliable and known. Readers have expectations and stand alone
journalists understand this and put that understanding into practice. 614
According to this definition, standalone journalists are not random reporters for just anybody.
They have a specific audience in mind and work to meet the expectations of this narrow
audience. Since the diasporan online media examined for this study can no longer be described
as engaging in “random acts of journalism” (their journalism is now far too regular for that
description to be apt) and are not exactly “the people formerly known as the audience” (since
most of them were professional journalists back in Nigeria) but are still not employed by
corporate news organization nor do they have an obligation to update their sites at regular,
inviolably specific time slots like the traditional media do, they still practice citizen journalism,
but it is a form of citizen journalism that defies the conventional notions of citizen media
practice. It seems appropriate, therefore, to borrow Nolan’s phrase and characterize this type of
journalism as “standalone citizen journalism.”
Alternative citizen media, on the other hand, are online citizen media that do not merely
produce episodic, non-professionalized, non-routinized journalism but that are, in addition,
committed to a higher, progressive ideal of extirpating the dominant, oppressive ideology in a
social formation. In the West, alternative journalism often takes an anti-capitalist or at least a
614
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counter-cultural form. In Nigeria, however, the dominant concern of the progressive segment of
the population is markedly different. There, opposition to corrupt governments—and,
increasingly, a close, corrupt, and compromised mainstream media formation—constitutes the
core of an “alternative” praxis. In this study, therefore, I conceptualize Nigerian alternative
online journalism as that type of episodic, non-routinized citizen reportage that is implacably
opposed to corrupt governments at all levels, that scrutinizes and holds accountable the domestic
national media, and that is sufficiently and uncompromisingly consistent in its advocacy
journalism on behalf of a transparent, democratic, and free Nigeria to cause governments to be
disconcerted and seek ways to undermine it.
Using this schema, the only Nigerian diasporan online citizen media site that qualifies to
be classified as an “alternative media” outlet is Sahara Reporters. The owners of the site not only
indicatively describe themselves as “unapologetic practitioners of advocacy journalism,” they
have also lived up to that declaration in their reportorial temperaments and practices. This fact is
now being acknowledged even by people outside Nigeria. For instance, as we saw in Chapter 5,
The Daily Beast’s Philip Shenon has perceptively characterized SaharaReporters as “Africa’s
WikiLeaks.” 615 This comparison is instructive because, like WikiLeaks, SaharaReporters
depends on whistleblowers located in the inner recesses of the Nigerian power structure to leak
embarrassing information about the inner, dirty workings of government and about government
officials. But while WikiLeaks is merely a treasure trove for sensitive, hacked documents that
Western governments would rather have shrouded in secrecy, SaharaReporters is a journalistic
project that simultaneously acts as a site for hacked documents and for analyses and reportage of
the documents. WikiLeaks depends entirely on citizen and traditional news media sites for the
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editorial analyses of the classified documents it episodically “dumps” on its site. So while
SaharaReporters is a citizen journalism project, WikiLeaks is not. As Joyce Nip notes in her
influential conception of citizen journalism, “to qualify as journalism, the content needs to
include some original interviewing, reporting, or analysis of events or issues to which people
other than the authors have access.” 616
But SaharaReporters certainly shares the subversive information gathering technique of
WikiLeaks. This is evident in SaharaReporters’ updated “philosophy and editorial policy,” which
states in part:
We depend on the efforts of concerned citizens who act [as] whistleblowers as well as
the main sources for our exposés. In a continent where much of the “professional”
media is compromised, we make a point of investigating and reporting stories that the
mainstream media dare not or will not report. 617
The above quotation also points to the key distinction between the reportorial practices of
Western alternative media formations and SaharaReporters. Whereas the core of the reportorial
quiddities of Western alternative media formation consists in such unconventional journalistic
practices as “native reporting” and “active witnessing,” SaharaReporters combines these
practices with the practice of proactively tapping into the internal discontent within the Nigerian
ruling class to get exclusive, often anonymously sourced, stories to expose high-profile
corruption and, in the process, discomfit the ruling class and force major policy changes. The site
is especially well-suited for this kind of reporting, as has been pointed out earlier, because
whistle-blowers who expose government dirt to the site can often be assured that their identities
will be concealed and, not being located in Nigeria, owners of the site cannot be subpoenaed by
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Nigerian courts to disclose the sources of their information. This is a privilege that no Nigerianbased media organization can have. SaharaReporters fiercely protects the anonymity,
confidentiality and safety of its sources.
Another factor that redounds to the site’s “alternativeness” is that it is reasonably
financially independent. When the site started, as pointed out, it was sustained primarily by
voluntary donations from its readers and from online advertising. It also initially accepted
advertising from governments but did not spare such governments from its adversarial, antigovernment advocacy journalism. However, after it won a $175,000 renewable grant from the
Ford Foundation, the site took a policy to reject all advertising from any government in Nigeria.
What is important in all this, though, is that Sahara Reporters has demonstrated that commercial
success does not necessarily preclude radical critique. The news journal Comedia came to this
realization long ago. 618 So did Abe Peck in his insightful social history of the “underground
press” in 1960s America. 619 They have shown examples of commercially viable alternative
media outfits that have not abandoned progressive ideals.
However, the warning from such alternative media scholars as Gholam Khiabany 620 and
Herbert Pimlott 621 that exposure to more advertising patronage than is sufficient to sustain the
life of alternative media can compromise their editorial independence and vitality is not entirely
without merit. This was certainly the case with ElenduReporters which, as we saw in Chapter 4,
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started out as a virile, uncompromisingly muckraking alternative online media platform but
degenerated into a mouthpiece for state governors whose sordid corruption it had unmasked. The
editorial focus of the site began to change after it accepted advertising from the people whose
shenanigans it covered and uncovered. Jonathan Elendu, the site’s owner, later took up jobs as a
political and media consultant to a slew of politicians his site had exposed as corrupt. Of course,
the consequence of that misadventure was the site degenerated from being the leading Nigerian
citizen media outlet between 2005 and 2006 to a peripheral, inconsequential one as of late 2010.
Interestingly, when security agents of the Nigerian government arrested and detained him
when he traveled home from his base in the United States on suspicion that he was associated
with SaharaReporters, his plight elicited minimal concern from Nigerians at home and in the
diaspora. He was condemned by many as the victim of his duplicity and lack of principles.
PointblankNews.com shows occasional flashes of radicalism in ways that tempt one to
characterize it as belonging to the alternative online media sub-formation but there is strong
evidence that, since accepting advertising from Nigerian federal government agencies, it has
tempered the causticity of its critiques of government.
What is apparent from the foregoing is that like Tanni Hass, 622 John Downing 623 and
others have theorized, the notion of alternative media is not a neat, self-sufficient, and
unblemished category, nor can it always be conceived in binary opposition to “mainstream”
media formations. Although SaharaReporters is decidedly an alternative media platform in the
context of the politics and performance of the Nigerian media system, its reportorial practices are
not always radically different from those of its mainstream, homeland counterparts. And
although it is unique in allowing citizen investigations and testimonies to be published unedited,
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it robustly deploys anonymous sourcing, a time-honored mainstream reporting style. Although it
now rejects advertising from government, it did accept it in the past and still accepts ads on its
sites from many businesses and traditional Nigerian news media organizations seeking to
promote their stories. Besides, its wild popularity and increasing acceptance in mainstream
society both in Nigeria and outside of it calls to question the appropriateness of its designation as
an “alternative media” outlet. It is becoming, at best, a mainstreamed alternative citizen media
outlet.
Another point that complicates the characterization of media outlets as “alternative” is the
reality of intentional ideological deceit evident in many Nigerian diasporan online media outlets.
Many of them started out as impassioned, hardnosed, anti-corruption media only so that they
could be noticed. They then exploited the reputational capital that their momentary popularity
conferred on them to seek opportunities for self-enrichment. This is especially becoming a trend,
with SaharaReporters being the notable exception. For being different from the crowd,
SaharaReporters is rewarded with wide reckoning in Nigerian politics. But this reality
complicates the mapping of diasporan media into ordinary citizen media and alternative media.
Some of the features of alternative online media isolated in Chapter 2 include the
following: they are usually run by activists who are motivated by emancipatory progressive
impulses; they intentionally function as counterweights to the corporate media; they are often
unfettered by the pressures of the market and free from state control; they deploy activist,
unorthodox reportorial practices (such as native reporting and active witnessing) in
newsgathering; they serve as counter-information systems and agents of development power;
they act as facilitators of social communication rather than as sources of information; and they
are more concerned with nurturing a “mobilized” citizenry than an “informed” citizenry.
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SaharaReporters, the only truly alternative online news medium, does not neatly fit these
categories. Although the site’s politics and journalistic preoccupations are clearly motivated by
liberatory impulses and are not subject to commercial and governmental pressures, it is not a
social movement platform, nor are its reportorial practices always in opposition to the
conventions of corporate news media practices. However, within the context of the politics of
Nigeria—and indeed of all countries that share Nigeria’s socio-historical characteristics—its
journalism cannot be described as anything other than “alternative.” Thus, the epistemological
and ontological boundaries of the time-honored conception of alternative journalism among
media scholars need to be expanded to take account of the fact that alternative media can exist
without being obsessed with extirpating capitalism or running against the cultural mainstream, or
being led and sustained by organized social movements or, for that matter, being both sources of
information and facilitators of social communication. Such a reconsideration of the conception of
alternative journalism would escape the charge of occluding the socio-historical singularities of
non-Western societies. What should matter in the conceptualization of alternative journalism is
the degree to which journalism is consistently oppositional both to the mainstream media (which
are by definition pro status quo and core instruments for the legitimation and naturalization of
the power structure) and oppressive cultural and political practices within societies and social
formations. The form and substance of this journalism will necessarily differ from society to
society. Transitional, emerging democracies will have alternative media formations that are
different from those of freer, more transparent societies, which will in turn be different from
deeply oppressive and closed societies. In other words, the form and character of alternative
media formations in the world will be inflected by their socio-historical and cultural singularities.
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However, they also share a passion for extirpating inequality, instituting justice and economic
liberty for all, and disrupting the comfort of oppressive power structures.

6.7

Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations

This study has illustrated that diasporic online citizen journalism of the kind that has been
examined here has the capacity to construct loose but nonetheless virile media-created virtual
public spheres that can influence, challenge, and alter the politics and traditional media
formations of homelands in peripheral, transitional societies as well as serve as alternatives or
complements to state-run and corporate media. This extends the conversation about how the
Internet has transformed the dynamics of content creation and consumption. While the
transformation of audiences into content creators has been amply documented within the bounds
of nations and states, this study has chronicled one of only a few instances of previous diasporic
consumers of homeland news transforming to creators of news content for and about the home
from which they are geographically separated for good and, in the process, contributing to
raising the bar of domestic national discourse, media practice, and governmental policy
formulations. The study is therefore important in pointing out ways that countries saddled with a
compromised or strangulated domestic media system can turn to their diasporas in the West—or
any other technologically and politically advanced society—to challenge or improve homeland
media formations and influence government policies.
While instances of exilic individuals challenging homeland state policies and even
changing whole governments through the instrumentality of “small media” have been welldocumented, 624 the kind of diasporic journalism examined in this study is unique in many
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respects. First, it is practiced by people who are not temporary political exiles but permanent
legal residents in their host countries. Many of them were professional journalists back home
who changed careers upon arrival in their new host countries. Others were pro-democracy and
human-rights activists before they relocated to the United States. Still others are U.S.-based IT
professionals who are merely interested in expanding the discursive space in Nigeria. But all of
them practice citizen journalism as a part-time endeavor. And, unlike the exilic elites of 1980s
Iran, for example, who brought about changes back home while away from it using small media
and going back home thereafter, the Nigerian diaspora at the vanguard of the online citizen
journalism in this study have a sense of rootedness and membership in their host communities
and have no desire to return to the homeland. 625
Similarly, over the years, their diasporic online media have been mainstreamed and are
now seen as part of Nigeria’s media landscape. This fact has conferred on them institutional
authenticity in ways that the small media of exilic elites highlighted in previous studies did not
have. So the citizen media system that the Nigerian diaspora has helped birth is not episodic,
contingent, and inspired by fleeting political concerns. It emerged first as a complement and later
as a competitor to the domestic media. A diasporic media formation, located solely on virtual
space but with preoccupations entirely centered on the homeland is unique. It is even more
unusual that such a media system can influence government policies and threaten the
professional and institutional authority of the domestic legacy media. Thus, this media system, as
the Ford Foundation aptly notes, provides a model for deepening participatory democracy and
serving as a counterfoil to compromised media systems in developing societies. Of course, not
Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution: Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota, 1994).
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all the online media highlighted for this study have democratizing potential, but it is significant
that the discursive democracy the Internet enables also makes it easy for readers to desert news
outlets that betray the trust of their readers.
It is obvious that that the diasporan online media in Nigeria have been effective partly
because of their capacity to attract the attention of government back home. And they have
succeeded in attracting the attention of the government because the diasporan media sites are
located in the United States, a country whose approval the Nigerian governments traditionally
seek, with a few exceptions. 626 As one of the case studies showed, fear of being exposed to
“international embarrassment” (which is often shorthand for American disapproval) is often a
potent motive force for changing unpopular state policies in Nigeria. It is conceivable that were
the diasporan citizen news media to be located anywhere outside America, they would not have
been as effective as they have been. This is the core of the claims of the theory of boomerang
effect: its power derives from the willingness of governments of resource-rich countries in the
West to compel governments in the Third World to change policies considered unpopular. This
means that the relative success of the diasporan online media can only be replicated in countries
where governments are sensitive to international public opinion, where governments are eager to
be in the good graces of Western governments, and where the press systems are at least “partly
free,” to use the Freedom House’s terminology for the classification of the world’s freedom
index.627 Nigeria has been consisted classified as “partly free” except for once when it was
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classified as “free.” It was also once classified as “not free” during General Sani Abacha’s brutal
military dictatorship. The point then is that the online citizen media of Third World diasporas can
only be effective and active agents of change in their original homelands if those homelands at
least make pretensions to democracy and freedom, like Nigeria does. It would be pointless in
countries like North Korea, Cuba, Iran, China, Pakistan, the Gulf States, and so on where Web
sites can be arbitrarily blocked by governments without reputational consequences, where
governments are contemptuous of international public opinion, and where anti-Western
sentiments are mainstream. In other words, countries where the press systems are “not free” are
exempt from the consequences of the random acts of journalism of geographically displaced
ethnoscapes in the Western core. This consideration is the major limitation in the applicability of
this study. However, even in these totalitarian or authoritarian countries, the proliferation of
mobile Internet access is rendering government control of the Web rather slippery. In China, for
instance, many demonstrations have been successfully organized by otherwise widely dispersed
people through cell phones.
It is important to note, too, that although the Internet is not as widely accessible in the
developing world as it is in the West, potentially limiting the power and reach of online citizen
media, Internet access and literacy have been growing by leaps and bounds lately, especially
with the wild popularity of mobile Internet service. In Nigeria, as in most developing countries,
most people get access to the Internet through their cell phones. But, more importantly, as the
two-step flow theory of communication (sometimes called the multiple-step-flow theory of
communication) suggests, the effects of mass communication are not often measured primarily
through the number of people who have had first contact with the content of the mass media.
News often percolates to the general populace through a network of interpersonal relationships
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led by “opinion leaders.” 628 The theory states that news from the mass media usually first get to
opinion leaders, who are usually well-educated, media-savvy and have access to modern
communication facilities, who then relay it to the lower strata of the society through informal
channels. Most of the stories covered in the online diasporan media that had momentous
consequences in Nigeria became topics of national conversation precisely because they were first
exposed to a few influential people who had access to the Internet and who later diffused the
information to the larger populace through a multiple-flow process. With the profusion of
Internet access through cell phones, which empowers many more people to directly encounter
news on the Internet, this theory and its implications may become less significant.
As a result of the success of the first set of diasporan online citizen media outlets, there
has been a mushrooming of diasporan online citizen media that are actively involved in
traditional news reporting. It is conceivable that they will become a permanent fixture of the
Nigerian media landscape, but it is also possible that their emergence is actuated by the general
election in Nigeria billed for April 2011. Most of these sites are obviously politically motivated,
are designed to feather the political aspirations of certain politicians and to undermine those of
others, and generally fall short of the expectations that made some of their forerunners popular
and successful. Similarly, such older diasporan media sites as TheTimesofNigeria.com and
Huhuonline have become partisan in ways that suggest that they have been compromised and
that they are selling their influence, especially to Nigeria’s current president and his minions.
The good thing, though, is that these sites seem to be losing their readers while those of
628

The two-step flow theory was first conceptualized by Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues. See Paul Felix
Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes up His Mind in a
Presidential Campaign (Columbia University Press, 1944). It was later fleshed out by Elihu Katz in many
experiments such as his famous “The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-To-Date Report on a Hypothesis,”
The Public Opinion Quarterly 21 no. 1 (1957): 61-78. Although the theory has been criticized it offers a useful
framework to conceptualize how information flows especially in societies where the mass media have not fully
permeated.

255
SaharaReporters.com seem to be increasing by the day. 629 The deliberative democracy that the
Internet makes possible will ultimately allow readers to express their feelings through online
comments and patronage. In the final analysis, the Web sites that will survive will be those that
are not only transparent and unaffiliated with politicians and political parties but that are seen to
be so by readers.
Although there is no parallel as of the time of this study of diasporan online journalistic
activism of the kind examined here, it would be interesting to look out for such instances when
they emerge and compare them with the Nigerian example. It would also be useful to undertake
comparative online media journalistic activist studies with countries that share Nigeria’s
demographic and socio-historical attributes such as Malaysia where bloggers recently caused a
major political earthquake by helping to unseat a government that had clung on to power since
the country’s independence through an iron-clad strangulation of the discursive space. In
Malaysia, like in Nigeria, “people trust the Internet more than official sources.” That is why
Malaysian researchers found that “more than 70 percent of voters in March 8 [2008] elections
were influenced by blogs. 630 Such an effect has not been systematically measured in Nigeria, but
given the mass disillusionment with the mainstream media in Nigeria and the immense
popularity of online media, it is entirely possible that a similar finding will be made.
One of the limitations of this study is that I did not directly interview Nigerian journalists.
Future research that interviews Nigerian journalism to find out their views, anxieties, and
concerns about the diasporan media would be an invaluable contribution. So would an
ethnographic study of the U.S.-based diasporan journalists themselves. But, significantly, this is
629
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an exploratory study of an unfolding phenomenon. The insights presented in this study can
become the basis for a more descriptive study.

WORKS CITED
Abati, Rueben. “The Gbenga Obasanjo ‘Interview.’” [Nigerian] Guardian, January 13, 2006;
accessed on April 24, 2010 from
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/opessays/?u=Abati_on_Gbenga_Obasanjo_interview_by_
Sowore.htm&PHPSESSID=69a95bb996be7efdb8b862b2ff7fbdf8.
Abercrombie, Nicholas, Stephen Hill, and Bryan S Turner. Dictionary of Sociology 3rd edition.
Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1994.
About US. “Title for TheTimesofNigeria.” http://www.aboutus.org/TheTimesOfNigeria.com;
accessed April 24, 2010.
Achebe, Chinua. Things Fall Apart. London: Heinemann, 1986 (originally published in 1958).
Ackerman, Bruce. “Why Dialogue?” The Journal of Philosophy, 86 no 1, (1989): 5-22.
Adamu, Abdallah U. “Istanci, Imamanci and Bollywoodanci: Media and Adaption in Hausa
Popular Culture.” In Hausa Home Videos: Technology, Economy and Society edited by
Abdallah Adamu, Yusuf M. Adamu, and Umar Faruk Jibril (Kano, Nigeria: Center for
Hausa Cultural Studies, 2004).
Adega, Majek. “Citizen Investigation: Harvard University Denies Agreement with Governors.”
Nigerian Village Square, June 11, 2009,

257
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/patrick-nwadike/harvard-university-deniesagreement-with-governors.html (accessed September 6, 2010).
Adega, Majekodumi. “Harvard Denies Agreement with Nigerian Governors.” SaharaReporters,
June 12, 2009, http://saharareporters.com/report/harvard-university-denies-agreementnigerian-governors (accessed September 6, 2010).
Adekola, Shola. “FG Probes Killing of Nigerian Aboard Spanish Plane.” Nigerian Tribune, June
29, 2007; accessed May 13, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
6476&catid=169&Itemid=46.
Adeyemo, Tudun. “Why I Write: Omoyele Sowore,” Tell, September 7, 2009.
http://tundunadeyemo.blogspot.com/2009/09/why-i-write-omoyele-sowore.html
(accessed April 24, 2010).
Adeniyi, Olusegun. “Why the Hell Am I Here?” Nigerian Village Square, September 07, 2007;
accessed May 15, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
7117&catid=336&Itemid=46.
Adibe, Jideofor. “Nigerian Governors and the MOU with Harvard University: A Contrary
View.” HollarAfrica, http://www.hollerafrica.com/showArticle.php?catId=1&artId=306
(accessed September 6, 2010).
Adigun, Bashir. “Nigerian President Declares Assets.” The Associated Press, June 28, 2007;
accessed May 13, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
6470&catid=169&Itemid=46.

258
Afigbo, Adiele E. “Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State.”
Publius 21 no. 4 (1991): 13-29.
Againstbabangida.com. “FG Shuts Saharareporters.com.” Accessed May 15, 2010 from
http://againstbabangida.com/home/307-fg-shuts-saharareporterscom.
Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Palo Alto: Stanford
University Press, 1988.
Agbaje, Adigun A. The Nigerian Press, Hegemony, and the Social Construction of Hegemony,
1960-1983. Ontario, Canada: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992.
Agbese, Aje-Ori. The Roles of the Press and Communication Technology in Democratization:
The Nigerian Story. New York & London: Routledge, 2006.
Ahmad, Gausu. “Gaskiya Tafi Kwabo: From Colonial Service to Community Beacon.” In
Indigenous Language Media in Africa edited Abiodun Salawu, 95-113. (Lagos, Nigeria:
Centre for Black and African Arts and Civilization, 2006).
Akaeze, Anthony. “How They Survived Hard Times in US.” Newswatch October 13, 2009;
accessed April 24, 2010 from
http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1399&It
emid=48.
Akinbanjo, Idris. “Yar'Adua Denied me Passport - El-Rufai.” NEXT,
http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5460669-146/story.csp (accessed
September 26, 2010).
Akinfeleye, Ralph. “Religious publication: Pioneers of Nigerian Journalism.” In Mass
Communication in Nigeria: A Book of Readings edited by Onuora E. Nwuneli, 26-34.
Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985.

259
Akinkuotu, Ayo. Tell, August 31, 1998.
Akintayo, Akin. “Nigeria: Sahara Reporters Comes of Age,” NEXT, January 03, 2010; accessed
April 24 from http://community.234next.com/content/nigeria-sahara-reporters-comesage.
Akintunde, Kazeem. “Outrage over Governors’ Harvard Programme.” Newswatch, June 28,
2009,
http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1062&It
emid=47 (accessed September 6, 2010).
Albert, Isaac Olawale. “Whose Deliberative Democracy? A Critique of Online Public
Discourses in Africa.” Nigerian Village Square, April 19, 2010; accessed May 11, 2010
fromhttp://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=15291&catid=67&Itemid=46.
Aluede, R.O.A. “Regional Demands and Contemporary Educational Disparities in Nigeria.”
Journal of Social Science 13 no. 3 (2006):183-189.
Aluko, M.A.O. “The Institutionalization of Corruption and its Impact on Political Culture and
Behavior in Nigeria.” Nordic Journal of African Studies 11 no. 3 (2002): 393-402.
Aluko, Mobolaji. “Re: SaharaReporters’ Strategic Success.” USAAfrica Dialogue Series,
December 18, 2008; accesses May 12, 2010
fromhttp://groups.google.com/group/USAAfricaDialogue/browse_thread/thread/b004523
3d98cd8db.
Aluko, Mobolaji. “Diaspora Petition to President Yar'adua over Non-renewal of Passport.”
Nigerian Village Square, http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/mobolajialuko/diaspora-petition-to-president-yaradua-over-non-renewal-of-passport.html

260
(accessed September 26, 2010).
Amadi, Sam. “Who Needs Harvard Education?” AllAfrica.com,
http://allafrica.com/stories/200906250567.html (accessed September 5, 2010).
Anaba, Eze. “IBB, Visit to Minna and Journalism.” Vanguard, August 20, 2010,
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/08/ibb-visit-to-minna-and-journalism/ (accessed
October 4, 2010.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism. New York, NY: Verso, 1983.
Andjelkovic, Maja. “The Future is Mobile: Why Developing Country Entrepreneurs Can Drive
Internet Innovation.” SAIS Review 30 no. 2 (2010): 121-133.
Andrews, Paul. “Is Blogging Journalism?” Nieman Reports 57 (2003): 63-64.
Appadurai, Arjun. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
Arendt, Hanna. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
A Report by the Press Freedom Committee of the Nigerian Union of Journalists. NUJ, Lagos,
1993.
Arthur, John A. Invisible Sojourners: African Immigrant Diaspora in the United States.
Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2000.
Article 19. Truth From Below: The Emergent Press in Africa. London: Article 19, 1991.
Atton, Chris. “Ethical Issues in Alternative Journalism.” In Communication
Ethics Today, edited by R. Keeble 15–27. Leicester: Troubadour, 2005.
Atton, Chris. An Alternative Internet. Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 2004.
Atton, Chris. “Towards a Cultural Study of Alternative Media on the Internet.” Southern Review

261
35 no. 3 (2002): 52-62.
Atton, Chris. “Alternative Media in Scotland: Problems, Positions and ‘Product’.” Critical
Quarterly 42 no. 4 (2000): 40-47.
Atton, Chris. Alternative Media. London: Sage, 2001.
Atton, Chris. “News Cultures and New Social Movements: Radical Journalism and Mainstream
Media.” Journalism Studies 3 (2002): 491-505.
Atton, Chris. “What is ‘Alternative’ Journalism?” Journalism: Theory, Practice and Criticism 4
(2003): 267-72.
Atton, Chris and Emma Wickenden. “Sourcing Routines and Representation in Alternative
Journalism: A Case Study Approach.” Journalism Studies 6 (2005): 347-59.
Babalola, Hakeem. “Elendu Released: Nigerian Press Vs Citizen Online Press.” Nigerian Village
Square, October 29, 2008; accessed May 18, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/hakeem-babalola/elendu-released-nigerianpress-vs-citizen-online.html.
Bamidele, Razak. “How We Planned to Fund Harvard Programme –Govs’ Forum.”
http://news.onlinenigeria.com/templates/?a=4841&z=12 (accessed September 6, 2010).
BBC News. “News Blogger Detained in Nigeria.” Accessed September 11, 2009 from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7686119.stm.
Bahktin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
UP, 1984.
Baoill, Andrew. “Weblogs and the Public Sphere.” In Into the Blogosphere: Rhetoric,
Community, and Culture of Weblogs, edited by Minnesota Blog Collective, accessed
September 12, 2009 from

262
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/weblogs_and_the_public_sphere.html.
Bardoel, Jo and Mark Deuze. “Network Journalism: Converging Competences of Media
Professionals and Professionalism.” Australian Journalism Review 23 no. 2 (2001): 91103.
Bastian, Misty. “Nationalism in a Virtual Space: Immigrant Nigerians on the Internet.”
West Africa Review 1 no.1 (July 1999): 13,
http://www.africaresource.com/war/vol1.1/bastian.html.
Bauder, David. “Web Has Unexpected Effect on Journalism.” USA Today, March 17, 2008,
accessed September 16, 2009 from http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-03-173511532335_x.htm.
Becker, Bruce and Jason Wehner. “Electronic Networks and Civil Society: Reflections on
Structural Changes in the Public Sphere.” In Culture, Technology, Communication:
Towards an International Global Village, edited by Charles Ess, 67–85. Albany, NY:
SUNY Press, 2001.
Becker, David G. “Bonanza Development and the New Bourgeoisie.” Comparative
Political Studies 15 (1982): 88-243.
Ben, Sayre, Leticia Bode, Dhavan Shah, Dave Wilcox, and Chirag Shah. “Agenda Setting in a
Digital Age: Tracking Attention to California Proposition 8 in Social Media, Online
News, and Conventional News.” Policy & Internet 2 no. 2 (2010): 7-32.
Benbasat, Izak, David .K. Goldstein and Melissa Mead. “The Case Research Strategy in Studies
of Information Systems.” MIS Quarterly 11 (1987): 369-387.
Benhabib, Seyla. "Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and
Jürgen Habermas." In Habermas and the Public Sphere. Edited by Craig Calhoun. MIT

263
Press, 1992.
Benjaminson, Peter and David Anderson. Investigative Reporting 2nd edition. Ames: Iowa State
University, 1990.
Benson, Rodney. “Commercialism and Critique; California’s Alternative Weeklies.” In
Contesting Media Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World, edited by James
Curran and Nick Couldry, 111-127. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003.
Bernal, Victoria. “Diaspora, Cyberspace and Political Imagination: The Eritrean Diaspora
Online.” Global Networks 6 no. 2 (2006): 161–179.
Biltereyst, Daniel and Philippe Meers. “The International Telenovela Debate and the ContraFlow Argument: A Reappraisal.” Media, Culture & Society, 22 no. 4 (2000): 393-414.
Bittner, John R. Mass Communication: An Introduction 5th edition. New Jersey: Prentice Hall,
Inc., 1989.
Boczkowski, Pablo J. “The Development and Use of Online Newspapers: What Research Tells
Us and What We Might Want to Know.” In Handbook of New Media: Social Shaping
and Consequences of ICTs, L.A. edited by Lievrouw and S. Livingstone, 270–86.
London: Sage, 2002.
Bohman, James. “Expanding Dialogue: The Internet, the Public Sphere and Prospects for
Transnational Democracy.” In After Habermas: New Perspectives on the Public Sphere
Edited by Nick Crossley and John M. Roberts, 131-154. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing,
2004.
Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.
Bowman, Shayne and Chris Willis. “We Media: How Audiences Are Shaping the Future of
News and Information.” http://www.hypergene.net/wemedia/; accessed September 11,

264
2009.
Boyd-Barrett, Oliver. “Media Imperialism: Towards an International Framework for the Analysis
of Media Systems.” In Mass Communication and Society, edited by James Curran,
Michael Gurevitch and Janet Woollacott 116-141. London: Edward Arnold, 1977.
Bradley, Matthew T. “Civil Society and Democratic Progression in Postcolonial Nigeria:
The Role of Non-Governmental Organizations.” Journal of Civil Society 1 no. 1
(2005): 61-74.
Brettell, Caroline B. “Political Belonging and Cultural Belonging Immigration Status,
Citizenship, and Identity among Four Immigrant Populations in a Southwestern
City.”American Behavioral Scientist 50 no.1 (2006): 70-99.
Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. Digital Diasporas: Identity and Transnational Engagement.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
Bruner, Michael L. “Carnivalesque Protest and the Humorless State.” Text and Performance
Quarterly 25 no. 2, (2005): 136–155.
Bruns, Axel. “The Active Audience: Transforming Journalism from Gatekeeping to
Gatewatching.” In Making Online News: The Ethnography of New Media Production
edited by Chris Patterson and David Domingo. Peter Lang, New York, 2008.
Bunz, Mercedes. “In Mobile Phone Journalism, Africa is Ahead of the West.” The Guardian,
December 18, 2009; accessed December 20, 2010 from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/pda/2009/dec/17/digital-media-mobilephone-usageafrica-leapfroging-ushahidi-swift-river.
Calhoun, Craig, “Introduction.” Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun.
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.

265
Campbell, Donald T. “Degrees of Freedom and the Case Study.” Comparative Political Studies
8 no. 1 (1975): 178-191.
Campbell, Vincent. Information Age Journalism: Journalism in an International Context.
London: Arnold, 2004.
Cammaerts, Bart and Leo Van Audenhove. “Online Political Debate, Unbounded Citizenship,
and the Problematic Nature of a Transnational Public Sphere.” Political Communication
22 (2005): 179-196.
Carroll, Brian. “Culture Clash: Journalism and the Communal Ethos of the Blogosphere.” In
Into the Blogosphere: Rhetoric, Community, and Culture of Weblogs, edited by
Minnesota Blog Collective, accessed September 12, 2009 from
http://blog.lib.umn.edu/blogosphere/culture_clash.html.
Cecil, Matthew, ed. “Alternative Media.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 24 no. 4 (2000):
355-356.
ChatAfrik. “Omoyele Sowore.” Accessed April 24, 2010 from
http://www.chatafrikarticles.com/categories/Article-Writers-Profile/Omoyele-Sowore/.
Chaiho Kim, Chaiho. “A Study of Internet Penetration Percents of Africa Using Digital Divide
Models.” Technology Management for Global Economic Growth (PICMET), 2010
Proceedings of PICMET , October 14, 2010.
Chesa, Chesa. “Presidency Administers Secrecy Oath on Staff.” Daily Independent, September
24, 2008; accessed September 24, 2008 from
http://www.independentngonline.com/news/tfpg/article01.
Chick, John D. “The Nigerian Press and National Integration.” Commonwealth & Comparative
Politics 9 no.2 (1971): 115 – 133.

266
Chiedozie, Ihuoma. “Presidency Lifts Ban on Passports of el-Rufai, Ribadu.” Punch, October 15,
2009.
Chinn, Menzie D and Robert W. Fairlie. “ICT Use in the Developing World: An Analysis of
Differences in Computer and Internet Penetration.” Review of International Economics
18 no. 1 (2010): 153–167.
Cho, Hiromi, Hugh Martin, and Stephen Lacy. “An Industry in Transition: Entry and Exit in
Daily Newspaper Markets, 1987-2003.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly
83 no. 2 (2006): 381-396.
Chonoko, Ibrahim. “How Yar’adua Betrayed Us, By el-Rufai.” Daily Trust, October 22, 2009,
http://www.news.dailytrust.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=8204
:how-yaradua-betrayed-us-by-el-rufai-&catid=48:inside-politics&Itemid=123 (accessed
October 4, 2010).
Chung, Deborah S, Eunseong Kim, Kaye D. Trammell, and Lance V. Porter. “Uses and
Perceptions of Blogs: A Report on Professional Journalists and Journalism Educators.”
Journalism & Mass Communication Educator 62 no. 3 (2007): 305-332.
CNN.com. “CNN Denies Nigerian Allegations of Staging Report.” February 13, 2007; accessed
April 25, 2010 from
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/02/12/nigeria.reaction/index.html.
Coleman, James S. Nigeria: A Background to Nationalism. Los Angeles and Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1960.
Collins, Anthony. Words of Fire: Independent Journalists Who Challenge Dictators, Drug
Lords, and Other Enemies of a Free Press. New York: New York University Press, 2001.
Comedia. “The Alternative Press: The Development of Underdevelopment.” Media, Culture &

267
Society 6 (1984): 95-102.
Committee to Protect Journalists. “Second U.S.-based Nigerian Blogger Held.” Oct. 31, 2008
[accessed September 11, 2009 from http://cpj.org/2008/10/second-us-based-nigerianblogger-held.php].
Conboy, Martin and John Steele. “The Future of Newspapers.” Journalism Studies 9 no. 5
(2008): 650-661.
Concerned Nigerians in Diaspora. “Letter to President Obasanjo on Third Term Agenda - On His
Visit to the White House.” Nigerian Village Square, March 29, 2006; accessed May 17,
2010fromhttp://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=ar
ticle&id=2718&catid=111&Itemid=46.
Conway, Janet and Jakeet Singh. “Is the World Social Forum a Transnational Public Sphere?:
Nancy Fraser, Critical Theory and the Containment of Radical Possibility.” Theory,
Culture & Society 26 no. 5 (2009): 61–84.
Cottle, Simon. “Rethinking News Access.” Journalism Studies. 1 no. 3 (2000) 427-448.
Couldry, Nick. “Mediation and Alternative Media, or Relocating the Centre of Media and
Communication Studies.” Media International Australia Incorporating Culture and
Policy, 2002. 103 (2002): 24-31.
Couldry, Nick. The Place of Media Power: Pilgrims and Witnesses in the Media Age. London:
Routledge, 2000.
Cowan, Brian. “The Rise of the Coffeehouse Reconsidered.” The Historical Journal 47 no. 1
(2004): 21-46.
Curran, James. “Globalization Theory: The Absent Debate.” In Media and Power, edited by
James Curran, 166-184. London: Routledge, 2002.

268
Curran, James and Jean Seaton. Power Without Responsibility: The Press, Broadcasting, and
New Media in Britain. London: Routledge, 2003.
Curran, James. “Rethinking the Media as a Public Sphere.” In Communication and Citizenship:
Journalism and the Public Sphere, edited by Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks, 1-57.
London: Routledge, 1991.
Dahlgren, Peter. “Introduction.” In Journalism and Popular Culture, edited by Peter Dahlgren
and Collin Sparks, 1-23. London: Sage, 1992.
Dahlberg, Lincoln. “Computer-mediated Communication and the Public Sphere: A Critical
Analysis.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 7 no. 1 (2001): [journal
online]; available from http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol7/issue1/dahlberg.html; Internet
accessed February 05, 2010.
Dare, Sunday. Guerilla Journalism: Dispatches from the Underground. Ibadan, Nigeria: Kraft
Books Limited, 2007.
Darke, Peter, Graeme Shanks, and Marianne Broadbent. “Successfully Completing Case Study
Research: Combining Rigour, Relevance and Pragmatism.” Information Systems Journal
8 (1998): 273-289.
Daura, Mamman. “Editing a Government Newspaper in Nigeria.” In Reporting Africa edited by
Olav Stokke , 39-46. New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1971.
Davis, Steve. “Public Journalism: The Case Against.” Journalism Studies 1 no. 4 (2000): 6869.
Dean, Jodi. “Why the Net is not a Public Sphere.” Constellations 10 no. 2 (2003): 95-112.
Dean, Jodi. “Virtually Citizens.” Constellations 4 no. 2 (1997): 264-282.
Deuze, Mark. “The Web and its Journalisms: Considering the Consequences of Different Types

269
of Newsmedia Online.” New Media & Society 5 no. 2 (2003): 203-230.
Deuze, Mark. “Journalism and the Web: An Analysis of Skills and Standards in an Online
Environment.” Gazette 61 no. 5 (1999): 373–390.
Dewey, John. The Public and its Problems. Athens, Ohio: University of Ohio
Press, 1927.
Dike, Akobundu U. “Strategies for Preservation and Increased Access to Newspapers in
Nigerian University Libraries.” In Library Philosophy and Practice 2009, edited by
University of Idaho, accessed September 30, 2009 from
http://www.webpages.uidaho.edu/~mbolin/ugah7.htm.
Dimitrova, Daniela V. and Matt Neznanski. “Online Journalism and the War in Cyberspace: A
Comparison between U.S. and International Newspapers.” Journal of ComputerMediated Communication 12 (2006): 248–263.
Dirlik, Arif. “Intimate Others: [Private] Nations and Diasporas in an Age of Globalization.”
Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 5 no. 3 (2004): 491-502.
Downing, John D. “Audiences and Readers of Alternative Media: The Absent Lure of the
Virtually Unknown.” Media, Culture & Society 25 (2003): 625-65.
Downing, John. Radical Media: Rebellious Communication and Social Movements. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001.
Downing, John. Radical Media: The Political Experience of Alternative Communication.
Boston: South End Press, 1984.
Duyile, Dayo. Makers of Nigerian Press: A Historical Analysis of Newspaper Development, the
Pioneer Heroes, the Modern Press Barons and the New Publishers from 1859-1987.
Lagos: Gong Communications Ltd, 1987.

270
Eason, David L. “On Journalistic Authority: The Janet Cooke Scandal.” In Media, Myths and
Narratives: Television and the Press, edited by James Carey, 246-261. Newbury Park,
CA: Sage, 1988.
Ebeling, Mary F. “The New Dawn: Black Agency in Cyberspace.” Radical History
Review 87 (2003): 96-108.
Edomaruse, Collins and Festus Akanbi. “Document Affirms Govs’ Forum, Harvard Varsity
Deal.” ThisDay Online, June 14, 2009,
http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=146038 (accessed September 6 2010).
Eisenhardt, Kathleen M. “Building Theories from Case Study Research.” The Academy of
Management Review 14 no. 4 (1989): 532-550.
Ekine, Sokari. “Nigeria Joins List of Countries Harassing Bloggers.” BPS Media Shift,
November 10, 2008; accessed May 19, 2010 from
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2008/11/nigeria-joins-list-of-countries-harassingbloggers315.html.
Elendu, Jonathan and Omoyele Sowore, “Sokoto Governor Paid £500,00.00 More for House.”
Elendu Reports, October 9, 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=79&Itemid=33
).
Elendu, Jonathan and Omoyele Sowore. “Bayelsa Governor’s ‘Modest’ Mansion in Potomac.”
Elendu Reports, October 13, 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=82&Itemid=33.
Elendu, Jonathan and Omoyele Sowore. “Potomac Mansions: Kalu and Atiku are Neighbours.”
Elendu Reports, August 30, 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from

271
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=58&Itemid=33
);
Elendu, Jonathan and Omoyele Sowore. “More Corrupt Deals of Bayelsa Governor Uncovered.”
Elendu Reports, September 30, 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=73&Itemid=33
)
Elendu, Jonathan and Omoyele Sowore. “Sokoto Governor Has His Share of London.” Elendu
Reports, August 04, 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=76&Itemid=33
)
Elendu, Jonathan. “Carlston Masters: Obasanjo’s Multi-Million Dollar Lobbyist.” May 20, 2005,
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=33
(accessed April 10, 2010).
Elendu, Jonathan and Omoyele Sowore. “War on Corruption: Obasanjo is Complicit.” Elendu
Reports, September 06, 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=61&Itemid=33
Elendu, Jonathan and Omoyele Sowore. “War on Corruption: Obasanjo’s Oily Hands.” Elendu
Reports, September 10, 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=63&Itemid=33.
Elendu, Jonathan and Sowore Omoyele. “Olu Obasanjo’s House: Lies, Half-truths, and Threats.”
Elendu Reports, September 12, 2005
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=64&Itemid=33
(accessed April 10, 2010).

272
Elendu, Jonathan. “A Visit to the Seat of the Caliphate.” Elendu Reports, March 26, 2006
(accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=186&Itemid=3
3).
Elendu, Jonathan. “Sowore Disengages From Elendureports.com.” Elendu Reports, January 4,
2006 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=150&Itemid=3
3).
Elendu, Jonathan. “Bafarawa Cleared By House of Assembly.” Elendu Reports, February 27,
2006 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=177&Itemid=2
9.
Elendu, Jonathan. “Yar’adua Dead.” Elendu Reports, March 7, 2007; accessed April 25, 2010
from
http://elendureports.com/index.php?Itemid=1&id=356&option=com_content&task=view.
Elendu, Jonathan. “The Plot to Destroy Jeff Koinange.” Elendu Reports, February 21, 2007,
accessed April 25, 2010 at
http://www.elendureports.com/index.php?Itemid=1&id=349&option=com_content&task
=view.
Elliot, Philip and Peter Golding. “Mass Communication and Social Change: The Imagery of
Development and the Development of Imagery.” In Sociology and Development edited
by Emanuel Jehuda De Kadt and Gavin Williams, 229-254. London: Tavistock, 1974.
Elombah, Daniel. “Umaru Yar’adua Joins the 'Battle on Cyberspace '.” June 17, 2009; accessed

273
May 20, 2010 from
http://www.elombah.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=981:umaruyaradua-regime-joins-the-cyber-battle&catid=25:politics&Itemid=37.
Elombah.com. “Nigerians Kick Against Harvard Training for Governors.” June 14, 2009,
http://www.elombah.com/index.php/templates/ja_purity/images/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=960:nigerians-kick-against-harvard-traning-forgovernors&catid=25:politics&Itemid=37(accessed September 6, 2010).
El Pais, Spain. “Aikpitanhi’s Death Causes Major Policy Change in Spain.” Nigeria Village
Square. November 11, 2007; accessed May 13, 2010 from
http://nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=7781
&Itemid=46.
Empowered Newswire. “I am Here to Understudy the Americans--Adeniyi, Yar'Adua's
Spokesman, on US Visit.” Nigerian Village Square, September 4, 2007; accessed May
15, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
7094&catid=22&Itemid=46.
Erbring, Lutz, Edie N Goldenberg, and Arthur H. Miller. “Front-Page News and Real-World
Cues: A New Look at Agenda-Setting by the Media.” American Journal of Political
Science 24 no.1 (1980): 16-34.
Ette, Mercy. “Agents of Change or Stability: The Nigerian Press Undermines Democracy.” The
Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics 5 no. 3 (2000):67-86.
Evans, Michael R. “Hegemony and Discourse: Negotiating Cultural Relationships Through
Media Production.” Journalism: Theory, Practice &Criticism 3 no. 3 (2002):309-329.

274
Everett, Anna. “The Revolution Will Be Digitized: Afrocentricity and the Digital Public
Sphere.” Social Text 71/20 no. 2 (2002): 125-146.
Fabiyi, Olusola. “FG Stops New Passports for Ribadu, el-Rufai.” Punch, October 10, 2009,
http://www.punchng.com/Article2Print.aspx?theartic=Art200910102362065 (accessed
September 26, 2010).
Fadayomi, Theophilus O. “Brain Drain and Brain Gain in Africa: Causes, Dimensions, and
Consequences.” In International Migration in and from Africa: Dimensions, Challenges,
and Prospects edited by A. Adepoju and T. Hammer. Stockholm: Population, Human
Resources and Development in Africa, Centrum for Invandringsforskning, 1996.
Fagbenle, Kunle. “Re: Malicious Defamation of President Olusegun Obasanjo.” November 7,
2006; accessed May 15, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
4226&catid=111&Itemid=46.
Fagbenle, Kunle. “Cease and Desist Letter: Re: Invasion of the Privacy of Chief (Mrs.) Lamide
Adegbenro by www.saharareporters.com, et al.” Nigerian Village Square, December 13,
2006; accessed May 15, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
4512&atid=111&Itemid=46.
Fakoya, Olusegun. “Nigeria Mass Media - The Fourth Estate of Graft.” PointblankNews.com,
March 26, 2010, http://www.pointblanknews.com/artopn2542.html (accessed October 10,
2010).
Falola, Toyin. The History of Nigeria. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.
Fargo, Anthony. “Evidence Mixed on Erosion of Journalists' Privilege.” Newspaper Research

275
Journal 22 no. 2 (2003): 50-63.
Fernald, Anne E. “A Feminist Public Sphere? Virginia Woolf’s Revisions of the Eighteenth
Century.” Feminist Studies 31 no.1 (2005): 125-158.
Fiske, John. “British Cultural Studies and Television.” In Channels of Discourse, Reassembled,
2nd ed., edited by Robert C. Allen 284-326. London: Routledge, 1992.
Flacks, Richard. Youth and Social Change. Chicago: Markham, 1971.
Flew, Terry. New Media: An Introduction. 3rd edition. Melbourne, & London: Oxford
University Press, 2005.
Frank, Thomas. New Consensus for Old: Cultural Studies from Left to Right. Chicago: Prickly
Paradigm Press, 2002.
Franklin, Bob. “The Future of Newspapers.” Journalism Practice 2 no. 3 (2008): 306-317.
Fraser, Nancy. “Rethinking the Public Sphere.” Social Text 25/26 (1990): 56-80.
Fraser, Nancy. “Transnationalizing the Public Sphere: On the Legitimacy and
Efficacy of Public Opinion in a Post-Westphalian World.” Theory, Culture & Society
24 no. 4 (2007): 7-30.
Freedom House. “Freedom House’s Annual Survey of Global Media Independence: An
Historical Review, 1984-2007.” http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=359;
accessed February 28, 2010.
Friedland, Lewis A. Public Journalism: Past and Future. Dayton, OH: Kettering Foundation
Press, 2003.
Furuholt, Bjørn and Stein Kristiansen. “Internet Cafés in Asia and Africa: Venues for Education
and Learning?” The Journal of Community Informatics 3 no. 2 (2007): 1-12.
Flyvbjerg, Bent. “Five Misunderstandings about Case-Study Research.” Qualitative Inquiry 12

276
no. 2 (2006):219-245.
Gambrelle, Jon. “Bomb Suspect Came from Elite Family, Best Schools.” Associated Press,
accessed April 24, 2010 from http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=9429039.
Gentry, Mae and Shelia M. Poole. “GoodWorks Draws Criticism: Andrew Young's Lobbying
Firm under Fire for Ties with Nigerian President Obasanjo.” Atlanta Journal
Constitution, March 18, 2007.
www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/atlanta/stories/2007/03/17/0318etgoodworks.html 44k -(accessed April 10, 2010).
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social
Sciences. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, 2005.
Ghorashi, Halleh and Kees Boersma. “The ‘Iranian Diaspora’ and the New Media: From
Political Action to Humanitarian Help.” Development & Change 40 no. 4 (2009): 667691.
Gibbs, Patricia and James Hamilton, eds. “Special Issue of Media History: Alternative Media.”
Media History 7 no. 2 (2001): 117-118.
Giddens, Anthony. Runaway World. BBC Reith Lectures, 1999
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/events/reith_99; accessed August 29, 2009.
Gillmor, Dan. “A New Brand of Journalism is Taking Root in South Korea.” San Jose Mercury
News, May 18, 2003.
Gillmor, Dan. We the Media: Grassroots Journalism by the People, for the People. Sebastopol,
CA: O’Reilly Media, 2004.
Glasser, Theodore L. “The Politics of Public Journalism.” Journalism Studies 1 no. 4
(2000): 683-6.

277
Glasser Theodore L., ed. The Idea of Public Journalism. New York: Guilford Press, 1999.
Goldfarb, Jeffery C. Civility and Subversion: The Intellectual in Democratic Society. New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Golding, Peter. “Media Professionalism in the Third World: The Transfer of an Ideology.” In
Mass Communication and Society, edited by James Curran, Michael Gurevitch and Janet
Woollacott, 291-308. London: Edward Arnold/Open University Press, 1977.
Guardian. “The Proposed Harvard Training For Governors.” The [Nigerian] Guardian, June 11,
2009, Editorial.
Guardian Editorial. “DYA Campaign: The Vice President’s Assets.” [Nigerian] Guardian,
August 8, 2007; accessed May 14, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
6801&catid=111&Itemid=46.
Guidry, J.A., M.D. Kennedy and M.N. Zaid. Globalizations and Social Movements: Culture,
Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
2000.
Haas, Tanni.“From ‘Public Journalism’’ to the ‘Public’s Journalism’? Rhetoric and Reality in
the Discourse on Weblogs.” Journalism Studies 6 no. 3 (2005): 387-396.
Haas, Tanni. “Alternative Media, Public Journalism and the Pursuit of Democratization.”
Journalism Studies 5 (2004): 115-21.
Habermas, Jürgen. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy Cambridge: Polity, 1996.
Habermas, Jürgen. The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory edited by Ciaran
Cronin and Pablo De Greiff. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998.

278
Habermas, Jürgen. “The public sphere.” In Rethinking Popular Culture, edited by C. Mukerji
and M. Scudson, 338-340. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a
Category of Bourgeois Society. Translated by T. Burger. London: Polity Press, 1989.
Halavais, Alexander. ‘‘The Web as News: September 11 and New Sources of Web News.’’
Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the Association of Internet Researchers,
Maastricht, The Netherlands, October, 2002.
Hall, Philippa. “‘Think Imperially’: The Private Press Mediation of State Policy and the Global
Economy within Colonial and Postcolonial Nigeria.” Journal of African Media Studies 1
no. 2 (2009): 247-262.
Hall, Stuart. “Encoding/Decoding.” In Culture, Media, Language, edited by Centre for
Contemporary Cultural Studies, 128-138. London: Hutchinson, 1980.
Halleck, DeeDee. Hand Held Visions: The Impossible Possibilities of Community Media. Bronx:
New York: Fordham Press, 2002.
Hamilton, James. “Alternative Media: Conceptual Difficulties, Critical Possibilities.” Journal of
Communication Inquiry 24 no. 4 (2000): 357-378.
Hannerz, Ulf. Transnational Connections: Cultures, People, Places. London: Routledge, 1996.
Hansen, Thomas B. and Finn Stepputat. Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the
Postcolonial World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
Harcup, Tony. “The Unspoken Said: The Journalism of Alternative Media.” Journalism 4 no. 3
(2003): 256-376.
Harcup, Tony. “‘I’m Doing this to Change the World’: Journalism in Alternative and
Mainstream Media.” Journalism Studies 6 no. 3 (2005): 361-374.

279
Harcup, Tony. Journalism: Principles & Practice. London: Sage, 2009.
Hargrove, Thomas and Guido Stempel III. “Use of Blogs as a Source of News Presents Little
Threat to Mainline News Media.” Newspaper Research Journal 28 no 1 (2007): 99-102.
Haruna, Mohammed. “The Life and Times of Abubakar Imam: Lessons for Today.” Weekly
Trust, April 30-May 6, 2005.
Hassane, Muolaye. “Ajami in Africa: The Use of Arabic Script in the Transcription of African
Languages.” In The Meanings of Timbuktu edited by Souleymane Shamil Jeppie and
Bachir Diagne, 109-121. Cape Town, South Africa: The Human Sciences Research
Council, 2008.
Hatchten, William. Muffled Drums. Ames, Iowa, 1971.
Hatton, Timothy J. and Jeffery G. Williamson. “Out of Africa? Using the Past to Project
African Emigration Pressure in the Future.” Review of International Economics
10 no. 3 (2002):556-573.
Hochheimer, John. “Organizing Democratic Radio: Issues in Practice.” Media, Culture &
Society 15 no. 4 (1993): 473-486.
Howe, Jeff. “The Rise of Crowdsourcing.” Wired, June, 2006 2007; accessed December 12,
2010 from http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/14.06/crowds.html.
Huhuonline.com. “Who We Are.”
http://www.huhuonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=section&layout=blog
&id=4&Itemid=358; accessed May 13, 2010.
Huhuonline. “South Africans Vow to Sack Christ Embassy… As Authorities Humiliate Chris
Oyakhilome at Airport.” http://news.onlinenigeria.com/templates/?a=1855; accessed May
14, 2010.

280
Huhuadmin. “How Aliko Dangote Blackmailed, Bribed his Way to NSE Presidency.”
http://www.huhuonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id
=644:how-aliko-dangote-blackmailed-bribed-his-way-to-nsepresidency&amp;catid=91:elibrary&amp;Itemid=374; accessed May 13, 2010.
Huhuadmin. “Dangote Group: Exodus Continues…… As Aliko Finds Solace in Drugs.”
http://www.huhuonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id
=643:dangote-group-exodus-continues-as-aliko-finds-solace-indrugs&amp;catid=91:elibrary&amp;Itemid=374; accessed May 13, 2010.
Hujanen, Jaana and Sari Peitikainen. “Interactive Uses of Journalism: Crossing Between
Technological Potential and Young People’s News-Using Practices.” New Media &
Society 6 no. 3 (2004): 383-401.
Ibekwe, Nicholas. “Ishiekwene Leaves CNN Judges Panel.” NEXT, April 7, 2010,
http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5551143146/ishiekwene_leaves_cnn_judges_panel_.csp (accessed October 10, 2010).
Ibekwe, Nicholas. “Allegations Against Punch Director Sad, Says Journalism Teacher.” NEXT,
March 11, 2010, http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5538392146/allegations_against_punch_director_sad_says.csp (accessed October 10, 2010).
Ibelema, Minabere. “The Nigerian Press and June 12: Pressure and Performance during a
Political Crisis.” Journalism Communication Monographs, 4 no. 4 (2003): 163-209.
Ibrahim, Jibrin. “Towards a Political Economy of Mass Communication in Nigeria.” Paper
Presented at the Graduate Political Economy Seminar, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria,
Nigeria on November 5, 1979.
Idonor, Daniel. “Yar’Adua Orders Probe of Sacked NIA Boss.” Vanguard, October 15, 2009.

281
Idowu, Lanre. “IBB, Sahara Reporters, and the Press.” NEXT, September 1, 2010,
http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/Home/5613382-146/story.csp (accessed October
4, 2010).
Ifedigbo, Sylva Nze. “It’s Been Three Years: An Anniversary Message To SaharaReporters.”
January 24, 2009; accessed April 20, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/sylva-nze-ifedigbo/it-s-been-three-years-ananniversary-message-to-sahararepor.html.
Iffer, Emmanuel. “Ribadu/El-Rufai Saga: Yar’Adua Fires NIA Boss.” Leadership, October 14,
2009.
Ige, Ise-Oluwa and Ikechukwu Nnochiri. “FG After My Life over Ibori, Says Ribadu.”
Vanguard, September 24, 2009, http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/09/fg-after-my-lifeover-ibori-says-ribadu/ (accessed September 21, 2010).
Ihemeremadu, Johnson. “Much Ado About Harvard.” The Nation, June 7, 2009,
http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/9314/1/Much-ado-about-Harvard-/Page1.html
(accessed September 6, 2010).
Ikuomola, Vincent. “‘Why Governors Seek Harvard Training’.” The Nation, June 23, 2009,
http://thenationonlineng.net/web2/articles/7566/1/Why-governors-seek-Harvardtraining/Page1.html (accessed September 6, 2010).
Inda, Jonathan Xavier and Renolta Rosaldo. “Introduction: A World in Motion.” In The
Anthropology of Globalization: A Reader edited by J. X. Inda and R. Rosaldo. Malden,
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.
iReports-ng.com. “Dirty War Over Money Tears Punch Apart, as Editor Opens Can of Worms
on Multi-Million Naira Corruption Scandal.” March 14, 2010, http://ireports-

282
ng.com/2010/03/04/dirty-war-over-money-tears-punch-apartas-editor-opens-can-ofworms-on-multi-million-corruption-scandals/ (accessed October 10, 2010).
iReports-ng.com. “Punch Chairman in Desperate Moves To Cover Up Corruption Scandals.”
March 30, 2010, http://ireports-ng.com/2010/03/30/punch-chairman-in-desperate-movesto-cover-up-corruption-scandals/ (accessed October 10, 2010).
iReports-ng.com. “Another Staff Opens Can of Worms On Azu, Punch’s Deep-Rooted
Corruption.” March 12, 2010, http://ireports-ng.com/2010/03/12/another-staff-opens-canof-worms-on-azu-punchs-deep-rooted-corruption/ (accessed October 10, 2010).
iReports-ng.com. “PUNCH/Azugate Scandal: Media Group Calls for Probe as EFCC Steps in.”
March 8, 2010, http://ireports-ng.com/2010/03/08/punchazugate-scandalmedia-groupcalls-for-probe-as-efcc-steps-in/ (accessed October 10, 2010).
Iser, Wolfang. The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore, MD: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978.
Ishiewene, Azubuike. “An Era Ends, a Story Begins….” SaharaReporters, April 17, 2010,
http://www.saharareporters.com/article/era-ends-story-begins%E2%80%A6 (accessed
October 10, 2010).
Isine, Ibanga. “Federal Government Seeks Power to Intercept Internet Communications.” Punch
February 7, 2007.
Jacubowicz, Karol. “Musical Chairs? The Three Public Spheres of Poland.” Media Culture &
Society 12 (1990): 195-212.
Jimoh, Mike. “Blogger/Blackmailer Unmasked.” Nigerian Village Square, March 03, 2007
(accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/j2/articles/nvs/bloggerblackmailer-unmasked.html).

283
Johnson, Kristen A. and Susan Wiedenback. “Enhancing Perceived Credibility of Citizen
Journalism Web Sites.” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly 86 no. 2 (2009):
332-348.
Joseph, Richard. Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987.
Jude, Igbanoi. “How Nigerians in the Diaspora Significantly Aid our Development.” This
Day, February 19, 2007.
Kahn, Richard and Douglas Kellner, “Techopolitics, Blogs, and Emergent Media Ecologies: A
Critical Reconstructive Approach.” In Small Tech: The Culture of Digital Tools, edited
by B. Hawk, D.M. Rieder, and Ollie O. Oviedo, 27-37. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2008.
Kanu, Ahaoma. “NVS Members Donate $1200 to the Aikpitanhi Family, NTA Goes Haywire.”
Nigerian Village Square, August 13, 2007; accessed May 10, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/nvs-projects/nvs-members-donate-1200-tothe-aikpitanhi-family-nta-goes-haywire.html.
Karim, Karim H., ed. The Media of Diaspora: Mapping the Globe. London: Routledge, 2003.
Karim, Karim H. “Mapping Diasporic Mediascapes.” In The Media of Diaspora: Mapping the
Globe , edited by Karim. H. Karim, 1–18. London: Routledge Press, 2003.
Karim, Karim H. “From Ethnic Media to Global Media: Transnational Communication
Networks Among Diasporic Communities.” Economic and Social Research Council,
Oxford University, 1998, Available from
http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk/working%20papers/karim.pdf
Katz, Elihu. “The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-To-Date Report on a Hypothesis.”

284
The Public Opinion Quarterly 21 no. 1 (1957): 61-78.
Kaufman, Stephen. “Malaysia’s Alternative Media Become Decisive Political Factor.”
America.gov, April 3, 2008; accessed December 20, 2010 from
http://www.america.gov/st/democracyenglish/2008/April/20080403175441esnamfuak0.1
705591.html.
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in
International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Kellner, Douglas. Media Culture: Cultural Studies, Identity and Politics between the Modern
and the Postmodern. London, Routledge, 1995.
Khiabany, Gholan. “Red Pepper: A New Model for the Alternative Press.” Media, Culture &
Society 22 (2000): 447-463.
Kidd, Dorothy and Bernadette Barker-Plummer Eds. “Social Justice Movements and the
Internet.” Peace Review 13 no. 3 (2001): 331–337.
Killson, Martin. Political Change in a West African State: A Study of the Modernization Process
in Sierra Leone. Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA, 1966.
Kim, Chaiho. “A Study of Internet Penetration Percents of Africa Using Digital Divide Models.”
Technology Management for Global Economic Growth (PICMET), 2010 Proceedings of
PICMET , October 14, 2010.
Kim, Eun-Gyoo and James W. Hamilton. “Capitulation to Capital? OhmyNews as Alternative
Media.” Media, Culture & Society 28 no. 4 (2006): 541-560.
King, Russell and Nancy Wood, eds. Media and Migration: Constructions of Mobility and
Difference. London: Routledge, 2001.
Koinange, Jeff. “Big Guns, Big Oil Collide in Nigeria.” CNN, February 12, 2007; accessed April

285
25, 2010 from
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/africa/02/06/btsc.koinange.nigeria/index.html.
Kolawole, Simon. “What’s Wrong with Harvard?” ThisDay, June 14, 2009.
Kómoláfé, Julius. “Searching for Fortune: The Geographical Process of Nigerian
Migration to Dublin, Ireland.” Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Migration (2003)
africamigration.com,
http://www.africamigration.com/archive_01/j_komolafe_searching.htm.
Koselleck, Reinhart. Critique and Crisis: Enlightenment and the Pathogenesis of Modern
Society. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988.
Kovach, Bill and Tom Rosenstiel. The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople Should Know
and The Public Should Expect. New York: Crown Publishers, 2001.
Kovach, Bill and Tom Rosentiel. “Are Watchdogs an Endangered Species?” Columbia
Journalism Review 40 no. 1 (May 2001): 50. Communication & Mass Media Complete,
EBSCOhost (accessed April 10, 2010).
Kperogi, Farooq A. “CNN, Niger Delta and Western Media Portrayals of Africa (I).” Weekly
Trust, February 24, 2007.
Kperogi, Farooq A. “CNN, Niger Delta and Western Media Portrayals of Africa (II).” Weekly
Trust, March 3, 2007.
Kperogi, Farooq A. “CNN, Niger Delta and Western Media Portrayals of Africa (III).” Weekly
Trust, March 10, 2007.
Kperogi, Farooq A. “Now That CNN has Finally Dismissed Jeff Koinange.” Weekly Trust, June
12, 2007; archived at http://farooqkperogi.blogspot.com/2009/03/now-that-cnn-hasfinally-dismissed-jeff.html.

286
Kperogi, Farooq A. “Guerrillas in Cyberia: The Transnational Alternative Online Journalism of
the Nigerian Diasporic Public Sphere.” Journal of Global Mass Communication 1 no. 1
(2008): 72-87.
Kperogi, Farooq A. “Cooperation with the Corporation? CNN and the Hegemonic Cooptation of
Citizen Journalism Through iReport.com.” New Media & Society 13 no. 2 (2011): 314–
329.
Kumar, Chetan. “Transnational Networks and Campaigns for Democracy.” In The Third Force:
The Rise of Transnational Civil Society edited by Ann M. Florini, 5-142. Washington,
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000.
Kunz, William M. “Prime-Time Island: Television Program and Format Importation into the
United States.” Television & New Media 11 no. 4 (2010): 308-324.
Kyem, Peter A. Kwakwu and Peter Kewku LeMaire. “Transforming Recent Gains in the Digital
Divide Into Digital Opportunities: Africa and the Boom in Mobile Phone Subscription.”
The Electronic Journal on Information Systems in Developing Countries 28 no. 5
(2006):1-16.
Laguerre, Michel S. “Homeland Political Crisis, the Virtual Diasporic Public Sphere, and
Diasporic Politics.” Journal of Latin American Anthropology 10 no.1 (2008): 206-225.
Lasica, J.D.. “Blogs and Journalism Need Each Other.” Nieman Reports 2003
http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reports/03-3NRfall/V57N3.pdf (accessed May 5, 2009).
Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. The People's Choice: How the Voter
Makes up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. Columbia University Press, 1944.
Legun, Colin. “The Mass Media: The Institution of the African Political Systems.” In Reporting
Africa edited by Olav Stokke, 27-38. Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute of African

287
Studies, 1971.
Lewis, Peter. “From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in
Nigeria.” The Journal of Modern African Studies 34 no.1 (1996): 79-103.
Lipmann, Walter. Public Opinion New York: Free Press, 1922.
Lippman, Walter. “The Appeal to the Public.” In Public Opinion, 398-410. New York,
Macmillan, 1922.
Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition. Translated by Brian Massumi and others.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984.
Macha, Ndesanjo. “Nigerian Blogger Arrested for Sponsoring a ‘Guerilla News Agency’.”
Global Voices, October 24, 2008; accessed May 18, 2010 from
http://globalvoicesonline.org/2008/10/24/nigerian-blogger-arrested-for-sponsoring-aguerilla-news-agency/.
Mai, Nicola. “The Albanian Diaspora-in-the-Making: Media, Migration and Social Exclusion.”
Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 31 no. 3 (2005): 543-561.
Mainsah, Henry. “Cameroonians in Oslo, Diaspora, and Uses of the Media.” NORDICOM
Review 30 no. 1 (2009): 83-94.
Mahmud, Sakah S. State, Class and Underdevelopment in Nigeria and Early Meiji Japan.
London: Macmillan Press, 1996.
Malakata, Michael. “Nigeria Claims Top Internet Spot in Africa.” ComputerWorld, August 10,
2010, http://news.idg.no/cw/art.cfm?id=5DBFEB28-1A64-67EA-E470DF5BE0AA9E10
(accessed October 10, 2010).
Massey, Brian and Mark Levy. ‘‘Interactivity, Online Journalism, and English-Language Web
Newspapers in Asia.’’ Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly 76 no. 1 (1999):

288
138-152.
Matheson, Donald. “Weblogs and the Epistemology of the News: Some Trends in Online
Journalism.” New Media & Society 6 no. 4 (2004): 443-68.
Mba, Osita. “How Much Land Does Reuben Abati Need?” Nigerian Village Square, January 18,
2009, http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/osita-mba/how-much-land-doesreuben-abati-need.html (accessed October 4, 2010).
Mbembe, Achille. “Necropolitics.” Public Culture 15 (2003): 11-40.
McChesney, Robert. Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times.
New York: New Press, 2000.
McCombs, Maxwell and Donald Shaw. “The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media.”
Public Opinion Quarterly 6 no. 2 (1972): 176-187.
McLaughlin, Neil. “Origin Myths in the Social Sciences: Fromm, the Frankfurt School and the
Emergences of Critical Theory.” Canadian Journal of Sociology 24 no. 1 (1999): 109139.
McLaughlin, Neil. Feminism, the Public Sphere, Media and Democracy. Media
Culture and Society 15 no. 4 (1993): 599.
Media Legal Defence Initiative. “Nigeria Case is Real-life Thriller: Africa Graft Story Ends up
in New York, via Texas.” February Issue 01 February 2010- April 2010; accessed May
16, 2010 from http://www.mediadefence.org/MDQ2/Nigeria-case-real-life-thriller.html.
Meehan, Johanna, ed. Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject of Discourse. New
York: Routledge, 1995.
Melucci, Alberto. Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1996.

289
Merritt, Davis. “What Citizen Journalism Can Learn from Public Journalism.” In Public
Journalism 2.0: The Promise and Reality of a Citizen-Engaged Press, edited by Jack
Rosenberry and Burton St. John III, 21-31. New York and London: Routledge, 2010.
Miles, Matthew and A.M. Huberman. Qualitative Data Analysis: An Expanded Sourcebook.
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1994.
Miller, Jade L. “Ugly Betty Goes Global: Global Networks of Localized Content in the
Telenovela Industry.” Global Media & Communication 6 no. 2 (2010): 198-217.
Mora, Abdulrahman ed. The Abubakar Imam Memoirs. Zaria, Nigeria: Northern Nigeria
Publishing Company Ltd., 1989.
Morris, Meaghan. “Banality in Cultural Studies.” In What is Cultural Studies? A Reader, edited
by John Storey, 147-167. London: Arnold, 1996.
Mosley, Paul. “Policy-Making without Facts: A Note on the Assessment of Structural
Adjustment Policies in Nigeria, 1985-1990.” African Affairs 91(1992): 227-240.
Mowlana, Hamid, Global Information and World Communication 2nd edition. Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage, 1997.
Musa, Mohammed and Jibril Mohammed. “The Political Economy of Media Ownership in
Nigeria.” In Who Owns the Media?: Global Trends and Local Resistances edited by
Pradip Thomas and Zaharom Nain, 227-247. London: Zed Books, 2004.
Nairaland Forum. “Jeff Koinange Sacked From CNN Over His Story On The Niger-delta Based
Mend Group.” Accessed April 25, 2010 from http://www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic57196.128.html.
Nairland.com. “Elendu Reports - Cutting Edge Investigative Journalism.”
http://www.nairaland.com/nigeria/topic-2845.0.html#msg263767; accessed May 15,

290
2010.
Neblo, Michael. “Thinking through Democracy: Between the Theory and Practice of
Deliberative Politics.” Acta Politica 40 no. 2, (2005): 169-181.
Nerone, John and Kevin G. Barnhurst. “Beyond Modernism: Digital Design, Americanization
and the Future of Newspaper Form.” New Media & Society 3 no. 4 (2001): 467-483.
Negt, Oskar and Kluge, Alexander. Public Sphere and Experience: Toward an Analysis of the
Bourgeois and Proletarian Public Sphere. Translated by Peter Labanyi and others.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Nerone, John C. “The Mythology of the Penny Press.” Critical Studies in Mass Communication,
4 no. 4 (1987): 376-404.
Nerone, John and Kevin G. Barnhurst. “Beyond Modernism: Digital Design, Americanization
and the Future of Newspaper Form.” New Media & Society 3 no. 4 (2001): 467-483.
Nieminen, Hannu. “On the Formation of the National Public Sphere.” Paper Presented at the
International Association for Media and Communication Research Conference, Porto
Alegre, Brazil August, 25-30, 2004.
Nigerian Village Square. “Corruption in the Nigerian Media- Case of Azubuike Ishiekwene.”
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/guest-articles/punch-editors-bombshell-oncorruption-in-the-nigerian-media-2.html (accessed October 10, 2010).
NigeriansinAmerica.com. “The Haunted Guys at Sahara Reporters.” Accessed May 13, 2010
from http://www.nigeriansinamerica.com/vbulletin/showthread.php?t=7553.
Nip, Joyce. “Exploring the Second Phase of Public Journalism.” Journalism Studies 7 no. 2
(2006): 212-236.
Njoku, Raphael C. “Deconstructing Abacha: Demilitarization and Democratic

291
Consolidation in Nigeria after the Abacha Era.” Government and Opposition 36 no.1
(2001): 71–96.
NVS News. “US Court Dismisses Paul Orhili's Lawsuit Against Saharareporters.” April 2, 2009;
accessed March 17, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/newsflash/us-court-dismisses-paul-orhilislawsuit-against-saharareporters.html.
NVS News. “Breaking News Update: ‘I’m Alive & Well, Yar’adua Speaks to TON.” Nigerian
Village Square, March 6, 2007; accessed May 11, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
5213&catid=168&Itemid=46.
Nwabughuogu, Anthony. “The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in
Nigeria.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies 14 no. 1 (1981): 65-92.
Nwankwo, Robert L. and George T. Kurian, “Nigeria.” World Press Encyclopedia edited by
George T. Kurian, 687-697. New York: Fact on File, 1982.
Nworah, Uche. “The Impact of the Internet on Journalism Practice in Nigeria.” Accessed April 7,
2010 from http://www.nathanielturner.com/journalisminnigeria.htm.
Nworah, Uche. “I Have No Interest in Working for Obasanjo—Sowore Omoyele.”
http://www.nigeriansinamerica.com/articles/855/1/I-Have-No-Interest-In-Working-ForObasanjo--Omoyele-Sowore/Page1.html (accessed April 10, 2010).
Obadare, Ebenezer. “Second Thoughts on Civil Society: The State, Civic Associations
and the Antinomies of the Public Sphere in Africa.” Journal of Civil Society 1 no. 3
(2005): 267-281.
Obijiofor, Levi. “Singaporean and Nigerian Journalists' Perceptions of New Technologies.”

292
Australian Journalism Review 23 no. 1 (2001): 131-151.
Ocheja, Joshua. “Nigeria at the Mercy of Sahara Reporters.”
http://www.gamji.com/article8000/NEWS8584.htm (accessed April 12, 2010).
Ochonu, Moses E. “Sahararepoters’ Strategic Success.” December 18, 2008; accessed May 12,
2010 from http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/moses-ebeochonu/saharareporters-strategic-success-12.html.
Offoha, Marcellina U. Educated Nigerian Settlers in the United States: The Phenomenon
of Brain Drain, Thesis (Ph. D.)—Temple University, 1989.
Ogbondah, Chris. “Nigerian Journalism: A Bibliographical Essay.” International
Communication Gazette 36 no. 3, (1985): 175-191.
Ogbondah, Chris and Emmanuel U. Onyedike. “Origins and Interpretations of Nigerian Press
Laws.” African Media Review 5 no. 2 (1991): 59-70.
Ogbondah, Chris. “The Pen is Mightier than the ‘Koboko’: A Critical Analysis of the Amakiri
Case in Nigeria.” Political Communication and Persuasion 8 (1991): 109-124.
Ogundamisi, Kayode. “Starving Nigerian Journalists and Blood-Stained Proprietors.” P.M.
News, May 21, 2010, http://pmnewsnigeria.com/2010/05/21/starving-nigerian-journalistsand-blood-stained-proprietors/ (accessed December 15, 2010).
Ojekunle, Jobola. “Treasonable Sex! ‘You Slept with My Wife,’ Gbenga Accuses Dad ExPresident Obasanjo and Father-in-law, Doubts Paternity of Kids, Seeks DNA Tests.” The
Sun, January 13, 2008; accessed April 24, 2010 from
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/20080112230541zg/spotlight/Son_Gbenga_Accuses_Obas
anjo_and_father_in_law_of_sleeping_with_his_wife_asks_for_paternity_test_and_divorc
e.

293
Ojo, Tokunbo. “The Nigerian Media and the Process of Democratization.” Journalism 8 no. 5
(2007): 545–550.
Okonkwor, Chude R. “Nigeria's Sedition Laws-- Their Effects on Free Speech.” Journalism
Quarterly 60 no. 1 (1983): 54-60.
Okome, Mojúbàolú O. “The Antinomies of Globalization: Some Consequences of
Contemporary African Immigration to the United States of America.”
Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Migration 1 no.1 (2002), africamigration.com.
Olasanmi, Kunle. “EFCC Declares el-Rufai Wanted .” Nigerian Compass, December 22, 2008,
http://www.compassnewspaper.com/NG/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&
id=6656:efcc-declares-el-rufai-wanted&catid=43:news&Itemid=799 (accessed
September 21, 2010).
Oloja, Martins. “El-Rufai-Ribadu Passport Saga: How Nigeria Escaped International
Embarrassment.” Guardian, October 18, 2009.
Olokoyun, Ayo. “Media Accountability and Democracy in Nigeria, 1999-2003.” African Studies
Review 47 no. 3 (2004): 69-90.
Oloruyomi, Dapo. “Defiant Publishing in Nigeria.” Media Studies Journal 10 no. 4 (1996):
65-74.
Olorunyomi, Dapo. “Defiant Publishing in Nigeria.” In Journalism in Peril edited by Nancy J.
Woodhul and Robert W. Snyder, 53-63. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers,
1998.
Olufemi, Adelusi. “Poverty Militates Against Code of Ethics.” In Ethics and Regulation:
Formulating a Working Agenda for Journalists and the Media, edited by International
Press Centre, 39-43. Lagos, Nigeria: IPC, 2000.

294
Olukoshi, Adebayo O. ed. The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Nigeria. London: James
Carey, 1993.
Olukotun, Ayo. “Authoritarian State, Crisis of Democratization and the Underground Media in
Nigeria.” African Affairs 101 (2002): 317-342.
Olumhense, Sonala. “Our SaharaReporters.” The Nigerian Village Square. August 10, 2008;
accessed April 24, 2020 from http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/sonalaolumhense/our-saharareporters.html.
Olumhense, Sonala. “Keep SaharaReporters Alive.” [Nigerian] Guardian, December 20, 2008.
Also available at http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/sonala-olumhense/keepsaharareporters-alive-13.html.
Olumhense, Sonala. “Popular Investigative Nigeria Website Sued For $25 Billion.” Black Star
News December 26, 2008; accessed May 17, 2010 from
http://www.blackstarnews.com/?c=135&a=5254.
Olumhense, Sonala. “The Nigerian Media on Trial.” [Nigerian] Guardian, March 21, 2010, p.
29.
Olumhense, Sonala. “Nigeria’s Citizen Reporters.” Nigerian Tribune, January 9, 2011,
http://tribunengrworld.com/mobile.php?docID=2634377; accessed January 9, 2011.
Omenugha, Kate Azuka and Majority Oji. “News Commercialization, Ethics and Objectivity in
Journalism Practice in Nigeria: Strange Bedfellows?” Estudos em Comunicação no. 3
(2008):13-28.
Omoh, Gabriel, Sina Babasola and Hector Igbikiowubo. “Obasanjo's Library Fund is Executive
Extortion – Soyinka.” Vanguard, May 17, 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from
http://allafrica.com/stories/200505171507.html.

295
Omu, Fred I. Press and Politics in Nigeria 1800-1937. London: Longman, 1978.
Our Reporter. “Kalu’s Wife Not Our Patient Now – US Hospital.” The Punch, August 14, 2007;
Accessed May 12, 2010 from
http://www.punchontheWeb.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art2007081323505068.
Oyebode, Olayinka. “Nigerian Governors’ Forum Lied—Harvard University.” Punch, June 13,
2009, http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art20090613644327 (accessed
September 6, 2010).
Oyedoyin, Tunde. “Omoyele Sowore: The 10-Year-Old Boy Who Became an Activist.”
Accessed April 24, 2010 from http://www.chatafrikarticles.com/categories/ArticleWritersProfile/Omoyele-Sowore/.
Oyekunle, Jibola. “I Have Moles in OBJ’s Home, Says Omoyele Sowore.” The Sun, Sunday,
December 2, 2007;
http://www.nigerianmuse.com/nigeriawatch/20071201202522zg/I_have_moles_in_OBJ_
s_home_says_Omoyele_Sowore (accessed April 24, 2010).
Page, Clarence. “Black Immigrants Collect Most Degrees but Affirmative Action is
Losing Direction.” Chicago Tribune, March 18, 2007;
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/chi0703180344mar18,1,2681158.column?coll=chi-news-col; accessed February 18,
2010.
Panagakos, Anastasia N. and Horst Heather A. “Return to Cyberia: Technology and the
Social Worlds of Transnational Migrants.” Global Networks 6 no. 2 (2006): 109–
124.
Palmer, H.R. Sudanese Memoirs, Being Mainly Translations of a Number of Arabic Manuscripts

296
Relating to the Central and Western Sudan. London: Frank Cass, 1967.
Pavlik, John V. “The Future of Online Journalism.” Columbia Journalism Review 36 no. 2
(1997): 30–38.
Peck, Abe. Uncovering the Sixties: The Life and Times of the Underground Press. New York:
Citadel Press, 1991.
Peters, John D. “Distrust of Representation: Habermas on the Public Sphere.” Media, Culture
and Society 15 no. 4 (1993): 541-571.

Philips, Anza. “Keep Your Mouth Shut.” Newswatch, October 4, 2008; accessed on September
30, 2009 from
http://www.newswatchngr.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Ite
mid=47.
Picard, Robert G. “Shifts in Newspaper Advertising Expenditures and their Implication for the
Future of Newspapers.” Journalism Studies 9 no. 5 (2008):704-716.
Pimlott, Herbert F. “Mainstreaming the Margins: The Transformation of Marxism Today.” In
Media Organizations in Society edited by James Curran. London: Arnold, 2000.
Platon, Sara and Mark Deuze. “Indymedia Journalism. A Radical Way of Making, Selecting and
Sharing News?” Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism 4 (2003): 336-55.
P.M. News. “VP Jonathan Declare Assets.” P.M. News, August 8, 2007; accessed May 14, 2010
fromhttp://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article
&id=6804&catid=111&Itemid=46.
Press Reference. “Nigeria Press, Media, TV, Radio, Newspapers.” Accessed September 30, 2009
from http://www.pressreference.com/Ma-No/Nigeria.html.
Pointblanknews.com. “U.S. Hospital Accuses Kalu of Forgery.”

297
http://www.pointblanknews.com/os486.html; accessed May 12, 2010.
Pointblanknews.com. “Turaki Plans Escape, Declares False Affidavit ...As Singaporean Hospital
Denies Him.” http://www.pointblanknews.com/os614.html; accessed May 12, 2010.
Pointblanknews.com. “Exclusive News Archive.”
http://www.pointblanknews.com/exclusivenewshome.html; accessed March 12, 2010.
Pointblanknews.com. “Vanguard Newspaper Publisher, Sam Amuka-Pemu’s Wife in Ritual
Killing …14-yr Old Boy Beheaded …Bribes Police with N4m.” Accessed March 12,
2010 from http://www.pointblanknews.com/os1307a.html.
Pointblanknews.com. “Between Pointblanknews and VANGUARD Newspaper: An Anatomy of
a Smear.” Accessed May 12, 2010 from http://www.pointblanknews.com/os1506.html.
Pointblanknewews.com. “IBB's Minna Parley: How Punch's Editorial Board Chairman Was
Fired.” September 1, 2010, http://www.pointblanknews.com/News/os3828.html
(accessed October 4, 2010).
Post, Kenneth and George D. Jenkins. The Price of Liberty: Personality and Politics in Colonial
Nigeria. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1973.
Punathambekar, Aswin. “Bollywood in the Indian-American Diaspora: Mediating a Transitive
Logic of Cultural Citizenship.” International Journal of Cultural Studies 8 no. 2 (2005):
151-173.
Punch. “A Statement from PUNCH.” Punch, March 20, 2010,
http://www.punchng.com/Articl.aspx?theartic=Art20100320462910 (accessed October
10, 2010).
Ragin, Charles C. “‘Casing’ and the Process of Social Inquiry.” In What is a Case? Exploring
the Foundations of Social Inquiry, edited by C.C. Ragin and H.S. Becker, 217-226.

298
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Rauch, Jennifer. “Activists as Interpretive Communities: Rituals of Consumption and Interaction
in an Alternative Media Environment.” Media, Culture & Society 29 no. 6 (2007): 9941013.
Redden, Guy. “Read the Whole Thing: Journalism, Weblogs and the Remediation of the War
in Iraq.” Media International Australia Incorporating Culture & Policy 109 (2003): 15366.
Reese, Stephen D., Lou Rutigliano, Kideuk Hyun, and Jaekwan Jeong, “Mapping the
Blogosphere: Professional and Citizen-based Media in the Global News Arena.”
Journalism 8 no. 3 (2007): 235-261.
Reynolds, Rachel R. “An African Brain Drain: Nigerian (Igbo) Decisions to Immigrate to
the U.S..” Review of African Political Economy 29 no. 92 (2002): 273-284.
Reynolds, Rachel. “‘We are not Surviving, We are Managing’: The Constitution of a
Nigerian Diaspora along the Contours of the Global Economy.” City & Society 16 no. 1
(2004): 15-37.
Reynolds, Rachel and Scott M. Younstedt. “Globalization and African Ethnoscapes:
Contrasting Nigerien Hausa and Nigerian Igbo Migratory Orders in the U.S.” City &
Society 16 no. 1 (2004): 5-13.
Rodriguez, Clemencia. Fissures in the Mediascape: An International Study of Citizens’ Media.
Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 2001.
Rosen, Jay. “The People Formerly Known as the Audience.” PressThink: Ghost of Democracy
in the Media Machine.
http://journalism.nyu.edu/pubzone/weblogs/pressthink/2006/06/27/ppl_frmr.html

299
(accessed May 5, 2009).
Rosen, Jay. What Are Journalists For? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.
Rosen, Jay. “Chris Nolan: The Stand Alone Journalist is Here....” PressThink, April 21, 2005,
http://archive.pressthink.org/2005/04/21/nol_stnd.html (accessed November 29, 2010).
Sahara Admin. “‘Mercedes Jeep’ Bribe: EFCC Chair Plans Arrest of Supplier, as EFCC’s
International Image Plummets.” January 7, 2009; accessed May 15, 2010 from
http://www.saharareporters.com/real-news/hot-topic/436-qmercedes-jeepq-bribe-efccchair-plans-arrest-of-supplier-as-efccs-international-image-plummets.html?showall=1.
SaharaReporters. “US Hospital Denies Knowledge of Surgery Letter on Kalu's Wife.” August
08, 2010; accessed May 12, 2010 from http://67.192.103.155/reports/exclusive/1871-ushospital-deny-knowledge-of-surgery-letter-on-kalus-wife-.html.
SaharaReporters. “As London Case Winds Up, Details of Case Against Ibori Money-laundering
Associates Exposed; Governor Uduaghan, David Edevbie also Cited.” SaharaReporters,
May 9 2010; accessed May 9 2010 from http://www.saharareporters.com/realnews/sr-headlines/6037-as-london-case-winds-up-details-of-case-against-iborimoney-laundering-associates-exposed-governor-uduaghan-david-edevbie-alsocited.html.
SaharaReporters. “About Sahara Reporters.”
http://www.saharareporters.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=584
(accessed April 12, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “What About Sahara Reporters?”
http://www.facebook.com/#!/?page=1&sk=updates&tid=226337319625 (accessed April
24, 2010).

300
SaharaReporters. “Federal Court Declares the Arrest and Detention of US-based Blogger
Emmanuel Asiwe Illegal.” February 3, 2009; accessed March 14, 2010 from
http://67.192.103.155/news/663-federal-court-declares-the-arrest-and-detention-of-usbased-blogger-emmanuel-asiwe-illegal.html.
SaharaReporters. “Nigerian Ambassador to the UN, Joy Ogwu, to Commence Multi-million
Dollar Lawsuit against SaharaReporters.” Accessed April 30, 2010 from
http://www.saharareporters.com/real-news/sr-headlines/5880-nigerian-ambassador-tothe-un-joy-ogwu-to-commence-multi-million-dollar-lawsuit-against-saharareporters.html.
Sahara Reporters. “Umaru Yar’adua Regime Launches $5 Million Online War.” June 16, 2009;
accessed May 17, 2010 from
http://www.saharareporters.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3024
:umaru-yaradua-regime-launches-5-million-online-war-&catid=1:latestnews&Itemid=18.
SaharaReporters. “FG Grants Ugwuonye, Embattled Washington DC Lawyer Who Withheld
Embassy Funds, Authority to Sue Ambassador, Howard University Professor, and
Saharareporters.” March 18, 2009; accessed May 17, 2010 from
http://174.143.70.126/news/1885-fg-grants-ugwuonye-embattled-washington-dc-lawyerwho-witheld-embassy-funds-authority-to-sue-ambassador-howard-university-professorand-saharareporters.html.
Sahara Reporters, “Federal Court Declares the Arrest and Detention of US-based Blogger
Emmanuel Asiwe Illegal.” February 3, 2009 [accessed September 11, 2009 from
http://www.saharareporters.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=663
%3Afederal-court-declares-the-arrest-and-detention-of-us-based-blogger-emmanuel-

301
asiwe-illegal&catid=1%3Alatest-news&Itemid=18&showall=1.
SaharaReporters. “ARG to Governors' Forum: If You Must Go to Harvard, Resign!”
SaharaReporters, June 8, 2009, http://www.saharareporters.com/press-release/arggovernors-forum-if-you-must-go-harvard-resign (accessed September 6, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “Adams Oshiomole Says Governors' Forum ‘MOU’ with Harvard is False.”
June 22, 2009, http://www.saharareporters.com/press-release/adams-oshiomole-saysgovernors-forum-mou-harvard-false (accessed September 6, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “El Rufai, Ribadu: ‘No New Passport! No Renewal of Passport! No Passport!’
Yar’Adua Orders.” October 10, 2009, http://saharareporters.com/news-page/el-rufairibadu-%E2%80%9Cno-new-passport-no-renewal-passport-no-passport%E2%80%9Dyar%E2%80%99adua-orders (accessed September 26, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “About Face: Yar'Adua Repudiates NIA Memo on El Rufai and Ribadu, Fires
DG Imohe for Memo.” October 13, 2009, http://saharareporters.com/news-page/aboutface-yaradua-repudiates-nia-memo-el-rufai-and-ribadu-fires-dg-imohe-memo (accessed
September 26, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “It is Official: El-Rufai and Ribadu Can Enjoy Passport Services, Yar'Adua
Now Says.” October 14, 2009, http://www.saharareporters.com/news-page/it-official-elrufai-and-ribadu-can-enjoy-passport-services-yaradua-now-says (accessed September 26,
2010).
SaharaReporters. “IBB's N10 Million Photo-Op with Media Executives.” August 19, 2010,
http://www.saharareporters.com/photo/ibbs-n10-million-photo-op-mediaexecutives?page=1 (accessed October 4, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “Punch Newspaper Prohibits News Critical of Jonathan.” September 19, 2010,

302
http://www.saharareporters.com/news-page/punch-newspaper-prohibits-news-criticaljonathan?page=2 (accessed October 4, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “How Farida Waziri and Top Nigerian Editors Got Abuja Land Allocations.”
January 4, 2009, http://www.saharareporters.com/news-page/how-farida-waziri-and-topnigerian-editors-got-abuja-land-allocations (accessed October 4, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “Our Philosophy and Editorial Policy.” October 25, 2010,
http://www.saharareporters.com/press-release/saharareporters-our-philosophy-andeditorial-policy (accessed November 25, 2010).
SaharaReporters. “Nigerian Treasury Looters Have Moved over to China, India, and Persian
Gulf Countries.” December 7, 2010, http://www.saharareporters.com/newspage/nigerian-treasury-looters-have-moved-over-china-india-and-persian-gulf-countries
(accessed December 9, 2010).
SaharaTV. “Borno Governor, Senator Ali Modu Sheriff Dancing and Spraying Dollars in
Dubai.” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RRCuvQZPlgw November 05, 2008
(accessed April 10, 2010).
Salawu, Abiodun. “Paradox of a Milieu: Communication in African Indigenous Languages in the
Age of Globalization.” In Indigenous Language Media in Africa edited by Abiodun
Salawu, 1-20. Lagos, Nigeria: Center for Black and African Arts and Civilization, 2006.
Sayre, Ben. “Agenda Setting in a Digital Age: Tracking Attention to California Proposition 8 in
Social Media, Online News, and Conventional News.” Policy & Internet 2 no. 2 (2010),
Article 2.
Schiller, Herbert. Communication and Cultural Domination. White Plains, NY: International
Arts and Sciences Press, 1976.

303
Schiller, Herbert I. Culture Inc., The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989.
Schiller, Herbert. Mass Communications and American Empire. Beacon Press, 1969.
Schramm, Wilbur. Mass Media and National Development. Stanford University Press, 1964.
Schudson, Michael. “Why Conversation is not the Soul of Democracy.” Critical Studies in Mass
Communication 14 no. 4 (1997): 297-309.
Schultz, Tanjev and Paul S. Voakes. “Prophets of Gloom: Why Do Newspaper Journalists Have
So Little Faith in the Future of Newspapers?” Newspaper Research Journal 20 no. 2
(1999): 23-41.
Scott, James C. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 1985.
Schwartz, Frederick. Nigeria. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965.
Schweizer, Kristen. “U.S. Web Advertising Exceeds Newspaper Print Ads in 2010, eMarketer
Says.” Bloomberg Businessweek, December 20, 2010; accessed December 25, 2010 from
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-20/u-s-web-ads-exceed-newspaper-print-adsin-2010-emarketer-says.html.
Serafin, Tatiana. “Then There Was One: Nigeria Loses One of its Billionaires as its Two
Wealthiest Citizens Battle it out.” Forbes.com March 27, 2009; accessed March 14, 2010
from http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/27/nigeria-dangote-otedola-business-billionairesfeud.html.
Shaw, Martin. “Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach.”
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 23 no. 3 (1994): 647-667.
Shehu, Garba D. “The Role of Mass Media in National Development: A Case Study of Gaskiya

304
Ta Fi Kwabo,” M.A. Thesis, Department of Mass Communication, University of Nigeria,
Nsukka, 1991.
Shenon, Philip. “Africa's WikiLeaks.” The Daily Beast, http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogsand-stories/2010-08-12/sahara-reporters-uncovering-nigerias-corruption/2/m (accessed
October 10, 2010).
Shi, Yu. “Identity Construction of the Chinese Diaspora, Ethnic Media Use, Community
Formation, and the Possibility of Social Activism.” Continuum: Journal of Media &
Cultural Studies 19 no. 1 (2005): 55-72.
Sholle, David. “Access through Activism: Extending the Ideas of Negt and Kluge to American
Alternative Media Practice.” Javost—The Public 2 no. 4 (1995): 21-35.
Silverstone, Roger. Why Study the Media. London: Sage, 1999
Singer, Jane. “The Political J-Blogger.” Paper Presented at the Annual Convention of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Toronto, Canada,
August, 2004.
Singer, Jane B. “Changes and Consistencies: Newspaper Journalists Contemplate Online
Future.” Newspaper Research Journal 18 no.1 (1997): 2–18.
Singer, Jane B. “Still Guarding the Gate? The Newspaper Journalist’s Role in an On-line
World.” Convergence 3 no.1 (1997): 72–89.
Sobowale, Idowu I. “The Historical Development of the Nigerian Press.” In Mass
Communication Culture and Society in West Africa, edited by Frank Ugboajah. Oxford:
Hans Zell, 1985.
Sowore, Omoyele and Jonathan Elendu. “‘The House is Mine’: Sokoto Governor.” Elendu
Reports October 6 2005 (accessed April 11, 2010 from

305
http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=77&Itemid=33
).
Sowore, Omoyele/Sahara Reporters. “Exclusive and Explosive: Gbenga Obasanjo on Atiku, ElRufai, Corruption, Otta, EPZ and More.” The Nigerian Village Square, January 06, 2006;
accessed April 24, 2010 from
http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=22
41.
Sowore, Omoyele. “Gbenja Obasanjo Speaks: Atiku is Greedy.” SaharaReporters January 15,
2006; accessed April 24, 2010 from
http://www.saharareporters.com/interviews/interview-political/452-gbenga-obasanjospeaks-atiku-is-greedy-.html.
Spitulnik, Debra. “Alternative Small Media and Communicative Spaces.” In Media and
Democracy in Africa, edited by Goran Hyden, Michael Leslie and Folu F. Ogundimu,
177–205. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002.
Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle. “Globalization, Communication and Transnational Civil
Society: Introduction.” In Globalization, Communication and Transnational Civil
Society, edited by S. Braman and A. Sreberny-Mohammadi, 1-19. Cresskil:
Hampton Press, 1996.
Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle. “Small Media for a Big Revolution: Iran.” International
Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 3 no. 3 (1990): 341-371.
Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle and Ali Mohammadi. Small Media, Big Revolution:
Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota, 1994.

306
Stake, Robert E. The Art of Case Study Research. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995.
St. Jorre, John de. The Nigerian Civil War London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1972.
Starr, Amory. Naming the Enemy: Anti-Corporate Movements Confront Globalization London
and New York: Zed Books, 2002).
Stoller, Paul. Jaguar: A Story of Africans in America. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1999.
Straubhaar, Joseph D. “Beyond Media Imperialism: Asymmetrical Interdependence and Cultural
Proximity.” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 8 (1991): 39-59.
Streitmatter, Rodger. Voices of Revolution: The Dissident Press in America. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2001.
Takougang, Joseph. “Contemporary African Immigrants to the United States.”
Ìrìnkèrindò: A Journal of African Migration 2 (2003), africamigration.com.
Tal, Azran. “Resisting Peripheral Exports: Al Jazzera’s War Images on US Television.” Media
International Australia Incorporating Culture & Policy, 113 (2004): 75-86.
Teel, Leonard R. and Ron Taylor. Into the Newsroom: An Introduction to Journalism 2nd edition
Chester, Conn.: Globe Pequot Press, 1988.
The Nigerian Village Square. “About Us.” http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/about-us.html.
The Sun News. “Stanley Macebuh (1942-2010).”
http://www.sunnewsonline.com/Webpages/opinion/editorial/2010/mar/17/editorial-17032010-001.htm (accessed April 10, 2010).
The Times of Nigeria. “Delta Shares in Oceanic Not Used in Paying Ascot Loan.” April 18,
2010; accessed April 25, 2010 from
http://www.thetimesofnigeria.com/Article.aspx?id=2555.

307
The Times of Nigeria. “EFCC Continued Investigation In Delta Shows they Have No Evidence
Against Me – Ibori.” April 22, 2010; accessed April 25, 2010 from
http://www.thetimesofnigeria.com/TON/Article.aspx?id=2565.
ThisDay. “Governors Sign MoU with Harvard on Capacity Building.” ThisDay Online,
http://www.thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=144251 (accessed September 5, 2010).
Thompson, Susan. The Penny Press: The Origins of the Modern News Media, 1883-1861.
Northport, Ala: Vision Press, 2004.
Thurman, Neil. “Forums for Citizen Journalists? Adoption of User Generated Content Initiatives
by Online News Media.” New Media & Society 10 no.1 (2008):139–157.
Thurman, Neil and Susan Jones. “From Nexus to Newslog: Online Journalism from the
Grassroots.” In Print Journalism: A Critical Introduction, edited by R. Keeble,
252-263. London: Taylor and Francis, 2005.
Thussu, Daya. “Introduction.” In Media on the Move: Global Flow and
Contra-Flow, edited by Daya. Thussu. London and New York: Routledge, 2007.
TIME. “Who is Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab?” TIME, accessed April 24, 2010 from
http://www.time.com/time/photogallery/0,29307,1950292_2017642,00.html#ixzz0b8mA
vQ6n.
Tomaselli, Kenya and Eric Louw. “Alternative Media and Political Practice: The South African
Struggle.” Communication for and against Democracy, edited by Marc Raboy and Peter
Bruck, 203-220. Montreal: Black Rose, 1990.
Tony, Onyisi. “Mass Media Ethics: Analyzing the ‘Brown Envelope’ or ‘AWUFU’ Syndrome.”
In Mass Media and Marketing Communications, edited by Ikechukwu Nwosu and
Uchenna Ekwo, 79-91. Enugu, Nigeria: Thoughts Communications Publishers, 1996.

308
Turner, Graeme, ed. “Citizens’ Media.” Media International Australia Incorporating Culture
and Policy, 103 (2002), http://www.uq.edu.au/emsah/mia/issues/miacp103.html.
Turner, Terisa. “Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup.” In Soldiers and Oil: The Political
Transformation of Nigeria edited by Keith Panter-Brick, 166-197. London: Frank Cass,
1978.
Uche, Luke U. Mass Media, People and Politics in Nigeria. New Delhi: Concept Publishing
Company, 1989.
Ugboajah, Frank O. “Four Options for Press Regulation.” In Communication Training and
Practice in Nigeria: Issues and Perspectives edited by Frank O. Ogboajah, Ikechukwu E.
Nwosu and Tom Adaba, 129-140. Nairobi, ACCE, 1987.
Ugboajah, Frank O. “Nigerian Media Behavior on Development Issues of Conflict [sic].”
Instant Research on Peace and Violence 6 no. 4 (1976): 183-194.
Ugwoke, Francis. “FG Fires Security Chief over el-Rufai, Ribadu.” ThisDay, October 15, 2009.
Ujah, Emma and Peter Egwuatu. “AP Shares - Otedola Seeks N117 Billion Compensation.”
Vanguard, April 24, 2009; accessed May 14, 2010 from
http://allafrica.com/stories/200904240020.html.
Usua, N. “Citizen Media and the Future of Government-Owned Broadcast Organizations: A
Study of Radio Nigeria.” Lwati: A Journal of Contemporary Research 7 no. 2 (2010): 119.
Vanguard. “The Lies of www.pointblanknews.com: Police Report on Blackmailer Steve
Chinuwa Ogwu and Others.” August 08, 2009; accessed May 12, 2010 from
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/06/08/the-lies-of-wwwpointblanknewscom-policereport-on-blackmailer-steve-chinuwa-ogwu-and-others/.

309
Vanguard. “Drama as Alleged Ritual Murder Victim Surfaces in Court.” June 25, 2009; accessed
May 12, 2010, from http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/06/25/drama-as-alleged-ritualmurder-victim-surfaces-in-court/.
Vanguard. “Editorial: www.pointblanknews.com: Dealing with Online ‘Character Assassins’.”
June 8, 2009; accessed March 12, 2010 from
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/06/08/editorial-wwwpointblanknewscom-dealingwith-online-%E2%80%9Ccharacter-assassins%E2%80%9D/.
Vertovec, Steve. “Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism.” Ethnic and Racial Studies
22 (1999): 447–462.
Villareal, Tamara F. and Genève Gil. “Radical Internet Use.” Radical Media: Rebellious
Communication and Social Movements, edited by John D. Downing, 201-234. Thousand
Oaks, CA: Sage, 2001.
Violanti, Anthony. “Alternative News Made its Mark.” Buffalo News, November 4, 2004, p.
C1.
Warner, Michael. Publics and Counterpublics. New York, Zone Books, 2005.
Weaver, David H., Judith M. Buddenhaum, and Jo Ellen Fair. “Press Freedom, Media, and
Development, 1950- 1979: A Study of 134 Nations.” Journal of Communication 35
(1985): 104-117.
Wessler, Hartmut and Manuel Adolphsen. “Contra-Flow from the Arab World? How Arab
Television Coverage of the 2003 Iraq War was Used and Framed on Western
International News Channels.” Media, Culture & Society 30 no. 4 (2008): 439-461.
Whitaker, Brian. News Limited: Why You Can’t Read All about It. London: Minority Press
Group, 1981.

310
White, Bob W. “Talk about School: Education and the Colonial Project in French and British
Africa (1860—1960).” Comparative Education 32 no.1 (1996): 9-25.
Whitehead, Clive. “The Historiography of British Imperial Education Policy, Part II: Africa and
the Rest of the Colonial Empire.” History of Education 34 no. 4 (2005): 441–454.
Woodstock, Louise. “Public Journalism’s Talking Cure: An Analysis of the Movement’s
‘Problem’ and ‘Solution’ Narratives.” Journalism: Theory Practice and Criticism 3 no. 1
(2002): 37-55.
Woollacott, Janet. “Messages and Meanings.” In Culture Society and the Media, edited by
Michael Gurevitch, Tony Bennett, James Curran, and Janet Woollacott, 91-111. London:
Methuen, 1982.
Yahya, I.Y. Hausa a Rubuce: Tarihin Rubuce-Rubuce Cikin Hausa. Zaria, Nigeria: Northern
Nigerian Publishing Company, 1988.
Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods 4th ed. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage,
2008.
Youngstedt, Scott M. “The New Nigerien Hausa Diaspora in the U.S.: Surviving and
Building Community on the Margins of the Global Economy.” City & Society 16 no.1
(2004): 39-67.
Yu, Yeon-Jung. “OhmyNews Makes Every Citizen a Reporter.” Japan Media Review
September 17, 2003, http://www.japanmediareview.com/japan/internet/1063672919.php.
Zeleza, Paul T. “Contemporary African Migration in a Global Context.” African Issues
30 no. 1 (2002): 12-25.
Zelizer, Barbie. “Achieving Journalistic Authority through Narrative.” Critical Studies in Media
Communication 7 no. 4 (1990): 366-376.

311
Zelizer, Barbie. “Journalists as Interpretive Communities.” Critical Studies in Mass
Communication 10 no. 3 (1993), 219-237.

